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Special and differential treatment (SDT) in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has failed to integrate developing countries into the international trading system, as contemplated by the WTO Agreement, itself. This paper aims to interrogate the current application of SDT by WTO members as the possible undermining factor for SDT not delivering on its objective.

The research uses a qualitative legal methodology. This study conducts desk analysis of primary legal materials and existing literature to assess current reflections of SDT and draw lessons for reforms in the WTO.

From interrogating current SDT practice in the WTO and a comparative analysis with a similar differential treatment under the Montreal Protocol, this paper finds that indeed, the problem lies in the current approach to SDT application in the WTO. This study finds that the existing absence of eligibility criteria for determining access to SDT by countries is the core reason for the abuse and sub-optimal outcome from its application.

While making a case for a rules-based approach to differentiation in the WTO, this paper proposes a unique methodology for differentiating between developing countries for SDT, including the use of a composite indicator to ensure that indicators that are used sufficiently reflect their heterogeneous needs. Drawing inspiration from Gonzalez et al. (2011a), this study introduces an adaptation for selecting a threshold for graduation. Specifically, the proposal on the value of the standard deviation of countries from the weighted mean of the composite indicator as the threshold for graduating countries from SDT is novel.

As the US-China conflict intensifies, the United States is pursuing a ‘decoupling’ strategy to build a new world trade order, arguing that the current World Trade Organization (WTO) system does not properly regulate China's non-market economic system. The WTO provides special and differentiated treatment (S&DT) for developing countries. The United States argues that China should give up its developing country (DC) status. Sufficient research on the DC status and S&DT has not been conducted as a means of resolving the US-China conflict. Decoupling means the collapse of the global supply chain (GSC), which will bring substantial shock to the global economy and a catastrophe for China. This paper examines the re-classification of DC status and S&DT in the context of US-China conflict and seeks an approach for China to avoid decoupling and coexist with the United States. It would be an optimal way for China to revive the WTO first and to improve its economic system through negotiations under the WTO.

This paper is prompted by the dissatisfaction of developing countries regarding the grant of special and differential treatment (SDT) under the legal framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As a result of such dissatisfaction, the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations explicitly called for a review of such treatment with a view to making it more precise, effective and operational. This mandate has not yet been met to the satisfaction of many developing countries. This paper aims to provide an alternative way of examining and evaluating the contestation which exists regarding SDT in the WTO.

This paper uses the conceptual framework provided by the economic contract theory and in particular, the concept of the incomplete contract to provide a scaffold for analysing SDT. This approach is intended to offer insights beyond those elucidated so far in the literature on the topic.

This paper, by using an economic contract theory approach, finds that SDT is constructed as an incomplete contract. Furthermore, the suboptimal outcomes associated with incomplete contracts are apparent in the constitution of SDT. This finding is useful in both an evaluative and programmatic sense, providing us with an alternative entry point to explain some of the shortcomings with SDT, as well as garnering us with a useful conceptual tool to think upon how SDT can be improved.

The paper contributes to the literature on SDT within the WTO in particular and differential treatment in international law in general. Drawing on literature on the WTO as an incomplete contract, the paper provides an original frame for analyzing SDT and draws attention, in particular, to the utility of the economic contract theory as a programmatic and evaluative frame for SDT and differential treatment more generally.

One of the important goals of trade facilitation is to lower the costs of trade that serve as a barrier to the developing countries from enjoying the benefits of increased trade and becoming integrated into global supply chains that account for nearly 60 percent of global trade today. The high trade costs that are plaguing most developing countries is mainly incurred from the lack of adequate trade-related infrastructure and low quality of institutions that hinder the efficient flow of goods across and within borders. Therefore, the trade facilitation rules that are contained in FTAs among bilateral trading partners are inevitably aimed at deepening their participation in the global value chain network. However, an observation of the FTAs concluded by Korea and the trade facilitation rules contained therein shows that the current trade facilitation rules in bilateral FTAs may be of little practical use for countries that lack the capacity to be involved in the international production activities in the first place. From the development perspective, the current WTO negotiations on trade facilitation which take full account of the special and differential treatment needs of the less developed country members appear more likely to contribute to providing the trading environment that is free from the barriers to trade that have inhibited the less developed countries from integration into the global supply chains and the benefits thereof.

At its inception, the Doha Round offered the hope of a more inclusive World Trade Organisation (WTO); one where developing countries in particular envisioned would allow them the policy space to enable their socio‐economic advancement even as they carried out their obligations as Member States of the rules‐based international trade system. While the rewards of this novel development round are awaited, WTO Member States are making a marked shift away from the foundation principles of multilateralism on non‐discriminatory treatment, and pursuing independent trade deals outside the rules. An emerging acceptance of this shift comes with an idea that countries can converge after divergence – that alternatives to multilateralism can still yield agreements that will operate in a multilateral rules‐based framework, post Doha. To this end, this article reviews the challenges facing the Doha negotiations as it pertains to developing country concerns and the shortcomings of the existing development framework. It critically examines the issues arising from the stalemate of the Doha negotiations and the efforts of the international trading system to continue engaging in trade in the face of globalisation, increasing unemployment, decreased wages and living standards in the backdrop of a global recession. It examines the emerging convergence theory which recognises departures from the uniform trading arrangements under multilateralism, without recognising this as a tacit acceptance of a return to protectionism with its consequences. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

Reference is made to primary and secondary research material on the subject including WTO rules and agreements.

The article finds that the stalemate in this Doha Round reveals more than just dissatisfaction between Member States on the nature and scope of the rules that must guide their global trading activities. It reveals the fragility of rules and the potential inefficacy of a system that attempts to regulate nebulous activity – trade in the face of divergent needs and concerns.

The research is library/desk based.

This work is an original contribution and is not under consideration elsewhere.

Posits that trade in agriculture constitutes the main element of the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations, with the World Trade Organisation, which has a conclusion date of 1 January 2005. Acknowledges that liberalization of trade in this sector was the prime reason why developing countries joined the WTO. Reckons that developed countries resist mounting pressure of decisive moves towards agricultural improvement, during the trade negotiations, by trying to protect their own agricultural sectors from foreign competition.

This paper aims to investigate whether the practice of self-designation of developing country status in the World Trade Organization (WTO) risks irrelevance of the institution, having regard to legitimacy concerns and evolving trade policy considerations.

The methodology of this paper involves the application of critical analysis to assess the utility of regime overhaul vis-à-vis a detailed recalibration of the status quo; included in this are key examinations of whether the introduction of a definitive classification criteria will alleviate present challenges as well as critiques of alternative target-specific schemes.

This paper suggests that an ideal approach to the controversies surrounding self-designation steers away from pure income-based indicators to arrive at targeted special and differentiated treatment allocation. Such a framework anchors itself on principles of nuanced differentiation that support depoliticization and facilitate capacity building in developing countries.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper represents an original evaluation of the possible reforms available to the WTO concerning the present status and functionality of the mechanism underpinning the practice of self-designation of developing country status.

The aim of this paper is to critically analyse the trade preferences offered by the European Union (EU) to developing countries under the Cotonou Agreement and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in relation to trade in sugar. There is a need for a timely examination of this area, given the context of the ACP‐EU Economic Partnership Agreements and the recent termination of the ACP‐EU Sugar Protocol (SP).

The paper focuses on the Caribbean region as a whole with a particular focus on two non‐least developed ACP Caribbean countries, Guyana and Jamaica which held the largest sugar quotas among ACP Caribbean which benefited from the SP.

The EU trade regime changes have affected the value of the African‐Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) sugar trade regime and could have a serious impact on the amount of sugar available for purchase on the global market. The paper argues that ACP Caribbean countries could find more profitable to grow sugarcane as an agricultural commodity to produce biofuel, which is currently in high demand.

The analysis in this paper is limited to the arrangements pertaining to developing countries and therefore excludes those relating to least developed countries. Trade in more highly processed sugars such as fructose or glucose, together with the growing trade in biofuel refined from sugar beet and sugar cane are also outwith the scope of this discussion.

The paper deals with an intricate issue. It discusses the socio‐economic impact of the trade regime changes on the selected Caribbean countries and includes a section on recommendations given the economic weight of sugar for these countries.

Radio frequency identification (RFID) provides a useful tool for the prescreening or detection of goods and containers moving across the border and for controlling the trade of illicit materials and preventing or mitigating the effects of terrorism. Although anti-terrorism measures are important in today’s dangerous world, RFID tools, if misused, may violate the WTO trade rules. Whenever goods or container control measures using RFID are proposed, their contents, objectives, and rationale must be published, and WTO members must be notified through the WTO Secretariat and allowed to make comments. WTO members should not take such measures that are designed or applied in a discriminatory manner and those measures must be adopted only under necessary situations and to the extent necessary. These measures must reduce the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities, and there should not be substantial penalties for minor breaches of the requirements under the measures. If the measures require country-of-origin information in RFID tags, they must apply in the same way to like products, and they must not cause unnecessary inconveniences or unreasonable cost. If the measures deal with containers in international transit, they must be reasonable, consider the conditions of the traffic, and guarantee transit through the most convenient routes for international transit.

A container control measure designed to restrict the flow of fissionable materials or their derivative materials, traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war, or traffic in military supply goods and materials may be justified, even if it violates some of the GATT rules. In addition, a measure established in time of war or other emergency in international relations or based on the United Nations Charter and designed to maintain international peace and security can also be justified. As a last resort, WTO members may request a waiver from GATT and TBT Agreement obligations for container control measures that include RFID.

Superpowers must be careful not to use RFID to practice power politics and create regulations to deal with national security and anti-terrorism issues that do not conform to international law. The key question is how to maintain a balance between the two inalienable values of free trade and national security in this era of globalization, harmonization, and terrorism .

Discussions on the appropriate international regime to govern trade in biofuels are in their infancy. However, a large number of countries have set minimum blending targets for biofuels. Meeting these targets will require greater production and increased international trade in biofuels. Concerns exist as to whether unsustainable practices will be used to satisfy this growing demand. There is currently no multilateral agreement governing sustainable production and trade in biofuels. In the absence of an international framework, this paper will seek to demonstrate that concerned countries may unilaterally regulate imports of unsustainably produced biofuels in a way that is consistent with international trade rules. Unilateral regulation is to be understood as a stop gap until multilateral agreement can be reached on the interaction between trade in biofuels and issues of sustainability.