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The purpose of this paper is to explore how non-professional investors (NPIs) with varying levels of financial sophistication interpret and perceive corporate disclosures and management credibility, specifically risk factors, when those disclosures are presented in readable and less-readable formats.

The paper uses an online experiment to test hypotheses related to the effects of financial sophistication (measured) and readability (manipulated) on NPIs’ equity valuations and perceptions of management credibility (competence and trustworthiness).

Increased readability appears to counteract less-sophisticated NPIs’ conservatism in equity valuations, such that they are not statistically significantly different from more-sophisticated NPIs’ equity valuations. Further, less-sophisticated NPIs judge management as less competent when disclosures are less readable, while more-sophisticated NPIs judge management as more competent when disclosures are less readable.

The paper has important implications for the SEC’s regulations related to plain English requirements for risk factor and other corporate disclosures. Financial sophistication varies among NPIs, and readability appears to influence these individuals in different ways.

The SEC’s Concept Release (April 13, 2016) acknowledges the need to update and improve risk factor disclosure regulations. This study provides evidence that contributes to those decisions.

The paper extends the research on processing fluency, by examining readability of disclosures with a consistent tone (negative). The NPIs surveyed are directly representative of the population of interest for risk factor disclosure regulations.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between individual investors’ level of sophistication and their expectations of risk and return in the stock market.

The author combines survey and registry data on individual investors in Sweden to obtain 11 sophistication proxies that previous research has related to individuals’ financial decisions. These proxies are related to a survey measure regarding individual investors’ expectations of risk and return in an index fund using linear regressions.

The findings in this paper indicate that sophisticated investors have lower risk and higher return expectations that are closer to objective measures than those of less-sophisticated investors.

These results are important, since they enhance the understanding of the underlying mechanisms through which sophistication can influence financial decisions.

The purpose of this study is to examine investors’ intention and behavior concerning ex ante information acquirement and ex post claims from the micro-level perspective with the deepening of the initial public offering (IPO) reform of China.

The authors made surveys and collected 932 valid questionnaires from investors in China. The authors also conducted interviews with sophisticated investors, investment bankers and government regulators to obtain first-hand information. Based on the survey results, the authors make the empirical analysis.

Investors’ attention to the first-hand information of the IPO prospectuses is inadequate. Individuals rely more on second-hand information, while institutions conduct more surveys. The higher the institutional practitioners’ degree of education, the more surveys they make. Only 1/3 investors intend to seek judicial remedy when getting fraud information due to high litigation costs and proof collecting difficulties. The investors who read more about prospectuses in advance are more likely to seek judicial protection afterwards. Compared with investors who know less about government administrative protection measures, those who know more have a low probability to choose “not to seek judicial protection.”

The authors enrich the research studies of IPO information acquisition and investor protection by conducting surveys to get first-hand data. Previous literature mostly makes empirical tests by using proxy variables.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the monitoring role exerted by large institutional investors and their ability to restrict the earnings management practices conducted around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).

The sample includes 130 French SEOs by non-regulated firms during 2004-2015. The authors used various cross-section, univariate and multivariate tests using several proxies for earnings management. They attempt to highlight that firms issuing SEOs are more able to manage earnings around SEOs owing to the predominance of large speculative institutional investors. Noteworthy, the monitoring role exerted by sophisticated institutional investors turns out to restrict the earnings management opportunities surrounding a SEOs event.

The results show that the issuing firms tend to manipulate earnings in an upward trend with respect to the year preceding the SEO offer. Thus, a special attention has been drawn on the fact that the issuing companies strive to prove their ability to manage earnings around SEOs in presence of large speculative institutional investors.

The results provide useful insights into the role different types of institutional investors play in terms of enhancing both governance and accounting information quality.

This paper adds to the literature questioning the evidence that institutional investor activism frequently engage in misleading earnings management around corporate events. The authors provide an alternative explanation for earnings management around SEOs in the French context.

This paper seeks to investigate whether the “financial highlights” section of annual reports of a sample of Indian companies satisfy the information requirements of investors.

The research method involves the preparation of a check‐list from those items that have been suggested as significant to be disclosed in annual reports by both the “sophisticated” and “non‐sophisticated” investors as suggested in the study of Joshi and Abdulla. After the preparation of this check‐list, “financial highlights” section of a sample of companies listed on any of the Indian Stock Exchanges has been examined to investigate whether this section contains that information, which has been considered as significant by the investors, in the study by Joshi and Abdulla.

Most of the companies do not disclose information items that are perceived by users of financial information in India as being significant under the “financial highlights” section.

The limitation of the current study rests on the fact that it uses Joshi and Abdulla for evaluating the “financial highlights” section and hence only considers the need of investors in annual reports and in this specific section. Second, the use of the survey result obtained by Joshi and Abdulla might not hold completely true at the present time due to difference in time period.

This is a pioneering study that questions whether the “financial highlights” section in annual reports provides those information items that are considered as “highlights” by investors.

When agents first become active investors in financial markets, they are relatively inexperienced. Much of the literature focuses on the incentives of presumably sophisticated informed agents to produce information, and not on the nave agents. However, unsophisticated agents are important aspects of financial markets and worth analyzing further. In this paper, we provide a theoretical perspective that addresses the issue of how many nave traders would one expect in a financial market where policy makers try to educate the nave agents.We show that such policy balances the effects of nave trades on corporate investment and liquidity, as well as the monetary cost of increasing financial sophistication. The optimal proportion of nave agents varies with the value of information, the noise in private signals, and the inherent sensitivity of corporate investment to prices.We also show that the policy tool of encouraging insider trading can deter nave investors and thus improve corporate governance and the efficacy of corporate investment.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether sentiment and mood, which are distinct theoretical concepts, can also be distinguished empirically.

Using a sample of German small-cap stocks and linear techniques, the effect of sentiment and mood on short-term abnormal stock return following earnings announcements is tested separately.

Mood tends to be a positive factor in predicting short-term abnormal stock return, as its biologically based impact uniformly affects the risk aversion of all market participants. Notably, negative mood influences stock return significantly negatively. Sentiment is no factor, however, as its cognitively based impact affects only unsophisticated investors, namely, their cash-flow expectations.

As the sample is restricted to small-cap stocks from a single stock market and only two proxies of sentiment and mood, respectively, are used, the findings should be generalized with caution. Future research might investigate other markets and employ different proxies of sentiment and mood.

Market participants should be aware of the different effect of sentiment and mood on stock return and adjust investment strategies accordingly.

As sophisticated investors are likely to profit from the irrational behavior of unsophisticated investors, who are prone to sentiment, the financial literacy of retail investors should be enhanced.

This paper is unique in distinguishing between sentiment and mood, both theoretically and empirically. Such distinction was largely ignored by related past research.

In the European Union, the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS IV) requires fund management companies to provide a Key Investor Information Document (UCITS KIID) for investors. This papers uses archival data from the Finnish mutual fund market to test how the regulation's information disclosure requirements concerning past performance, risk and fund fees are associated with mutual fund flows.

The study uses archival data on the mutual funds market in Finland to test how the regulation relating to retail investors' information requirements is associated with mutual fund flows.

Our findings suggest that the UCITS KIID predicts retail investors' fund flows. While past performance is associated with fund flows throughout the observation period, retail investors appear to have become more sensitive to fund fees and invest in less risky funds following the adoption of the UCITS IV period.

Information relating to fund fees and risk appears to be relevant to retail investors, which should be acknowledged in future iterations of short-form disclosure and in mutual fund marketing.

This paper is the first to assess the significance of KIID in actual market environment.

Mutual fund investors assess a fund manager’s skills when allocating their capital. To identify the rationale behind retail investors’ decisions, this study aims to examine the relation between mutual fund flows and abnormal returns (alpha), as well as the various risk factors in the Japanese mutual fund market, which has distinctive characteristics regarding investors and distributors.

Six standard asset pricing models are used to investigate how investors assess mutual fund managers’ skills: the market-adjusted return, the capital asset pricing model and the Fama–French three-factor model and its augmented versions.

Contrary to the literature, this study finds that investors in Japan mainly rely on alpha to assess mutual funds. In particular, investors respond to alpha for fund inflows and their evaluations depend on the market environment and their mutual fund search costs.

This study measures the response of investors to the skills of mutual fund managers in the Japanese market – especially for funds purchased through bank-related distributors that have aimed to capture inexperienced retail investors since deregulation in the 1990s – and reveals their high response to alpha.