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Three theories of legitimacy – Dornbusch and Scott’s “Evaluation and the Exercise of authority” (EEA), Walker and Zelditch’s “Legitimacy and the Stability of Authority” (LSA), and Meyer and Rowan’s “Institutonalized Organizations” (IO) – are integrated into a single consistent theory interrelating the internal and external legitimacy processes of organizations. One consequence of IO, the decoupling of sanctions, evaluations, and performance, contradicts EEA and LSA. The contradiction is addressed by aligning the scope of the three theories, which proves to be the source of the contradiction, accommodating their principles to the change in their scope. Translating their terms into a single, consistent language, auxiliary principles are formulated that interrelate their legitimacy processes and conditionalize pressures for evaluation and control and therefore the decoupling of sanctions, evaluations, and performance – the conditions depending on type of environment, extent of dependence on it, and its organization. Integration does not alter the basic principles of EEA or IO but does correct LSA’s over-estimation of the stability of authority and provides IO with a mechanism by which and refines the conditions under which sanctions, evaluations, and performance come to be decoupled.

We provide a comprehensive synthesis and extension of the real option (RO) literature on joint ventures (JVs), contributing in three main areas. First, we examine major alternative theoretical perspectives on JVs – learning, bargaining, transaction cost and agency theory – to elaborate how they complement or contradict RO predictions. Second, we compare arguments and variables used to explain different JV stages – initial RO explicitness and equity shares, JV stability, and performance consequences – and highlight research opportunities. Third, we discuss and extend research about behavioral aspects of making RO (JV) investments. Overall, we offer new predictions and suggestions for a better integration within the RO literature, and between RO and related literatures on JVs.

This study applies asymmetric rather than conventional symmetric analysis to advance theory in occupational psychology. The study applies systematic case-based analyses to model complex relations among conditions (i.e., configurations of high and low scores for variables) in terms of set memberships of managers. The study uses Boolean algebra to identify configurations (i.e., recipes) reflecting complex conditions sufficient for the occurrence of outcomes of interest (e.g., high versus low financial job stress, job strain, and job satisfaction). The study applies complexity theory tenets to offer a nuanced perspective concerning the occurrence of contrarian cases – for example, in identifying different cases (e.g., managers) with high membership scores in a variable (e.g., core self-evaluation) who have low job satisfaction scores and when different cases with low membership scores in the same variable have high job satisfaction. In a large-scale empirical study of managers (n = 928) in four (contextual) segments of the farm industry in New Zealand, this study tests the fit and predictive validities of set membership configurations for simple and complex antecedent conditions that indicate high/low core self-evaluations, job stress, and high/low job satisfaction. The findings support the conclusion that complexity theory in combination with configural analysis offers useful insights for explaining nuances in the causes and outcomes to high stress as well as low stress among farm managers. Some findings support and some are contrary to symmetric relationship findings (i.e., highly significant correlations that support main effect hypotheses).

This paper exposes the development of markets-as-networks theory from formal inception in the mid-1970s until 2010 state-of-the-art, en route presenting its historical roots. This largely European-based theory challenges the conventional, dichotomous view of the business world as including firms and markets, arguing for the existence of relational governance structures (the so-called “interfirm cooperation”) in addition to hierarchical and transactional ones.