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This paper considers the brand awareness and anchor influence on consumers' live-streaming purchases, and explores the existence of “free-riding” behavior, the comparison of brand promotion effect and active live-streaming effect and the optimal strategic combination between the brand and the anchor. The authors investigate the evolutionary stabilization strategies of the bounded rational brand and anchor, and explore the conditions for the realization of the optimal strategy. Management suggestions for the development of live streaming commerce can be provided in this paper.

Two significant models are used in this paper. The Stackelberg model is used to study the “free-riding” behavior, the comparison of brand promotion effect and active live-streaming effect and the optimal strategic combination between the brand and the anchor. Using evolutionary game theory to get the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategies and analyze the binary equilibrium strategy of the bounded rational brand and anchor. In addition, relevant simulation analysis is conducted using realistic data to verify the conclusions and for further analysis, making the conclusions of the paper have realistic significance.

The study shows that “free-riding” behavior exists and the positive effect of brand promotion is greater than that of active live-streaming. The brand and the anchor take active actions as the optimal strategy. As the sensitivity coefficient of consumers to live-streaming effort and the sensitivity coefficient of consumers to brand promotion change, various evolutionary stabilization strategies will appear. When the two sensitivity coefficients are below a certain threshold, the game sides will reach the optimal strategic combination to obtain the maximum benefits. When they rise above this threshold, it is counterproductive instead. The system achieves the optimal strategic combination when the difference factor between effort cost and promotion cost must be higher than a certain value, but when it takes the smallest possible value, the game sides tend to take active actions. This study can provide management suggestions for the sustainable development of the live-streaming model.

This paper shows that under certain conditions, the brand and the anchor can evolve into the optimal strategy to maximize the profits of both parties, which has certain practical significance for the prosperous development of live streaming commerce. In future research, the authors will consider the regulatory role of the government and construct a more realistic game model to provide constructive suggestions for the sustainable prosperity of live streaming commerce. Meanwhile, there are also games between multiple brands and multiple anchors, as well as games among brands-anchors-the live streaming platforms, and the authors will conduct more in-depth research in the future.

So far, the co-impact of anchor influence and brand awareness has not been considered simultaneously in published articles. This paper provides theoretical guidance for the behavioral choices of the brand and the anchor under the live streaming commerce, which is conducive to the prosperous development of live streaming commerce.

The consumers want to purchase the target products in the right place, whereas the manufacturers want to allocate their possible products to optimal distribution channels. The manufacturer must know how to handle itself in this business. The study aims to examine the B2B channel decision-making with different product qualities in a non-cooperative supply chain.

The authors develop a B2B Manufacturer-Stackelberg game as an analytical framework, combining asymmetric preference of purchase channels choice by the consumers, a continuous quality setting of the manufacturer and differential channel structure to study the manufacturer’s product strategy and channel optimisation. By horizontal comparisons across four channel structures, product variety can be classified into the differential quality-level zone through exogenous quality intervention, and the preference of manufacturers in each quality-level zone within the structures can be ranked.

Theoretically and practically, the hybrid-channel structure should be completely neglected when the direct channel dominates the retail channel. In contrast, dual-channel structures dominate single channels irrespective of the channel power, and channel preferences between high-quality and low-quality zones are stable, whereas the preference in medium-quality zone is unstable. In addition, the supply chain system cannot achieve global Pareto improvement without any additional coordination mechanism between the manufacturer and the retailer.

The extended results by numerical examples suggest that the bigger the area of the medium-quality zone, the more significant the product variety of the manufacturer.

Channel coordination has become an essential part of researching hotel supply chain management practices. This paper develops an improved channel coordination approach to coordinate the profit distribution between hotels and online travel agencies (OTAs) achieved through an introduction of advertising fees. This direction further improves the decentralization of cooperation and achieves Pareto improvement to achieve mutual profitability.

The methodology used in this study involves Stackelberg game theory employed for the decision-making and analysis of both the hotel and OTA. The OTA, acting as the leader, offers a hotel a contract specifying the commission rate that the hotel will pay to the respective OTA. The hotel, acting as a follower, sets a self-interested room rate as a given response. A deterministic, price-sensitive linear demand function is utilized to derive possible analytical solutions once centralized, noncooperative decentralization and cooperative decentralized channel occurs.

Results show that a new channel coordination approach is possible, namely via advertising fees. Prior to channel coordination, the OTA tends to set a higher commission rate, and the hotel sets a higher room rate in response under noncooperative decentralization. As such, this results in a lower channel-wide profit for all. One way to reduce channel-wide profit loss is to use a method of cooperative decentralization, which can, and will result in optimal profit as centralization takes place. However, the lack of incentives makes cooperative decentralization unfeasible. Further improvement is possible by using advertising fees based on a cooperative decentralization agreement, which can reach Pareto improvement.

This paper helps the OTA industry and hotel owners cooperate by way of smoother coordination. This study provides practitioners with two important practical implications. The first one is that the coordination between the hotel industry and OTA through cooperative decentralization allows for the achievement of higher profitability than that of noncooperative decentralization. The second one is that this paper solves the outstanding problem of insufficient incentives characteristic of cooperative decentralization by means of an advertising fee as a new supply chain coordination approach.

This paper offers both the problem and solution regarding the lack of incentives that hamper cooperative decentralization without the use of advertising fees. This paper is unique in that it derives analytical solutions regarding commissions levied in a typical hotel supply chain under noncooperative decentralization.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of greening and promotional effort dependent stochastic market demand on the remanufacturer's and the collector's profits when the quality of used products for remanufacturing is uncertain in a reverse supply chain.

The proposed model is developed to obtain optimal profits for the remanufacturer, the collector and the whole supply chain. Both the centralized and decentralized scenarios are considered. To motivate the collector through profit enhancement, the remanufacturer designs a cost-sharing contract. Through numerical examples and sensitivity analysis, the consequences of greenness and promotional effort on optimal profits are investigated.

The results show that the remanufacturer gets benefited from greening and promotional effort enhancement. However, a higher value of minimum acceptable quality level decreases the profits of the manufacturer and the collector. A cost-sharing contract coordinates the supply chain and improves the remanufacturer's and the collector's profits. Besides green innovation, remanufacturing mitigates the harmful effects of waste in the environment.

Two different viewpoints of remanufacturing are considered here – environmental sustainability and economic sustainability. This paper considers a reverse supply chain with a remanufacturer who remanufactures the used products collected by the collector. The quality of used products is uncertain, and customer demand is stochastic, green and promotional effort sensitive. These two types of uncertainty with green and promotional effort sensitive customer demand differs the current paper from the existing literature.

This paper aims to compare and analyze the effect of the dual-credit policy and product substitution rate on the automakers’ operational strategies under different production modes (e.g. centralized and independent), and further illustrate which production mode is more conducive to improving new energy vehicle (NEV) development.

The decision-making models for a centralized production mode where an integrated automaker produces both NEVs and fuel vehicles (FVs) and for independent production mode where an NEV automaker faces competition from a traditional FV automaker were formulated. The equilibrium solutions of each production mode were obtained by extreme value and game theory methods. The conclusions of the theoretical analysis were further verified with numerical analyses using IBM-MATLAB R2019a. Some management insights could be obtained by comparison analysis.

Under the dual-credit policy, an increase in the NEV credit trading price will always raise production quantity of NEVs, but only in an independent production mode where a higher trading price will also bring higher total profits to NEV automakers. In addition, only when the NEV credit trading price is high enough, a rising product substitution rate will be more favorable to NEV production and restrain FV production. Furthermore, an independent production mode is more favorable for the initial production of NEVs, but as each of the two vehicle types captures a certain amount of market share, a centralized production mode will be more conducive to the full replacement of FVs by NEVs.

The main contributions of this study include the formulation of decision-making models for FVs and NEVs in not only a centralized production mode but also an independent production mode. Moreover, this paper comprehensively analyzes how the dual-credit policy and product substitution relationship affect automakers’ production and pricing decisions. Then, the specific conditions under which each production mode is more conducive to NEV production and sales are summarized. The results proposed in this study provide scientific managerial insights for automakers and policy makers.

The digital economy is profoundly transforming the manufacturing industry's fundamental concepts and value creation logic, making digital transformation (DT) strategy a crucial decision for manufacturers. And faced with increasingly severe environmental issues, DT may become an important means to achieve sustainable development. This paper mainly discusses the strategic choice of the manufacturer's DT and analyzes the impact of DT on carbon emissions.

Based on the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism, the authors have constructed two decision models to study the DT strategy of the manufacturer, further exploring the impact of the mechanism on the DT strategy and production strategy of the manufacturer. Finally, the authors discussed the effect of manufacturers' DT on their carbon emissions.

The authors found that the manufacturer should initiate DT to enhance their competitiveness, regardless of whether they are in a low digital technology scenario or a high digital technology scenario. Notably, DT can enhance the ability of the manufacturer to respond to external emergencies. In a low digital technology market scenario, both carbon emissions per unit of product and carbon price are positively affecting the digitization level of the manufacturer. In a high digital technology market scenario, the manufacturer will initiate a full degree of DT. Moreover, the impact of DT on total carbon emissions varies in markets with different levels of digital technology.

Innovatively, the authors divided the DT of the manufacturer into market scenarios with low digital technology and high digital technology. Provide the manufacturer with DT decisions according to different scenarios. At the same time, it verifies the uncertainty of DT on carbon emission and enriches the related research.

In most economies, there are rules from the market regulators or government to sell at an equal wholesale price (EWP). But when one upstream channel is facing a negative demand disruption and another positive, EWP can create extra pressure on the disadvantageous supply chain partner, which faces negative disruption. The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of EWP and the scope of the discriminatory wholesale price (DWP) during disruptions.

For the study, the authors used a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, online retailer (OR) and traditional brick-and-mortar (BM) retailer. Stackelberg game is used to model the interaction between the upstream and downstream channel partners, and the horizontal Nash game to analyse the interaction within downstream channel partners. For modelling asymmetric disruption, the authors took instances from the lock-down and post-lock-down periods of the COVID-19 pandemic, where consumers flow from BM retailer to OR store.

By analysing the disruption period, the authors found that this asymmetric disruption is detrimental to the BM channel, favourable to OR and has no impact on the manufacturer. But with DWP, the authors found that the profit of the BM channel and manufacturer can be increased during disruption. Though the profit of the OR decreased, it was found to be higher than in the pre-disruption period. Under DWP, the consumer surplus increased during disruption, making it favourable for the customers also. Thus, DWP can aid in creating a win-win strategy for all the supply chain partners during asymmetric disruption. Later as an extension to the study, the authors analysed the impact of the consumer transfer factor and found that it plays a crucial role in the optimal decisions of the channel partner during DWP.

Very scant literature analyses the intersection of DWP and disruptions. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study, for the first time uses DWP as a tool to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruptions. The study findings will assist the government, market regulators and manufacturers in revamping the wholesale pricing policies and strategies to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruption.

This study aims to establish a centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model based on factors of risk aversion of supply chain members and product greenness. The research aims to study whether the introduction of the “cost + risk sharing” contract affects coordination of this type of green supply by calculating the optimal decision of each mode.

This research designs a supply chain model under centralized and decentralized decision-making. This model uses the Stackelberg game to calculate the optimal decision under decentralized decision-making to evaluate the effect of a green supply chain and then analyze the “cost + risk sharing” contract and the degree of coordination of the supply chain. A sensitivity analysis is conducted on the centralized mode for the impact of variables on the supply chain.

This research finds a double marginalization effect in decentralized decision-making, and the risk aversion coefficient plays a decisive role in the utility of supply chain members. The specific range of risk- and cost-sharing factors allows supply chain members to achieve Pareto improvements and provides decision-making based on the corresponding management strategies according to each other’s risk preference degree.

The influence of each variable on the green supply chain in the centralized mode is studied by MATLAB numerical simulation. It provides reference for green supply chain members to formulate corresponding management strategies according to each other's risk preference degree.

This research innovatively considers manufacturers and retailers to explore the market demand for product greenness. It introduces a novel “cost + risk sharing” contract to coordinate the green supply chain.

Different information sharing mechanisms and online platform information sharing to different charging models are compared and analyzed.

This paper uses the Stackelberg game model to study the demand information sharing and pricing decisions.

The results show that: (1) the retailer's pricing strategy is the highest when both of them obtain information, while the manufacturer's pricing strategy is affected by the related attributes of different products, such as the sensitivity of consumers to product prices; (2) in the online platform sales model, the demand information data sharing owned by the online platform can bring more expected profits to the whole supply chain and the members of the supply chain, and the higher the accuracy of the information, the higher the expected profit; (3) when the cost of obtaining demand information is zero, that is, the online platform shares the information data about market demand free of charge, the retailer and manufacturer tend to obtain information; (4) for the online platform, charging a certain fee can achieve higher expected profits than free sharing.

Based on the single platform online sales model, this paper uses the Stackelberg game model to study the demand information sharing and pricing decision of a manufacturer and a retailer selling products through the same online platform.

Industry practice has shown that technology licensing has an important effect on the R&D cooperation between firms. Different licensing methods will significantly impact a supply chain member's cooperative and price R&D decisions. However, there is scant literature investigating the decision on technology licensing and its impact on a supply chain member's price and cooperative R&D decisions. To address this gap, the authors investigate the R&D cooperation and the technology licensing in a supply chain formed of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), a contract manufacturer (CM), and a third-party manufacturer which will compete with the OEM when the technology licensing occurs.

The authors investigate two licensing patterns, royalty licensing, fixed fee licensing together with the no licensing, within the R&D cooperative supply chain by developing two three-stage and a two-stage Stackelberg models.

Compare to the no licensing strategy, technology licensing always benefits to the OEM and the society especially when the technology efficiency and the brand power of the third-party manufacturer are more significant; the royalty licensing benefits to the OEM more when the technology efficiency and the brand power of the third-party manufacturer are higher; the fixed fee licensing benefits to the OEM more when the technology efficiency and the brand power of the third-party manufacturer are lower.

The royalty licensing is more effective for mitigating price competition intensity and helping firms to maintain higher sales margins; the fixed fee licensing induces firms' lower sales margins but increases the firms' sales quantities; in most cases, the fixed fee licensing is optimal from the perspectives of consumer and society, however, the CM's investment intention to the R&D technology with the fixed fee licensing is lower.

So far, different licensing models under the R&D cooperation have not been investigated, and the authors propose two three-stage Stackelberg models with considering the competition caused by technology licensing under the R&D cooperation to deal with the cooperative R&D and technology licensing issues.