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The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between internal audit function (IAF) characteristics and organizational variables and IAF’s self-investigation about fraud and irregularities (SIFI) in the French context.

This paper uses the responses of 96 chief audit executives (CAEs) to a global survey of the internal auditing profession carried out by the Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation (IIARF) in 2010. A logistic regression model is used to determine factors influencing IAF’s SIFI.

The authors’ findings reveal that IAF’s SIFI is positively correlated to independence and objectivity, the number of activities performed by the function, adoption of a systematic approach to evaluate the effectiveness of risk management and the size of the company.

This study examines the factors associated only to IAF’s investigation rather than assessment of the risk of fraud. It remains for future research to analyze determinants those related to internal auditors’ approaches when they evaluate the risk of fraud.

The findings have implications for CAEs who wish to improve the IAF’s ability to investigate fraud.

Even if the IIA has stipulated since 2009 that internal auditors must have knowledge to evaluate the risk of fraud, no disclosure requirement exists, in France, for IAF or its charter. The areas of research related to internal audit behavior in relation to fraud concern fraud risk investigation of financial fraud and management/employee misconduct.

This study aims to investigate the relationship between related party transactions (RPTs), specifically sales and purchases, and financial distress. It also explores the moderating role of various corporate governance mechanisms and audit-firm characteristics in this relationship.

This study spans the period before and during the COVID-19 pandemic and uses a logistic regression model focusing on an eight-year noncylindrical panel data set, covering a sample of Omani listed companies from 2014 to 2021.

The empirical findings reveal a contrasting relationship between RPT sales and financial distress: a significant negative relationship in the postpandemic period, and a positive relationship in the prepandemic period. Conversely, RPT purchases exhibit a consistently significant positive relationship across all periods. The presence of a Big Four audit-firm and audit delay are notable moderating variables associated with audit-firm attributes. Additionally, the board’s review of RPT transactions, size, meetings and independence are significant moderator variables pertaining to corporate governance.

This study provides empirical evidence to inform regulators of the efficiency and opportunistic aspects of RPTs in relation to financial distress. The study’s findings offer valuable guidance to managers by suggesting ways to reinforce corporate governance practices and strengthen audit mechanisms to counteract the negative consequences of RPTs.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to explore the direct relationship between both RPT sales and purchases and financial distress while also examining the moderating effect of corporate governance and audit attributes. This comprehensive approach distinguishes itself from its unique contributions to the field.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of corporate governance failure, excess remuneration and entrenchment of managers, company variables and corporate governance variables on the company’s financial distress risk (DETR) in the French context.

Using the regression analysis, this paper is based on 201 observations about 67 companies of SBF 120 from 2015 to 2017. Data are collected on the Thomson Reuters database and in the referenced documents, which are published on the internet.

The research findings reveal that firm’s DETR is influenced negatively by excess remuneration and entrenchment of managers. In addition, there is a positive and significant relationship between DETR and company variables (performance and ownership structure) and corporate governance variables (power structure). However, a company’s size and board of directors’ independence do not affect firms’ DETR.

The impact highlighted between remuneration and entrenchment of managers and the financial distress of the company is explained by the intention of managers to work for announcing good short-term performance indicators that are most favorable to them.

The shareholder/manager agency problem can be changed when business performance tends to decline. Certainly, the managerial latitude adopted by the managers is used as an external careerism strategy. Its positive impact on the reduction of the firm’s financial distress can benefit shareholders who aim to sell their securities in the short term.