Search results

This English translation of Heinrich von Stackelberg’s Marktform und Gleichgewicht will be welcomed by economists working in the field of industrial organisation and beyond. It has been overdue for more than 80 years. This translation will allow matters to be set straight concerning a number of fundamental theoretical issues connected to Stackelberg’s work as well as allow to clarify a number of misunderstandings that go back to the first reviews of Stackelberg’s 1934 classic on competition theory.

In Canada, grain handling is an important agri-business that has traditionally been cooperative in nature (for example, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool). At the same time the industry is heavily regulated. There has been a dramatic change in the structure of the industry over the past 20 years and there are currently no major cooperatives present in the market. If the “yardstick effect” hypothesis of the role of cooperatives in an imperfectly competitive market is true, the disappearance of cooperatives could result in the ability of remaining firms to exercise market power over producers. To investigate the impact of changes in ownership structure in the market, we estimated two types of pricing games that might have been played between a cooperative, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP) and an investor-owned firm (IOF), Pioneer Grain (PG) in the Saskatchewan wheat-handling market over the period 1980–2004, with different assumptions about their pricing behavior imposed. We find that SWP and PG have likely been playing a Bertrand pricing game in the market over the period. We thus conclude that SWP, as the largest cooperative in the market, likely played a “yardstick effect” role in the market.

Salop and Stiglitz analyzed an equilibrium search model under a Stackelberg assumption that consumers could react to changes in the distribution of prices charged by firms even though they did not know which particular firms were charging the lowest price. In this chapter we assume that firms and consumers move simultaneously so that consumers cannot react to changes in the price distribution. We also assume that a firm cannot limit sales if demand exceeds its desired supply at the price it sets. In contrast to Salop and Stiglitz, a single-price equilibrium at the monopoly price always exists. For most distributions of consumer search costs, a range of two-price equilibria will also exist. In the two-price equilibria, the high price is always the monopoly price while the low price varies in a range above the minimum of average total cost.

This chapter explores Prospect Theory — a descriptive model of modelling individual choice making under risk and uncertainty, and its applications to a range of travel behaviour contexts.

The chapter provides background on Prospect Theory, its basic assumptions and formulations, and summarises some of its theoretical developments, applications and evidence in the field of transport research.

A body of empirical evidence has accumulated showing that the principle of maximisation of expected utility provides limited explanation of travel choices under risk and uncertainty. Prospect Theory can be seen as an alternative and promising framework for travel choice modelling (although not without theoretical and practical controversy). These findings are supported by empirical observations reported in the literature reviewed in this chapter.

The chapter provides a detailed account of the design and results of accumulated research in travel behaviour research that is based on Prospect Theory’s observations, insights and formulations. The potential of Prospect Theory for particular decision-making in travel behaviour research is articulated, main findings are presented and discussed, and limitations are identified, leading to further research needs.

In this article we design an econometric test for monotone comparative statics (MCS) often found in models with multiple equilibria. Our test exploits the observable implications of the MCS prediction: that the extreme (high and low) conditiona l quantiles of the dependent variable increase monotonically with the explanatory variable. The main contribution of the article is to derive a likelihood-ratio test, which to the best of our knowledge is the first econometric test of MCS proposed in the literature. The test is an asymptotic “chi-bar squared” test for order restrictions on intermediate conditional quantiles. The key features of our approach are: (1) we do not need to estimate the underlying nonparametric model relating the dependent and explanatory variables to the latent disturbances; (2) we make few assumptions on the cardinality, location, or probabilities over equilibria. In particular, one can implement our test without assuming an equilibrium selection rule.