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This article combines two sources of data to shed light on the nature of transactional legal work. The first consists of stories about contracts that circulate among elite transactional lawyers. The stories portray lawyers as ineffective market actors who are uninterested in designing superior contracts, who follow rather than lead industry standards, and who depend on governments and other outside actors to spur innovation and correct mistakes. We juxtapose these stories against a dataset of sovereign bond contracts produced by these same lawyers. While the stories suggest that lawyers do not compete or design innovative contracts, their contracts suggest the contrary. The contracts, in fact, are consistent with a market narrative in which lawyers engage in substantial innovation despite constraints inherent in sovereign debt legal work. Why would lawyers favor stories that paint them in a negative light and deny them a potent role as market actors? We conclude with some conjectures as to why this might be so.

Purpose – Study the investment and risk management approach of sovereign wealth funds when national wealth including natural resources is accounted for rather than only financial asset.

Methodology/Approach – Using a range of widely used asset classes, we simulate sovereign wealth fund returns when considering only financial assets but also under varying levels of national wealth holdings in oil. We optimize two-asset financial portfolios and three-asset portfolios when including oil to maximize the risk-adjusted returns.

Findings – Sovereign wealth funds by failing to invest for the national wealth portfolio are overlooking a major source of volatility. To reduce the level of volatility associated with yearly national wealth returns, allocating a higher percentage of fixed assets to high-quality fixed income and low-risk equities will maximize the risk-adjusted returns of national wealth for sovereign wealth fund states.

Social implications – By focusing solely on the financial assets managed by sovereign wealth funds, states are exposing themselves to significant national wealth risk.

Originality/Value of the paper – This is the first work to estimate the impact on national wealth of oil-dependent states by failing to account for volatile commodity prices through the investment strategies of sovereign wealth funds.

The study examines the joint effect of sovereign and call risks on the duration of callable sovereign bonds over the period 1996–2011. The results indicate that the sovereign risk-adjusted duration is significantly shorter than its Macaulay counterpart for U.S. dollar-denominated investment-grade callable sovereign bonds. Further, the “shortening” effect of sovereign and call risks on duration is generally stronger among bonds of lower ratings. Similar results are obtained when CDS prices are used as a proxy for changes in sovereign risk. Results from this study emphasize the importance of considering the joint effect of sovereign and call risks in managing the interest rate risk exposure in fixed income investments.

The social protests on the streets of indebted sovereigns in crises across the Eurozone have made debt restructuring an imperative. Further delay in achieving this expeditiously and equitably significantly exacerbates the social costs of crises from which current and future generations will struggle to recover. This article examines the feasibility of the drastic and widespread debt restructuring needed to resolve the problem in the face of existing private law sanctions that protect individual creditor rights. It relies on an analysis of US policy in the transition to a securitized market and of key sovereign debt cases to reveal the historical contingency of private law protections. It concludes by showing that the effectiveness of private law protections have always been constrained by the overriding imperative to achieve debt sustainability with negotiated and consensual workouts. This can be achieved in the Eurozone with statutory constraints on enforcement action pending the settlement of debt workouts as suggested in a recent proposal.

This is an essay that will be misinterpreted. Before I even mention genocidal rights, I want to make clear what my argument is not. First, my argument is not that genocide has not happened or does not continue to happen. Second, I will not suggest that genocide is not a serious crime. Finally, I will not try to develop a theory of victimhood – to challenge the centrality of the victim in discussions of genocide. Rather, my interest here will be the uncomfortably intimate relationship between genocidal violence on the one hand and the elaboration of civil, sovereign, and human rights on the other.

In October 2020, Zambia failed to make a $42.5 million interest payment on $1 billion in Eurobonds maturing in 2024, becoming the first African country to default on its debt obligations in the aftermath of COVID-19. Zambia's default highlights the fragmented nature of governance in sovereign debt markets. The Zambian default also underscores the continuing impact of colonial hangover in former colonies in Africa. Fragmented governance and colonial overhang create incentives for both debtors and creditors that contribute to cycles of sovereign debt. These cycles of debt pose a particular hazard to residents within countries that issue such debt. In African contexts, this has led to flows of funds for debt repayment that may significantly jeopardize the well-being of people who are already poor. Zambia's default also reflects the increasing need of African countries to navigate among different external actors, particularly China, which has given loans throughout Africa for varied projects, including infrastructure lending as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. The Zambian default draws attention to the significant amount of Eurobond debt African countries have incurred in recent years and the burdens that such debt may impose. The circumstances of Zambia's default, as well as recent disputes about external debt in Mozambique, reflect continuing issues about transparency and public scrutiny of sovereign debt transactions and the broader societal impact of debt internally within African countries and in relations between African countries and varied external powers.

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the young, but rapidly growing sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market, describes the function, trading, history, market participants, key statistical and stylized facts about CDS prices, determinants, price discovery, and risk issues.

The recent financial and sovereign debt crises around the world have sparked a growing literature on models and empirical estimates of defaultable debt. Frequently households and firms come under default threat, local governments can default, and recently sovereign default threats were eminent for Greece and Spain in 2012–2013. Moreover, Argentina experienced an actual default in 2001. What causes sovereign default risk, and what are the escape routes from default risk? Previous studies such as Arellano (2008), Roch and Uhlig (2013), and Arellano et al. (2014) have provided theoretical models to explore the main dynamics of sovereign defaults. These models can be characterized as threshold models in which there is a convergence toward a good no-default equilibrium below the threshold and a default equilibrium above the threshold. However, in these models aggregate output is exogenous, so that important macroeconomic feedback effects are not taken into account. In this chapter, we (1) propose alternative model variants suitable for certain types of countries in the EU where aggregate output is endogenously determined and where financial stress plays a key role, (2) show how these model variants can be solved through the Nonlinear Model Predictive Control numerical technique, and (3) present some empirical evidence on the nonlinear dynamics of output, sovereign debt, and financial stress in some euro areas and other industrialized countries.

The recent development of the European debt sovereign crisis showed that sovereign debt is not “risk free.” The traditional index bond management used during the last two decades such as the market-capitalization weighting scheme has been severely called into question. In order to overcome these drawbacks, alternative weighting schemes have recently prompted attention, both from academic researchers and from market practitioners. One of the key developments was the introduction of passive funds using economic fundamental indicators.

In this chapter, the authors introduced models with economic drivers with an aim of investigating whether the fundamental approaches outperformed the other models on risk-adjusted returns and on other terms.

The authors did this by constructing five portfolios composed of the Eurozone sovereigns bonds. The models are the Market-Capitalization RP, GDP model RP, Ratings RP model, Fundamental-Ranking RP, and Fundamental-Weighted RP models. These models were created exclusively for this chapter. Both Fundamental models are using a range of 10 country fundamentals. A variation from other studies is that this dissertation applied the risk parity concept which is an allocation technique that aims to equalize risk across different assets. This concept has been applied by assuming the credit default swap as proxy for sovereign credit risk. The models were run using the Generalized Reduced Gradient (GRG) method as the optimization model, together with the Lagrange Multipliers as techniques and the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions. This led to the comparison of all the models mentioned above in terms of performance, risk-adjusted returns, concentration, and weighted average ratings.

By analyzing the whole period between 2006 and 2014, it was found that both the fundamental models gave very appealing results in terms of risk-adjusted returns. The best results were returned by the Fundamental-Ranking RP model followed by the Fundamental-Weighting RP model. However, better results for the mixed performance and risk-adjusted returns were achieved on a yearly basis and when sub-dividing the whole period in three equal periods. Moreover, the authors concluded that over the long term, the fundamental bond indexing triumphed over the other approaches by offering superior return and risk characteristics. Thus, one can use the fundamental indexation as an alternative to other traditional models.

An industry of description and interpretation has developed around the growth of surveillance, accelerated by: the development of the internet; volatile international relations since the collapse of communism; demographic mobility, segregation by class and ethnicity in the rich and poor worlds, sharpening inequalities, and post 9/11 fears of terrorism. Influential narratives have emphasised the diminishing power of sovereign nation-states in a marketised and globalised world. This chapter challenges the notion that coercive, sovereign modes of rule are a monarchical survival in decline. Rather, sovereign technologies of rule, in which surveillance is central involves strategies of governance from below as well as from above. They combine coercive with rhetorical, metaphorical communication and other ‘soft’ modes of rule. These make thinkable the nation-state as a discrete, defensible entity. Political communication translates between the complex technical expertise of evolving surveillance and security technologies and language intelligible to the public. Though surveillance technologies and information can be produced by commercial and other non-state sites of governance, metaphorically, much surveillance can be viewed as the extension of the eye of the sovereign. Although we are all targets of surveillance, those seen as threatening to the majority help to constitute and reproduce the social collectivity.