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21 – 30 of 531Bin Cao, Rameshwar Dubey and Zongwei Luo
The consumers want to purchase the target products in the right place, whereas the manufacturers want to allocate their possible products to optimal distribution channels. The…
Abstract
Purpose
The consumers want to purchase the target products in the right place, whereas the manufacturers want to allocate their possible products to optimal distribution channels. The manufacturer must know how to handle itself in this business. The study aims to examine the B2B channel decision-making with different product qualities in a non-cooperative supply chain.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors develop a B2B Manufacturer-Stackelberg game as an analytical framework, combining asymmetric preference of purchase channels choice by the consumers, a continuous quality setting of the manufacturer and differential channel structure to study the manufacturer’s product strategy and channel optimisation. By horizontal comparisons across four channel structures, product variety can be classified into the differential quality-level zone through exogenous quality intervention, and the preference of manufacturers in each quality-level zone within the structures can be ranked.
Findings
Theoretically and practically, the hybrid-channel structure should be completely neglected when the direct channel dominates the retail channel. In contrast, dual-channel structures dominate single channels irrespective of the channel power, and channel preferences between high-quality and low-quality zones are stable, whereas the preference in medium-quality zone is unstable. In addition, the supply chain system cannot achieve global Pareto improvement without any additional coordination mechanism between the manufacturer and the retailer.
Originality/value
The extended results by numerical examples suggest that the bigger the area of the medium-quality zone, the more significant the product variety of the manufacturer.
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Lingcheng Kong, Ling Liang, Jianhong Xu, Weisi Zhang and Weijun Zhu
Although the wind power industry has been booming in China during the last decade, the development of wind turbine aftermarket service is still lagging behind, which seriously…
Abstract
Purpose
Although the wind power industry has been booming in China during the last decade, the development of wind turbine aftermarket service is still lagging behind, which seriously affects the operational efficiency of wind farms. If wind turbine manufacturers get involved in the aftermarket, the service pricing policy will impact the profits of both the manufacturer and the wind farm. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss an optimal service pricing strategy in the wind turbine aftermarket and design a method to improve electricity generation efficiency through service contract design. The paper aims to discuss these issues.
Design/methodology/approach
In order to decide the maintenance quantity and channel effort level, the authors design a normal Stackelberg game and an efficiency value-added revenue-sharing contract and discuss two kinds of revenue increment sharing models under situations, in which the supply chain’s leaders are the wind farm and the wind turbine manufacturer, respectively.
Findings
The results show that in either case, there exist optimal power generation revenue-sharing ratios that can maximize profit. At the same time, the authors outline an optimal service pricing policy, maintenance demand policy and channel service effort-level policy. The results summarize the influences of wind aftermarket services on wind farms’ and wind turbine manufacturers’ profit, which provides managerial insights into the process of manufacturing servitization.
Practical implications
The manufacturer’s channel effort level will influence the power generation increments very much, so the authors have developed a mechanism to stimulate the manufacturer improving the efficiency of aftermarket services.
Originality/value
Taking the power generation increment revenue as the profit increment function, the authors discuss the influence of service price on the profit increment of the wind farm and the wind turbine manufacturer and also consider the influence of service price on the wind farms maintenance quantity and wind turbine manufacturers channel effort level.
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Tengfei Nie, Hualin Liu, Yilun Dong and Shaofu Du
The existing literature has a lack of modeling of procedural fairness concerns in the supply chain level. This paper aims to investigate how procedural fairness concerns affect…
Abstract
Purpose
The existing literature has a lack of modeling of procedural fairness concerns in the supply chain level. This paper aims to investigate how procedural fairness concerns affect channel decisions, performance and coordination.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper considers a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer who have procedural fairness concerns in a classic Stackelberg game setting. The model is set in sales promotional environment. According to the existing literature, engagement is used to depict fair process. Some findings are made through analyzing respective decisions of the supplier and the retailer under the influence of procedural fairness concerns.
Findings
The results show that the channel efficiency can be improved when the retailer exhibits procedural fairness concerns, but if the aversion to unfair process exceeds a certain threshold, the retailer cannot benefit from it. Besides, the retailer profits more when he cares about distributional fairness, although the whole channel surplus can be improved by procedural fairness concerns.
Originality/value
This is the first paper to study the influences of procedural fairness concerns on supply chain decisions and channel performance. Finally, a mechanism combining a wholesale price contract with slotting allowances is proposed to coordinate the supply chain.
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James W. Bono and David H. Wolpert
It is well known that a player in a non-cooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may…
Abstract
It is well known that a player in a non-cooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that is contingent on the game’s outcome. We explore what happens when external parties – who we call “game miners” – discover this fact and seek to profit from it by entering an outcome-contingent contract with the players. We analyze various structured bargaining games among such miner(s) and players that determine such an outcome-contingent contract before the start of the original game. These bargaining games include playing the players against one another as in the original game, as well as allowing the players to pay the miner(s) for exclusivity and first-mover advantage. We establish restrictions on the strategic settings in which a game miner can profit and bounds on the game miner’s profit. We also find that game miners can lead to both efficient and inefficient equilibria.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of wholesale price discrimination by a manufacturer in a retailer–e-tailer dual-channel supply chain for different product…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of wholesale price discrimination by a manufacturer in a retailer–e-tailer dual-channel supply chain for different product categories based on their online channel preference.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain comprising of a retailer and an e-tailer engaged in competition. Game-theoretic models are developed to model the competition between the retailer and e-tailer and to derive their optimal price, optimal order quantity and optimal profit under (1) equal wholesale price strategy and (2) discriminatory wholesale price strategy. Further, a numerical example was employed to quantify the results and to capture the variation with respect to online channel preference of the product.
Findings
It is beneficial for the manufacturer to adopt a discriminatory wholesale price strategy for products having both high online channel preference and low online channel preference. However, equal wholesale price strategy is beneficial for the e-tailer and the retailer in the case of products having high online channel preference and in the case of products having low online channel preference, respectively.
Practical implications
The study helps the manufacturers to maximize their profit by adopting the right wholesale price strategy considering the online channel preference of the product when the manufacturers are supplying to heterogeneous retailers.
Originality/value
There is scant literature on the wholesale price strategy of the manufacturer considering the heterogeneous downstream retailers. This paper contributes the literature by bridging this gap. In addition, the study establishes a link between the wholesale price strategy and online channel preference of the product.
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Channel coordination has become an essential part of researching hotel supply chain management practices. This paper develops an improved channel coordination approach to…
Abstract
Purpose
Channel coordination has become an essential part of researching hotel supply chain management practices. This paper develops an improved channel coordination approach to coordinate the profit distribution between hotels and online travel agencies (OTAs) achieved through an introduction of advertising fees. This direction further improves the decentralization of cooperation and achieves Pareto improvement to achieve mutual profitability.
Design/methodology/approach
The methodology used in this study involves Stackelberg game theory employed for the decision-making and analysis of both the hotel and OTA. The OTA, acting as the leader, offers a hotel a contract specifying the commission rate that the hotel will pay to the respective OTA. The hotel, acting as a follower, sets a self-interested room rate as a given response. A deterministic, price-sensitive linear demand function is utilized to derive possible analytical solutions once centralized, noncooperative decentralization and cooperative decentralized channel occurs.
Findings
Results show that a new channel coordination approach is possible, namely via advertising fees. Prior to channel coordination, the OTA tends to set a higher commission rate, and the hotel sets a higher room rate in response under noncooperative decentralization. As such, this results in a lower channel-wide profit for all. One way to reduce channel-wide profit loss is to use a method of cooperative decentralization, which can, and will result in optimal profit as centralization takes place. However, the lack of incentives makes cooperative decentralization unfeasible. Further improvement is possible by using advertising fees based on a cooperative decentralization agreement, which can reach Pareto improvement.
Practical implications
This paper helps the OTA industry and hotel owners cooperate by way of smoother coordination. This study provides practitioners with two important practical implications. The first one is that the coordination between the hotel industry and OTA through cooperative decentralization allows for the achievement of higher profitability than that of noncooperative decentralization. The second one is that this paper solves the outstanding problem of insufficient incentives characteristic of cooperative decentralization by means of an advertising fee as a new supply chain coordination approach.
Originality/value
This paper offers both the problem and solution regarding the lack of incentives that hamper cooperative decentralization without the use of advertising fees. This paper is unique in that it derives analytical solutions regarding commissions levied in a typical hotel supply chain under noncooperative decentralization.
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Partha Gangopadhyay and Manas Chatterji
The fragmentation can either lead to an all-out civil war as in Sri Lanka or a frozen conflict as in Georgia. One of the main characteristics of fragmentation is the control of…
Abstract
The fragmentation can either lead to an all-out civil war as in Sri Lanka or a frozen conflict as in Georgia. One of the main characteristics of fragmentation is the control of group members by their respective leaders. The chapter applies standard models of non-cooperative game theory to explain the endogenous fragmentation, which seeks to model the equilibrium formation of rival groups. Citizens become members of these rival groups and some sort of clientelism develops in which political leaders control their respective fragments of citizens. Once the divisions are created, the inter-group rivalry can trigger violent conflicts that may seriously damage the social fabric of a nation and threaten the prospect of peace for the people for a very long time. In other words, our main goal in this chapter is to understand the formation of the patron–client relationship or what is called clientelisation.
David Kim Hin Ho, Eddie C.M. Hui, Tai Wing Ho and Satyanarain Rengarajan
This paper aims to examine the behavior of “rational” residential developers, under game theory, for their pricing strategy in a competitive environment.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine the behavior of “rational” residential developers, under game theory, for their pricing strategy in a competitive environment.
Design/methodology/approach
Results show that residential developers cooperate implicitly for long-term benefit, leading to a slow-down in sales. Developers are motivated to deviate from cooperating at the beginning and at the end of successive periods in a sub-market. Relatively high profits, earnable in the first few periods, provide an allowance to undercut prices and improve sales. For the last few periods, the punishment for any deviation from cooperating is insignificant or zero. Note that the first-mover advantage in a new market is evident. On the effect of uncertainty on the developer’s residential prices, results show that as uncertainty increases, prices decrease while price variability increases.
Research limitations/implications
This study highlights the merits of a uniquely simplified experimental research design for the strategic behavioral pricing of the private residential development market using a game theoretic approach.
Practical implications
This study enhances the understanding of the residential development strategy of developers in the residential development market.
Originality/value
There is limited research on pricing strategy for the private residential development market in Asia.
Details
Keywords
- Behavioural pricing
- Development and redevelopment
- Price uncertainty
- Experimental research design
- First-mover advantage
- Game theoretic approach
- Private residential development market
- Investor-developer
- Behavioral pricing
- Pricing strategies
- Game theoretic approach
- Experimental research design
- Equilibrium price
- First-mover advantage and price uncertainty
Martin Hingley, Valeria Sodano and Adam Lindgreen
The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to review the literature in order to assess the opportunities and the possible welfare effects of differentiation strategies in the…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to review the literature in order to assess the opportunities and the possible welfare effects of differentiation strategies in the food market; and second, to analyse the current structure and organisation of the fresh produce market (fruit, vegetable, and salad) in the light of new product procurement, innovation, and differentiation policies carried out by retailers at the global level.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper used a single dyadic case study across two countries (Italy and the UK): the primary producer is engaged in “partner” supply to a principal category management intermediary for channel leading multiple retailers.
Findings
First, equilibrium in differentiated markets is not stable, and a welfare assessment is difficult. Second, a differentiation strategy in the market for fresh produce might benefit retailers more than in other sectors, which seem to be consistent with the theoretical findings. Third, when retailers engage in product differentiation it is more likely that channel relationships shift from collaborative to competitive types, with the power imbalance becoming the disciplinary means by which vertical coordination is achieved and maintained.
Research limitations/implications
This article was based on a single case study.
Practical implications
For suppliers it could be wise to agree to some inequity as the cost of doing business, especially when smart large retailers carry out successfully competitive strategies with positive spill‐over effects on the upstream firms.
Originality/value
Using the industrial economic literature on the effects of differentiation strategies (horizontal and vertical differentiation) on market structure, firms' performance, and welfare effects, this paper analyses case findings from a study in the fresh produce industry and will be of interest to those within the field.
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The authors consider a dynamic emission-reduction technology investment decision-making problem for an emission-dependent dyadic supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a…
Abstract
Purpose
The authors consider a dynamic emission-reduction technology investment decision-making problem for an emission-dependent dyadic supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a retailer under subsidy policy for carbon emission reduction. The consumers are assumed to prefer to low-carbon products and formulate a supply chain optimal control problem.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors adopt differential game to analyze investment strategies of cost subsidy coefficient with respect to vertical incentive of a manufacturer and a retailer. A comparison analysis under four different decision-making situations, including decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, maximizing social welfare, is obtained.
Findings
The results show that the economic benefit and environmental pressure have a win–win performance in centralized decision-making. In four different game models, equilibrium strategies, profits and social welfare show changing diversity and have a consistent development trend as time goes on.
Research limitations/implications
The authors estimate the demand function is a linear function in this paper. According to the consumers’ preference to low-carbon products, consumer’s awareness meets the law of diminishing marginal utility like advertising goodwill accumulation. The carbon-sensitive coefficient might be a quadratic expression, which will complicate the problem and be consistent with reality.
Practical implications
It captures that there is a necessity to strengthen cooperation and exchange of carbon emission technology among the enterprises by simulation of different decision-makings when government granted cost subsidy.
Social implications
The results provide significant guidelines for the supply chain to make decision-makings of emission-reduction technology investment and relevant government departments to determine emission subsidies costs.
Originality/value
An endogenous subsidies coefficient is produced by the social welfare function. Distinguished from previous study, it also considered the influences of carbon emission trade policy and consumer preference.
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