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Khumbulani L. Masuku and Thabo J. Gopane
The study considers time-varying risk premium in investigating the capability of technical analysis (TA) to predict and outperform a buy–hold strategy in Bitcoin exchange rate…
Abstract
Purpose
The study considers time-varying risk premium in investigating the capability of technical analysis (TA) to predict and outperform a buy–hold strategy in Bitcoin exchange rate returns.
Design/methodology/approach
The study tests the technical trading rule of fixed moving average (FMA) on daily actual and equilibrium returns of Bitcoin exchange rates. The equilibrium returns are computed using dynamic CAPM in conjunction with a VAR-MGARCH (1, 1) system. The empirical evaluation of the study uses a case study of four Bitcoin exchange rates (BTC/AUD, BTC/EUR, BTC/JPY and BTC/ZAR) for the period 19 June 2010 to 30 October 2020.
Findings
The findings are consistent with related studies in conventional foreign exchange markets that find TA to be profitable, especially in emerging markets. Nevertheless, the consideration of risk premium has the effect of reducing the abnormal returns. Also, further robust tests reveal that Bitcoin returns possess a momentum effect which prompts further study in efficient market hypothesis research.
Practical implications
The empirical findings of this study should benefit portfolio managers and active investors on the strength of TA to predict returns in a speculative market like the Bitcoin exchange rate market.
Originality/value
The study takes cognisance that cryptocurrency trading is speculative in nature which renders it a good candidate for TA methods. While there are studies that have explored the value of TA in Bitcoin exchange rates, these studies fail to incorporate the effects of time-varying risk premiums, the strength and focus of the current paper.
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Sean Bradley Power and Niamh M. Brennan
Annual general meetings have been variously described as dull rituals for accountability versus entertaining theatre at the expense of accountability. The research analyses…
Abstract
Purpose
Annual general meetings have been variously described as dull rituals for accountability versus entertaining theatre at the expense of accountability. The research analyses director and shareholder participation and dialogic interactions at annual and extraordinary general meetings of Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSAC). The BSAC was incorporated under a royal charter in 1889 in return for power to exploit a huge territory, Rhodesia/now Zimbabwe. The BSAC's administration ceased in 1924/25. Thus, the BSAC had a dual mandate as a private for-profit listed company and to occupy and develop the territories on behalf of the British government.
Design/methodology/approach
The article analyses 29 BSAC general meeting minutes, comprising 25 full sets of verbatim minutes between 1895 and 1925. The study adopts manual content analysis. First, the research adopts conversational analysis to analyse director and shareholder turn-taking and moves by approving and dissenting shareholders. Second, the study identifies and analyses incidents of shareholder sentiment from the shareholder turns/moves. Finally, the article assesses how shareholder sentiment changed throughout the period and whether the BSAC's share price reflected the shareholder sentiment.
Findings
The BSAC's general meetings were associated with the greater colonial project of building the British Empire. The authors find almost 1,500 incidents of shareholder sentiment. Directors and shareholders take roughly an equal number of turns (excluding shareholder sentiment). Ritual and ceremony dominate director and shareholder turns and moves, while accountability to shareholders was minimal. The BSAC share price spiked in the early years of the project, waning after that. Shareholder sentiment, both positive and negative, reflect the share price behaviour.
Originality/value
A unique database of verbatim general meeting minutes records shareholders' reactions to what they heard in the form of sounding off through cheering, “hear, hears,” laughter and applause (i.e. shareholder sentiment).
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Abstract
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Domenico Campa, Alberto Quagli and Paola Ramassa
This study reviews and discusses the accounting literature that analyzes the role of auditors and enforcers in the context of fraud.
Abstract
Purpose
This study reviews and discusses the accounting literature that analyzes the role of auditors and enforcers in the context of fraud.
Design/methodology/approach
This literature review includes both qualitative and quantitative studies, based on the idea that the findings from different research paradigms can shed light on the complex interactions between different financial reporting controls. The authors use a mixed-methods research synthesis and select 64 accounting journal articles to analyze the main proxies for fraud, the stages of the fraud process under investigation and the roles played by auditors and enforcers.
Findings
The study highlights heterogeneity with respect to the terms and concepts used to capture the fraud phenomenon, a fragmentation in terms of the measures used in quantitative studies and a low level of detail in the fraud analysis. The review also shows a limited number of case studies and a lack of focus on the interaction and interplay between enforcers and auditors.
Research limitations/implications
This study outlines directions for future accounting research on fraud.
Practical implications
The analysis underscores the need for the academic community, policymakers and practitioners to work together to prevent the destructive economic and social consequences of fraud in an increasingly complex and interconnected environment.
Originality/value
This study differs from previous literature reviews that focus on a single monitoring mechanism or deal with fraud in a broadly manner by discussing how the accounting literature addresses the roles and the complex interplay between enforcers and auditors in the context of accounting fraud.
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