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The purpose of this paper is to examine the propensity of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) for shareholder activism and their potential impact on corporate governance.

The study highlights the relationships between SWFs and corporate governance and also applies eight antecedents/determinants of institutional activism to analyze whether SWFs have a predisposition for shareholder activism.

The study only finds two instances of SWF activism. Additionally, it finds that despite their mostly passive investments, SWFs possess a natural tendency toward shareholder activism. Some are more likely to engage in activism than others, however. SWFs with a higher proportion of their assets invested in equities, those with portfolios fully or partially constructed to emulate the broader financial markets through indexing, and those that depend less on external fund managers are the likeliest candidates for activism. The study also finds that the regulatory environment can curb the natural SWF inclination for activist behavior.

Due to the lack of transparency within the SWF universe, this study largely depends on the limited data available for sovereign wealth funds.

Given the growing importance of SWFs, managers, directors, and policymakers must assess SWF activism, its influence on corporate governance, and its implications for public policy deliberations.

This project, to the best of the author's knowledge, is the first study that applies tested financial models to SWFs in order to determine if they have inherent activist tendencies.

This paper aims to investigate the idea of building responsible borrowing and lending into sovereign wealth fund (SWF) decision-making. SWFs, which currently manage US$8 trillion in assets, are influential institutional investors, but their role in sovereign debt markets needs to be further explored. In this context, this paper aims to critically assess the linkages and convergences between the Santiago Principles on SWF and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) principles on responsible sovereign lending and borrowing.

This paper draws on legal scholarship, reports, policy papers and other open-source data to explore the role of SWFs in sovereign lending, borrowing and debt restructuring.

Building responsible borrowing and lending into SWF decision-making is feasible and justified on the grounds of both ethics and public duty. It is also justified in financial terms because it would protect SWFs from irresponsible lending and borrowing practices at the micro level while contributing to global financial stability at the macro level.

This is the first comprehensive study to juxtapose two important normative processes, the Santiago Principles and the UNCTAD Principles.

The purpose of this paper is to explore and evaluate the main segments of existing empirical literature related to Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) and provide a thorough investigation of their research questions, theoretical frameworks, data selections and research methodologies.

The literature on SWFs has been split into three main streams: qualitative studies with theoretical contributions aiming to conceptualize the phenomenon of SWFs; normative assessments of the optimal asset allocations of SWFs; and empirical works that aim to investigate different perspectives of SWFs. The paper attempts to review the state of existing literature relating to these areas by answering specific questions.

Despite their significant size and potential impact, the literature on SWFs seems to be still in its infancy. The paper collects insights from previous literature, addresses its difficulties and challenges.

The characteristics of the previous empirical literature and the challenges facing this line of research offer an insightful thought for the future research works in this topic.

The paper offers a thorough assessment of the existing empirical research on SWFs and shade some light on the techniques and procedures used.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a model of the Islamic sovereign wealth funds (ISWFs) based on Islamic finance principles to modify the precarious image of SWFs from Muslim countries. The Shariah laws are the cardinal direction for this study.

The authors applied a qualitative research technique that consists of three approaches: exploratory case study approach to critically examine and rank the existing status of SWFs; descriptive analysis; and content analysis to present a model of ISWFs in comparison of conventional SWFs.

The authors propose a model of the “Islamic Sovereign Wealth Funds” based on four key pillars: the major Shariah principles; the Islamic corporate governance framework; the Islamic transparency and disclosure framework; and the Islamic corporate social responsibility framework. Furthermore, the authors argue that the potential effect of the ISWFs on Islamic finance and economy will be positive.

The model is an initial work and idea to convert SWFs from Muslim countries into ISWFs, which required an in-depth policy review by governments.

The findings of the paper are useful for policymakers and governments of the Muslim countries to overcome the issues and criticism on SWFs by converting them in ISWFs.

This paper contributes to the literature related to Islamic finance and sovereign wealth fund by presenting a first model of ISWFs for Muslim countries.

This paper aims to systematically review all available evidence on the implications of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) for various stakeholders (recipients of sovereign investment, home countries, which incorporate SWFs and the world at large) and offer future research directions.

A systematic literature review (SLR) technique is used to review 102 handpicked articles for the period 2005‐2019.

This review reveals that the literature on the impact of SWFs emerged only during the financial crisis of 2008–2011 and much of it is qualitative in nature. The literature is lopsidedly focused on the impact of SWFs on target firms and there has been a limited empirical investigation of the impact on other stakeholders. There is a lack of consensus in several areas, which calls for additional research. Few areas, which have not been addressed in the literature and can be taken up by future researchers include the impact of SWFs on macroeconomic fundamentals and stock markets of recipient countries, especially emerging economies; implications of SWFs for alternative asset classes; impact on the welfare of citizens and internationalization strategies of home countries; impact on initial public offerings and unlisted corporations; and impact on innovativeness, efficiency and corporate governance practices of target firms.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to use the SLR technique to review the literature on SWFs. It considers the impact of SWFs on all stakeholders and covers both qualitative and quantitative literature published over a long period of 2005‐2019. It also systematizes all available evidence on this theme and identifies important research gaps, which may be helpful for academicians, practitioners and policymakers.

The purpose of this paper is to critically discuss the participation of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes. Sovereign wealth funds in emerging economies are often involved in corporate social responsibility. However, the 1 Malaysian Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal illustrates the possible use of SWF as a vehicle for corruption and abuse.

The primary objective is to develop good governance practices of CSR by SWFs that could limit corrupt practices. A case study approach is adopted to investigate the CSR involvement of two SWFs – Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) and Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD).

The finding shows that SWFs should not be directly involved in CSR. It is proposed that independent Non-government Organisations (NGOs), through a competitive funding model, could serve the CSR purpose of SWFs more effectively and bring socio-economic changes in emerging economies.

The funding model identifies the expected outcomes, priorities and uses of the funds. The funding committee should also be independent of the Board and transparent in its allocations.

Over the last two decades global cross‐border investment has increased. State‐owned and managed, sovereign‐wealth funds (SWFs), largely from the emerging‐market economies, have started playing a decisive role in underpinning, sustaining and expanding financial globalization. This paper aims to provide the reader with basic conceptual strands on the SWF, their genesis, coming into prime and recent spurt in their operations.

The paper focuses on defining SWFs and tracks their origin and growth. It explores the present and future market size of SWFs and examines the ramifications of this group of large institutional investors. It also answers the query whether anxieties about their operations are exaggerated and attempts to provide answers regarding some of the prickly policy questions.

The paper finds that, although they are an instrument of enhancing liquidity and financial resource allocation in the international capital market, they have become a source of controversies and threaten and escalation in financial protectionism.

The paper focuses on the concept of SWFs and the recent spurt in their activities and significance.

The purpose of this paper is to address a research gap by providing a comprehensive survey of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as international institutional investors and clarifying the definition of SWFs. By doing so, this paper aims to provide a balanced set of policy prescriptions towards SWFs.

This paper conducted a comprehensive survey of world major 24 SWFs with assets under management of 500 million USD between 2008 and 2012. Key dimensions include objectives, funding and governance, asset allocation and investment activities.

SWFs are planning institutions with management direction. They present great variety in terms of funding mechanism, governance, asset allocation and investment strategies, but they in essence pursue financial returns. It is not evident that SWFs are primarily motivated by political objectives and distinctively different from other international institutional investors. Difficulty in interpreting SWFs should not lead to the imposition of constraints on SWFs.

More in-depth and dynamic analysis of SWFs requires better data access. For such a purpose, case studies and longitudinal studies should be adopted, with particular emphasis on comparing SWFs with different types of financial institutional investors as well as typical state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and multinational enterprises.

This study is trying to demystify SWFs based on a comprehensive survey. As a result, this paper may assist investors, policy-makers and regulators to gain a better understanding of SWFs, their investment behaviours and rationales behind.

SWFs like other long-term capital is important for economic and job growth. To attract long-term investments, creating an open, unbiased and welcoming investment environment is the key.

The contribution of this paper is that we provide a deeper understanding of the strategy and empirics of SWF operations. First, after a clearer definition of the phenomenon of SWFs, we can explain their investment strategies and behaviour as firms. Second, we can derive rational policy prescriptions, and third, we can propose a research agenda that will further deepen our understanding of SWFs and the appropriate policy prescriptions.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in sustaining global economies. The subject of SWFs has increasingly garnered the concerns of policymakers, market players and scholars for two main reasons: First, these funds represent the largest concentration of capital that the world has ever known, with the Arabian Gulf SWFs becoming increasingly important global players, especially during the most recent financial crises. Second, there is the dominant role of national governments in the management of these colossal funds. This paper assesses the contrasting perspectives on SWFs and analyzes the role they can play in sustaining the global economy by engaging in foreign direct investment.

Both descriptive analysis and comparative analysis are used.

SWFs are large and tend to be long‐term investors and have characteristics that are compatible with foreign direct investment (FDI). There is a role for them in sustaining the global economy via FDI. This analysis suggests that only 11 percent of SWFs' investment in FDI is needed in order to counteract the forecast decline of FDI. Initiatives such as the recently established Santiago principles can help to allay the concerns of host and investor nations. This paper concludes that SWFs should be welcomed by market players and policy makers as tools of economic growth.

Current trends indicate that SWFs are playing an important role as a source of foreign investment, and are also reducing the impact of liquidity pressures in the international banking system. The main driving force of their investing in the global market is in securing higher returns. However, there has been unease among Western countries that have concerns that governments could use SWFs to seize control of strategic companies in sensitive sectors, for their own purposes.

The paper assesses the potential contribution of SWFs to FDI and highlights aspects related to fostering a code of conduct that can allay concerns around areas such as transparency, and the extent to which restrictions should be imposed by host governments.

The purpose of this article is to assess strategies available to recipient states for managing the putative risks posed by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the context of global, liberalized, and capital markets.

The paper employs a game theory analysis in assessing these risks. Four basic scenarios are outlined whereby recipient states may interact with SWFs: “unselfish recipient state – unselfish SWF” (Option 1); “unselfish recipient state – Selfish SWF” (Option 2); “Selfish Recipient State – unselfish SWF” (Option 3); and “Selfish Recipient State – Selfish SWF” (Option 4).

In the light of this analysis, and the balance of risks which the authors perceive recipient states are exposed to in practice, the authors claim that recipient states ought, rationally, to adopt a selfish regulatory strategy irrespective of the strategy which SWFs adopt in practice.

This claim does not deny the importance of voluntary international measures – such as the “Santiago principles” – in the way SWFs are regulated. Rather, it seeks to show that according to a game theory analysis, and an attempted application of that analysis in practice, undue reliance by recipient states on international “soft law” regulatory initiatives to regulate SWF activity (which constitutes the current international consensus) is strategically unwise.