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Andreas Stihl AG is the world's leading manufacturer of chain saws and other outdoor handheld power equipment. Based on marketing challenges in its high-volume retail channel—mass merchants such as The Home Depot and Lowe's—Stihl's U.S. unit has narrowed its distribution system to a single channel: independent retail dealers specializing in yard maintenance equipment. This risky and highly publicized decision has proved extremely successful, raising profits, attracting more dealers into exclusive relationships with Stihl, and strengthening the brand's top-quality positioning. But Stihl management are concerned that this channel system may not fit tomorrow's demographics, dominated by homeowners from the so-called Generation X and Generation Y. The case outlines Stihl's business and channel systems and customer needs, then poses a series of questions that management believes must be answered to determine whether to maintain or move away from reliance on its specialty retailers and how to adapt its system.

To understand issues related to retail channel strategy development in fast-changing consumer markets, as well as the challenges of adapting legacy routes-to-market systems to changing consumer service output demands.

The selection of purchasing channels by wine consumers indirectly affects buying experience and satisfaction, therefore, it is of great practical significance to study consumers' preference on channel selection. The purpose of this study is to investigate the current state of consumer selection for purchasing channel and the corresponding influencing factors.

A total of 2,976 valid questionnaires were collected by convenience sampling from 34 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions of China in 2020 via the Internet, yielding a response rate of 82.2%. A categorical statistical approach was used to understand consumer's selection for each channel. Besides, binary logistic regression model was used to analyze the factors affecting consumers' channel selection.

The results show that Chinese wine consumers' main purchasing channels are as follows: supermarket/mall, wine specialty stores, comprehensive e-business flagship stores, comprehensive e-business individual stores, restaurants and short video and live streaming platforms. Estimation results showed that among the 12 influencing factors in 4 categories, consumers' education and some other factors significantly influenced consumers' decision on wine purchasing channels.

Limited by time and experimental conditions, this study did not analyze the trend of wine consumers' purchasing channel selection. Future work would concentrate on multi-year data and conduct longitudinal comparative analysis.

This study innovatively subdivides the currently popular wine sales channels in Chinese market and conducts research related to consumer channel selection. The results of the study can provide reference for wine producers and distributors to update their strategic layout and also help various channels to understand the characteristics of their customer groups for targeted marketing.

This study aims to present a general overview of the characteristics of virtual communities hosted by apparel retailers.

Content analysis was conducted on 2,521 web sites hosted by apparel retailers. Web sites of apparel retailers were identified from Stores Magazine “top 100 specialty retailers” and “top 100 retailers” listings, and Google search engine directory. Web sites were analyzed in terms of general characteristics of apparel retailers (e.g. apparel product categories, ability to purchase online, presence of brick‐and‐mortar stores). Two coders individually visited each web site and coded the contents.

A total of 13 virtual communities hosted by apparel retailers were found. Apparel retailers selling casual merchandise to the young teen market had the strongest representation. Most of the virtual communities used bulletin or message board tools. About half of the virtual communities had registration requirements and rules or membership policies. Discussion topics of community members varied.

The small percentage of apparel retailers hosting virtual communities indicates that more evidence is needed to make it a compelling case for retailers to host virtual communities. Virtual communities may be of value to marketers for consumer research and feedback.

This paper examines virtual communities of consumption hosted by companies that sell apparel products.

The purpose of this paper is to examine consumer attitudes and purchase intentions toward three major retail types within China‐department stores, independent specialty stores, and franchising/chain specialty stores. Of particular interest is perceived risk of purchase, the relative importance of frontline sales staff, trust, and the relationships among satisfaction, trust, and customers' commitment to the salesperson.

Data were obtained by a street intercept personal interview survey from 554 Chinese consumers to test hypotheses about consumer behavior and attitudinal reactions to the three types of retail store formats. Personal interviews were conducted in four urban cities, each in a different region of China. Two measures of trust were studied – affective trust and cognitive trust.

There was a difference in perceived risk in purchasing from the different types of stores, but the importance of the frontline salesperson's influence on consumers did not differ. Increased satisfaction by consumers with the salesperson leads to a higher level of both cognitive and affective trust. Intention to maintain a relationship with the salesperson is positively related to both types of trust.

This study is the first to examine three major types of retail institutions in China and how trust in retailer salespersons is linked to customer satisfaction.

A family business founded by Chinese immigrants grew into a $133 million toy and costume maker by exploiting seasonal niche segments in the highly competitive, global toy industry. Sales of traditional toys stagnated when replaced by game consoles and electronic toys. Unable to compete in high tech toys, MegaToys moved instead toward seasonal products. In 2007, brothers Peter and Charlie Woo were about to pitch what they hoped would be $63 million in Easter basket sales to Wal-Mart. If Wal-Mart took the full order, it would come to represent over half of MegaToys' revenue.

The company was faced with the dilemma of how to grow, and at what pace. Charlie Woo knew that MegaToys could continue to grow as long as it was able to satisfy Wal-Mart's demands. Peter Woo wondered if this was the smartest way to grow the business. “Growth is a good thing as long as you don't sell your shirt to get it,” he noted. Should MegaToys continue to increase its sales to Wal-Mart, or would dependence on Wal-Mart eventually threaten the firm's success? Were there other, untapped opportunities for MegaToys that were well aligned with its strengths, resources, and capabilities?

The case simulates the experience of a private equity investor evaluating a potential investment, requiring the student to: (1) determine the risks and merits of an investment in Toys “R” Us, (2) evaluate the spectrum of returns using multiple operating model scenarios, and (3) identify strategic actions that might be undertaken to improve the risk/return profile of the investment. The case also discusses trends and participants in the private equity industry.

To understand how private equity firms analyze investment opportunities through application of an LBO model (provided in the case) that summarizes returns and risks. Also, to review private equity participation in club deals, large (and early) dividends, and IPOs.

Key structural changes in the business environment have affected the basic strategic elements of the chemical industry in the last decade. These environmental changes have not run their full course and require continual attention in strategic planning in an industry that shipped $187 billion in products in 1981.

The case highlights Mike Gilliland, who built a single organic foods store in 1987 in Boulder, Colorado, into Wild Oats Markets, a chain of natural foods stores that by 2001 had annual sales of $1 billion and stores in 38 states. The case includes a history of the natural foods business and explores why Gilliland's timing was so favorable. By the 1980s, when Gilliland got started, the natural foods business had grown and matured, consisting mostly of small specialty stores selling locally grown natural foods. Although the industry was created by the California counter-culturists, it was built into a national phenomenon by the second generation of leaders, including Gilliland and Whole Foods founder John Mackey. The natural foods industry was clubby and congenial until Gilliland sought to grow his business beyond Boulder, Colorado, expanding into four states, including California. Mackey responded by moving into Boulder. Whole Foods became the nation's number one natural foods seller by the early 1990s. Whole Foods went public in 1992, and Wild Oats, in 1996. Whole Foods's success had begun to erode Wild Oats's market share, hurt sales growth, and depress the stock price. Gilliland favored taking Wild Oats in a new direction, modeled after Henry's Marketplace, a San Diego chain that Wild Oats had purchased in 2000. Henry's approach was to offer a product mix that appealed to a broader range of people than did the natural foods stores. Henry's competed effectively with Whole Foods because it had a different customer base; the stores were cheap to build if the company wanted to expand; and the company had showed sustained growth since its founding in 1943. But the Wild Oats board of directors disagreed, opting instead for continuing on the same path. The board also expressed an interest in replacing Gilliland. He now had to weigh his options and contemplate leaving the company he had nurtured for the past twenty

This case can be used to examine the importance of long-range planning. Entrepreneurs tend to be reactive; they often succeed because they seize opportunities when they become available. The ability to recognize an opportunity and to seize it is an important entrepreneurial strength, but it can prove fatal if not balanced with proactive strategic planning.

The Tanunda Winery is a made‐up company facing a series of real world wine marketing issues. It has been successful domestically, but has not really looked to the global marketplace for growth. This case focuses on the decisions a medium sized winery must face when assessing the international marketplace and deciding which countries to enter. The case provides a reasonable amount of internal data for a medium‐sized (10,000–15,000 ton) winery, including financial and cost data. The case provides a great deal of information about the Australian wine industry and four of the most important wine export markets: the UK, the US, Canada, and Japan. Students can assess the opportunities available to Tanunda Winery and engage in real world cost‐benefit analysis in deciding which and how many countries to export to.