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This paper seeks to define a coherent management preference function for determining the conditions when the market can be effectively used in the management of spectrum based on abduction and volitional pragmatism.

Volitional pragmatism based on the logic of abduction is used to provide an explanation for real world empirical observation of few spectrum trades in the UK. This is generalized for application with wider context of European frequency management.

There has been a considerable regulatory effort directed toward spectrum trading in the EU. The UK experience with trading is clearly not what was expected. It was suggested that this is a result of an analytical approach based on deductive validationism subject to ceteris paribus assumptions. This approach does have merit but its application is over extended. This is due in large part institutional under specification of what constitutes the market and the nature of the transaction taking place.

The emphasis is in this paper is on the explanation of real world facts rather than normative prescription based on deductive validationism. Such an approach though fallible (all facts cannot be taken into account) is no less valuable in the process of regulatory decision making than deductive validationism.

This paper provides a more coherent explanation of spectrum development and the spectrum management reform process.

A set of conditions are provided for determining when the market can be used in the management of spectrum. This makes explicit the intended operation of the market as well as its limitations.

This paper seeks to examine current trends in spectrum management and implications for developing countries.

The paper summarizes the findings of an extensive review of recent literature on spectrum management. It addresses three questions: What is the case for spectrum management reform? What is the current debate on spectrum management all about? Why does this matter to developing countries?

Traditional spectrum management practice has led to technical and economic inefficiencies as well as obstacles to technological innovation. Two alternative approaches are being tried, one driven by the market (spectrum property rights) and another driven by technology innovation (commons). Practical solutions are evolving that combine some features of both. Although these changes are mainly taking place in high‐income countries, they are deeply relevant to developing countries as well.

Improving traditional administration of the spectrum in many developing countries would yield significant benefits, but governments may wish to consider moving straight into property rights or commons approaches. Countries at an early stage of building up spectrum management capacity may benefit from adopting new solutions from the start. These may be especially well suited for low‐ and middle‐income countries.

The paper offers a concise overview of major current trends in spectrum management, against which the responses of developing countries can be examined. The paper is extensively annotated and includes a selection of references, many of which are accessible online.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse some of the spectrum management policy implications of an evolving set of wireless technologies. Specially, deployment of heterogeneous networks (HetNets) as part of the rollout of long-term evolution networks and their expected use as the heart of next-generation services raises the question as to whether such networks should lead to any spectrum management policy changes.

The paper describes the use and variety of HetNets when using licensed and unlicensed or commons spectrum.

The paper demonstrates that there is little need to change current spectrum licensing regimes to deal with these networks in a licensed spectrum. However, it also shows that the deployment of HetNets other than WiFi in an unlicensed spectrum creates an information asymmetry, which means that spectrum regulators will find assessment of spectrum demand more difficult. The paper also highlights the problem facing spectrum regulators when there is a potential for interference to unlicensed services which are widely deployed but have no right to protection from interference.

Spectrum regulators will need to understand the extent to which an unlicensed spectrum is being used by mobile network operators to deliver wireless broadband services. This understanding is needed to be able to address potential interference with other services using an unlicensed spectrum and to be able to forecast spectrum demand.

The development of technologies that are designed to be used by existing mobile network operators for the delivery of wireless broadband services using an unlicensed spectrum creates novel regulatory challenges. This paper reviews some of these.

COVID-19 has influenced the way we utilise the radio spectrum in terms of increasing data rates, the localisation of usage, and the transfer of traffic from urban to rural areas. Most regulators have shown sympathy towards operator requirements, stipulating a range of mitigation actions including allowing technology neutrality and temporary assignments. Internationally, the ITU-R suspended all physical meetings and launched a new global network resiliency platform named ‘REG4COVID’ to share experiences including those related to spectrum management.

It is argued in this chapter that the pandemic has supported the calls for additional unlicensed spectrum for Wi-Fi in the 6 GHz and accelerated the rollout of 5G. Moreover, despite of increasing use of streaming, it is quite difficult to assume that traditional linear TV will be replaced, at least in the near future for a variety of reasons. The pandemic has also raised the question as to whether an innovative assignment model could be used to assign the spectrum instead of auctions, and whether, in some countries where temporary assignments were made, frequencies are kept unutilised or reserved. Concerning international spectrum management, it is expected that WRC-23 will be held on time though there will be some implications for issues such as the regulatory time-limits for bringing into use satellite networks frequency assignments. Finally, it is argued that the pandemic has also demonstrated the importance of flexibility and agility in national spectrum management, and placed spectrum managers in a new position where they were forced to be proactive instead of their traditional reactive role.

To provide an evaluation of an EU spectrum policy proposal aimed at furthering the goals of the i2010 Information Society initiative.

This paper revisits the methodology premised on neoclassical principles devised by Ronald Coase. An evaluation of EU spectrum reform based on the work of J.R. Commons is proposed.

The approach by Coase fails to take into account the need for institutional reform of the spectrum management process. The approach of J.R. Commons identifies areas that will have to be addressed if the proposals for EU spectrum reform are to be met.

The methodology advanced by J.R. Commons provides a more complete account of interdependent variables associated with spectrum management and is likely to lead to workable solutions to this complex policy problem. However, it is less theoretically coherent than Coase's model.

Recommendations for reform and problem areas are suggested that consider both market and extra‐market valuation of the spectrum resource.

This paper addresses this issue and provides an alternative model based on institutional economic analysis using the methodology given by J.R. Commons.

The European telecommunications landscape has been transformed over the past 25 years, but spectrum management has remained largely unchanged. The paper seeks to highlight the need for a more flexible approach to spectrum management and, in particular, the role of shared spectrum access.

The paper draws on a research study to examine the value of shared spectrum access, based on a review of the literature, a survey of European national regulatory authorities, and scenario analysis.

The paper highlights trends in wireless data growth and, in particular, the impact of 4G cellular mobile technology over the next five years. With pressure also growing on the licence‐exempt bands at 2.4 and 5 GHz, a more flexible approach to spectrum management will be required in future, including light licensing, de‐licensing and spectrum sharing.

The paper brings together a range of evidence to show how the current approach to spectrum management is no longer able to cope with the social and economic demands for the radio spectrum. It should be of value to policy makers, industry analysts and academics.

Recognizes significant constraints that the UK’s international obligations as a member of the International Telecommunications Union and the European Conference of Post and Telecommunications Administrations impose. States there is also a trade‐off between internationally mandated allocations, which give certainty to equipment manufacturers and states spectrum is an important input into the production of a wide range of services – from mobile telephony to national defence.

This paper aims to examine the influence of the international spectrum management regime on the introduction of flexibility in the national allocation of radiocommunication services. This is achieved through focusing on the main elements of the international regime.

A qualitative inductive methodology is adopted that examines the different elements of the international radiocommunication service allocation framework. Data are drawn from 66 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders who are actively involved in International Telecommunication Union Radiocommunication Sector discussions.

The international radio regulations (RR) are perceived to be more of a framework for harmonisation that does not constrain the flexibility of countries. Countries are only restricted on their borders with their neighbours, and flexibility is already facilitated through a range of different measures. Moreover, several elements of the RR can be used to achieve both, i.e. to promote flexibility and to restrict the decisions of others.

The international spectrum management regime is not one of the reasons for the unsuccessful practical application of the flexible spectrum property rights concept. This suggests the need for reviewing whether there still is a need for such a concept given the increasing importance of global harmonisation and economies of scales.

This paper sheds light on spectrum property rights from the perspective of the international spectrum management regime. Such a perspective is largely overlooked in the on-going current debate.

An aspect of spectrum reform receiving increasing attention is the introduction of secondary markets for spectrum in order to enable more flexibility to reassign unused and underused spectrum to users that will use it more efficiently. This paper proposes to focus on the policy issues relating to the development of well‐functioning secondary markets for spectrum.

The paper reviews developments in the debate over secondary markets for spectrum. It draws together key elements from the academic literature, various government and government‐commissioned reports, and the practical experience of the few countries that have already introduced spectrum trading. There is considerable focus on concerns and potential costs relating to the introduction of spectrum trading and liberalisation. This has a constructive aim – to draw attention to the need to address such concerns in order to facilitate the development of spectrum trading.

While there is a persuasive case for spectrum trading, countries have been slow to introduce it because of a number of concerns. This paper identifies these concerns and the regulatory framework/policies needed to address them.

The paper distils the policy issues in the debate over spectrum trading and identifies the role that regulators will need to play in the introduction, facilitation and regulation of secondary markets for spectrum.

The purpose of this paper is to characterise opportunity cost associated with the development of spectrum.

Differential Ricardian rent theory is used in the paper to explain the relationship between the development of spectrum along internal and external margins. Opportunity cost is introduced to characterise the link between spectrum and spectrum substitutes.

The study finds that workable strategies for spectrum reform require that economic externalities be internalised. Opportunity cost considerations can serve to improve spectrum management policy by justifying policy constraints and distribute the spectrum to the user with the best relative use.

Ricardian rent theory assumes that the “best” spectrum would be utilised first. In addition, there is no objective value‐based unit of spectrum and this limits the efficacy of Ricardo's theory.

The paper provides a more coherent explanation spectrum development and the spectrum management reform process.

The study provides a model for policy makers to introduce incremental change in the advent of novel wireless technologies