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States that the Stackelberg leadership model is rarely used to describe market price determination perhaps because of the lack of a theoretical basis for selecting the minimum size necessary for leadership. Provides structural sufficiency conditions for selecting a unique Stackelberg leader based on the concept of Pareto dominance, in which the structural criterion involves the relative capacity shares of the first and second largest market rivals. Suggests that the Stackelberg price game is a viable static equilibrium construct even though the fringe firms are not atomistic. Applies the Stackelberg model to antitrust merger analysis.

Proposes a model which shows that Stackelberg competition is not necessarily welfare‐ enhancing compared with Cournot competition. Shows that, although in a simple duopoly model prices in a Stackelberg equilibrium are lower than in a Cournot equilibrium, this is not necessarily true in an entry‐deterrence framework, where post‐entry competition is Stackelberg rather than Cournot. Derives conditions under which in this framework Stackelberg competition leads to lower expected welfare, in the case where demand is linear.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the work of earlier researches relating to insider trading issues in the stock market under a Cournot‐Stackelberg duopoly.

This paper models that the competition among the insiders in the real market be Stackelberg, which reflects that for all outside and inside reasons, the position and influence of a firm may become the leader or the follower as time goes by.

The paper demonstrates that when the listed company with insiders becomes the leader in the industry, the reaction functions of insiders will change as well as the parameters of the market, to signal from real and financial sides, but the amount traded by insiders remains the same; so does the degree of information revelation. In addition, for the information revealed to the public, the stock price reveals more information with Stackelberg real‐leader model than that of the Stackelberg financial‐leader model.

The main contribution of this paper is that market makers can very well observe signals from the real side, and bringing a signal from the real side can help the stock market reveal more information, but once the signal is introduced, it may not further enhance market efficiency.

Assesses the place of Heinrich von Stackelberg in the history of ideas as reflected in the literature of economics. Uses evidence from three main sources: histories of economics, the periodical literature and doctoral dissertations to support the conclusion that Stackelberg already has an important and lasting place in the history of economic thought. Points out that the use of Stackelberg’s ideas and techniques is now as general and common as the use of those of Cournot, Walras, Pareto and Nash. Presents a short section devoted to his views on state control because these are so often misunderstood. Speculates on possible reasons why Stackelberg is not ranked more highly than he usually is.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a numerical algorithm able to describe the Stackelberg strategy for a multi level hierarchical three-person game via genetic algorithm (GA) evolution process. There is only one player for each hierarchical level: there is an upper level leader (player L0), an intermediate level leader (player L1) who acts as a follower for L0 and as a leader for the lower level player (player F) that is the sole actual follower of this situation.

The paper presents a computational result via GA approach. The idea of the Stackelberg-GA is to bring together GAs and Stackelberg strategy in order to process a GA to build the Stackelberg strategy. Any player acting as a follower makes his decision at each step of the evolutionary process, playing a simple optimization problem whose solution is supposed to be unique.

A GA procedure to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium of the three-level hierarchical problem is given. An application to a Authority-Provider-User (APU) model in the context of wireless networks is discussed. The algorithm convergence is illustrated by means of some test cases.

The solution to each level of hierarchy is supposed to be unique.

The paper demonstrates the possibility of using computational procedures based on GAs in hierarchical three level decision problems extending previous results obtained in the classical two level case.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal decision methods under a cooperative situation in two-echelon logistic models.

The authors propose the optimal strategies of exporters in the three types of rival game behaviors: Stackelberg, Collusion, and Cournot, each of which provides the optimal decision for the duopolistic shippers and the oligopolistic forwarders in each scenario.

From the empirical studies the paper finds that among three scenarios, the oligopolistic treatment of forwarders’ actions demonstrates that Stackelberg behavior can carry out the maximum profit, and Collusion game can achieve the maximum profit for the shippers.

Proposed an optimal decision methods in two-echelon logistic models.

The purpose of this paper is to find an incentive strategy to enhance the interests of the main manufacturer by inducing the suppliers to conflict the fixed incentive provided by the main manufacturer.

The main manufacturer‐supplier model is widely applied in the R&D procedure of complex products such as aeroplanes. Because of the uncertainty in the R&D, the effort of the suppliers has an important effect on it. Considering the dynamic interaction between the main manufacturers and suppliers, with the main manufacturers as leaders and suppliers as followers, this paper establishes a Grey‐Stackelberg model to analyze the best change of the incentive strategies of the main manufacturers and the effort strategies under incentive‐conflict of suppliers under the uncertain environment. A numeric example is also computed in the last part of the paper.

The results show that the main manufacturer can increase its benefit without damaging the interests of suppliers by controlling the fixed incentives.

The paper succeeds in establishing the Grey‐Stackelberg model by analysing the grey area among the main manufacturer and the suppliers, and helps to develop grey systems theory.

This paper aims to consider the problem of determining the equilibriums on oligopoly market in case of Stackelberg leader (leaders) and reflexive behavior of market agents.

This paper includes economic and mathematical modeling, optimization methods and game theory.

This paper explains models of reflexive games on oligopoly market, taking into account the diversity of agents’ reasoning about strategies of environing and equilibrium mechanisms for coincidence or opposition of agents’ reflexive reasoning on the same rank of reflection.

This paper considers the oligopoly market with linear function of demand and costs of agents, the rational behavior of agents and the reflexive reasoning on the same rank of reflection. The set of agents’ reasoning about the environing strategies is considered as a set of market states for which the problem of agent’s optimal action choosing solves with the complete awareness.

Identification of reflexive behavior of environing allows agents to increase their market shares and profit.

Oligopoly markets play a leading role in the world oil trade and reflexive behavior affects the market equilibrium.

In the paper, the mechanisms of equilibrium in reflexive games on the linear duopoly market for arbitrary rank reflection are developed.

This English translation of Heinrich von Stackelberg’s Marktform und Gleichgewicht will be welcomed by economists working in the field of industrial organisation and beyond. It has been overdue for more than 80 years. This translation will allow matters to be set straight concerning a number of fundamental theoretical issues connected to Stackelberg’s work as well as allow to clarify a number of misunderstandings that go back to the first reviews of Stackelberg’s 1934 classic on competition theory.