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The purpose of this summary is to provide excerpts of selected Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) regulatory notices issued from September to November 2008.

The paper provides excerpts from FINRA Regulatory Notice 08‐54, Guidance on Special Purpose Acquisition Companies; Regulatory Notice 08‐62, Limit on Close Case Submissions; 08‐66, Retail Foreign Exchange; and 08‐70, FINRA Investigations.

Notice 08‐54: Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are shell companies that raise capital in initial public offerings (IPOs) for the purpose of merging with or acquiring an operating company. Notice 08‐62: Effective November 24, 2008, FINRA will limit the circumstances under which parties may make submissions to arbitrators in closed cases. Notice 08‐66: The retail over‐the counter foreign currency exchange (retail forex) market is opaque, volatile and risky. Broker‐dealers who engage in forex business with their retail customers must comply with the FINRA rules that apply to those activities. Notice 08‐70: FINRA is issuing this guidance to apprise firms of the circumstances in which extraordinary cooperation by a firm or individual may directly influence the outcome of an investigation.

These are direct excerpts designed to provide a useful digest for the reader and an indication of regulatory trends. The FINRA staff is aware of this summary but has neither reviewed nor edited it. For further detail as well as other useful information, the reader should visit www.finra.org

Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are created by a group of specialists to pool funds for financing future acquisitions within a specified time limit. SPACs are basically “shell” companies with no operations and business, assets or liabilities but they acquire the status of public corporations through initial public offerings (IPOs). The SPAC founders use the IPO funds to acquire a potential target. They are generally found to be successful to close an mergers & acquisitions (M&A) deal but they may not bother to ensure perpetual success of the acquired entity for a long time. In many countries, “shell” companies are characterized as the “bad boys” of the corporate world but they can be used for long-lasting successful M&As due to their inherent strengths, if they play the role of protagonists and “good guys” as SPACs. This chapter examines how SPACs can be used as special vehicles to ensure worthy and successful acquisitions to create sustainable corporations.

The purpose of this study is to extend the Fraud Diamond Theory to celebrity Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) and investigate their post-Initial Public Offering (IPO) stock market performance.

After obtaining a sample of celebrity SPACs from the Spacresearch.com database, fraud risk characteristics were obtained from Lexis Nexus searches. Buy and hold abnormal returns were calculated for celebrity SPACs versus a small-cap equity benchmark for time intervals after IPO, and multiple regression analysis was performed to examine the relationship between fraud risk features and post-IPO returns.

Celebrity SPACs exhibit Fraud Diamond characteristics and significantly underperform a small-cap stock portfolio on a risk-adjusted basis after IPO.

This study only examines celebrity SPACs that conducted IPOs on the NYSE and NASDAQ/AMEX and does not include those that are traded on the Over the Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB).

Celebrity endorsement of SPAC vehicles attracts investors who may not be properly informed regarding the risk characteristics of SPACs. Accordingly, investors should be warned that celebrity SPACs underperform a small-cap equity portfolio and exhibit significant elements of fraud risk.

The use of celebrity endorsement as a marketing device to attract investment in SPACs has regulatory implications.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the fraud risk characteristics and post-IPO performance of celebrity SPACs.

The authors examine one special focus of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), namely environmental, social and governance (ESG) related investments. The authors document the performance of SPACs with and without ESG focus.

The authors collect data, from several sources, on 1,737 SPAC IPOs formed between 2003 and 2022. A SPAC's focus on ESG is classified based on declared focus in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and in post-merger annual reports. The authors examine operational and financial performance of SPACs with and without ESG focus.

In the study's sample, only 50% of SPACs that announced an intention to acquire an ESG target ended up consummating a merger with an ESG private firm. ESG SPACs exhibit worse operating performance than non-ESG SPACs. Furthermore, they experience 11.6% lower 1-year post-merger excess returns than their non-ESG counterparts.

The study provides an examination of ESG firms that came to market via mergers with SPACs, which is an alternative method to traditional initial public offerings (IPOs). The study also provides a comparison of both operational and stock performance of ESG and non-ESG SPACs.

Purpose – We examine how the ownership and corporate governance of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) influence their short- and long-run performance.

Design/methodology/approach – By splitting our sample at the median value of different governance characteristics, we test for differences in short- and long-run performance between the low and high governance groups.

Findings – We find weak evidence of a positive influence of board independence on performance, but no indication that either managerial or institutional ownership is associated with performance.

Research limitations/implications – The study provides further evidence on the open question of how governance characteristics affect firm performance.

Originality/value – We describe the unique conflicts that exist within a SPAC, and the recent evolution of their organizational structure in response to these conflicts.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the Securities and Exchange Commission's recently proposed amendments to Rule 10b‐18 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that are intended to modernize Rule 10b‐18 to reflect changes in the market since the Rule's adoption.

The paper provides an overview of Rule 10b‐18, which provides an issuer that is buying its own stock a safe harbor from liability for market manipulation if the issuer satisfies the purchase, timing, price and volume conditions defined in Rule 10b‐18. It outlines the proposed amendments to the timing condition, price condition, limitation on disqualification, and the time in which the safe harbor is available in connection with an acquisition by a special purpose acquisition company.

The proposed amendments are intended to modernize Rule 10b‐18 to reflect changes in the market since the Rule's adoption.

The proposed amendments to the price condition and the disqualification provisions will likely be welcome by issuers and brokers who have been challenged by the evolution of market practices and technology, but the amendments to the timing condition and the restrictions on SPACs could result in fewer opportunities for issuers to purchase their own shares under the safe harbor.

The paper provides practical guidance from experienced securities lawyers.

The purpose of this paper is to study how institutional characteristics of specified purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are related to their post-merger survival. SPACs are unique financial firms that conduct the initial public offering (IPO) with the sole purpose of using the proceeds to acquire another private company. The paper finds that institutional characteristics of SPACs are important in determining post-merger outcomes of new company, specifically when it comes to their survival/failure, i.e., increases in pre-merger commitment by SPAC stakeholders and initial positive market performance increase post-merger survival likelihood; on the contrary, mergers with higher transaction costs and focused on foreign companies exhibit increased likelihood of failure.

Using unique sample of companies conducting an IPO, namely, SPACs, with the sole purpose to execute an acquisition in the future date within limited time, this paper presents additional evidence on the survival and acquisition frequency of IPOs, and determinants of these choices.

Observing unique set of specified purpose companies, this paper documents that SPACs’ failure rate is at the level of 58.09 percent, higher than any previously reported failure rate in the post-IPO survival literature and comparable only to failure rates found by Hensler et al. (1997) at 55.10 percent for general companies. In addition, the paper documents similar findings to Bhabra and Pettway (2003) that prospectus and market characteristics of original companies have predictive power with respect to survival.

This study extends the literature on post-IPO survival in following ways. First, the paper documents survival rates for unique set of companies organized with the sole purpose to acquire another company. Second, the paper presents evidence on how institutional characteristics of SPAC determine their post-merged outcomes, specifically when it comes to their failures. Finally, paper contributes to the scant literature on SPACs providing new evidence on their post-merger outcomes and performance.

This paper aims to explain the fundraising and valuation processes of startups and discuss the conflicts of interest between entrepreneurs, venture capital (VC) firms and stakeholders in the context of startup corporate governance. Further, this paper uses the examples of WeWork and Zenefits to explain how a failure of stakeholders to demand an external audit from an independent accounting firm in early stages of funding led to an opportunity for fraud.

The methodology used is a literature review and analysis of startup valuation combined with the Fraud Triangle Theory. This paper also provides a discussion of WeWork and Zenefits, both highly visible examples of startup fraud, and explores an increased role for independent external auditors in fraud risk mitigation on behalf of stakeholders prior to an initial public offering (IPO).

This paper documents a number of fraud risks posed by the “fake it till you make it” ethos and investor behavior and pricing in the world of entrepreneurial finance and VC, which could be mitigated by a greater awareness of startup stakeholders of the value of an external audit performed by an independent accounting firm prior to an IPO.

An implication of this paper is that regulators should consider greater oversight of the startup financing process and potentially take steps to facilitate greater independence of participants in the IPO process.

Given the potential conflicts of interest between VC firms, investment banks and startup founders, the investors at the time of an IPO may be exposed to the risk that the shares of the IPO firms are overvalued at offering.

This study demonstrates how startup practices can be extended to the Fraud Triangle and issue a call to action for the accounting profession to take a greater role in protecting the public from startup fraud. This study then offers recommendations for regulators and standards entities.

There are few academic papers in the financial crime literature that link the valuation and culture of startup firms with fraud risk. This study provides a concise explanation of the process of valuation for startups and highlights the considerations for stakeholders in assessing fraud risk. In addition, this study documents an emerging role for auditors as stewards of proper valuation for pre-IPO firms.