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The Communist Party of China represents a distinctive philosophy of leadership, one in which it tries to present itself as the key promoter of Chinese style modernity and the national mission to become a great, rich, and powerful country again. Contemporary Chinese leaders however have to operate in a territory laden with historic issues, with huge administrative responsibilities, and with challenges of mobilizing and gaining support from a vast, complex, and often fractious public. This chapter looks at the various ways leaders in China have tried to fulfill these often contradictory demands, while also attempting to remain true to their core ideological beliefs at a time when the country is undergoing rapid economic and social transformation.

The paper provides an overview of material helpful in placing the subsequent papers in context, as well as a summary of the research contributions made by the individual papers themselves.

We begin with a timeline of China’s Economic Reform, including both major events that permitted the opening and expansion of the nation’s economy, and important milestones of the historical movement. We then consider the impact of philosophy and culture (particularly, Confucianism and socialism) on China’s society and government, which leads naturally to certain observations regarding the political-economic model in which state-owned enterprises play a central role. In the final section, we briefly summarize the contents of the remaining papers.

The overall goal of this chapter is twofold. First, the authors aim to identify indigenous phenomena that influence employee turnover and retention in the Chinese context. Second, the authors link these phenomena to the contextualization of job embeddedness theory. To achieve the goal, the authors begin by introducing three macro-level forces (i.e., political, economic, and cultural forces) in China that help scholars analyze contextual issues in turnover studies. The authors then provide findings in the literature research on employee retention studies published in Chinese academic journals. Next, the authors discuss six indigenous phenomena (i.e., hukou, community in China, migrant workers, state-owned companies, family benefit prioritization, and guanxi) under the three macro-level forces and offer exploratory propositions illustrating how these phenomena contribute to understanding employee retention in China. Finally, the authors offer suggestions on how contextualized turnover studies shall be conducted in China.

Propose a more comprehensive explanation on the determinants and fluctuations of China’s exchange rate policy in the past decade (2005–2015).

Case study on China’s exchange rate policies in three respective stages since 2005 and then a comparative study on these three stages.

Put forward a two-pronged explanation on the determinants and fluctuations of China’s exchange rate policy in the past decade and arrive at three specific conclusions. First, external pressure is only one factor among many influencing the formation of China’s national interests (Guojia Liyi in Chinese) and the decision-making process on exchange rate policy. Second, national interest is the fundamental driving force and substratum for making China’s exchange rate policy. Third, in the short term, the specific exchange rate policies in different periods were not always in accordance to the national interests (or Guojia Liyi), due to the influences of some factors on the decision-making environment.

The comprehensive view is conducive to better explaining the formation and fluctuations of China’s exchange rate policy and consequently contributes to understanding and even predicting future policies.

Attitudes and beliefs towards marriage and family held by Chinese and American college students were compared in this study. The primary dimensions included whether to marry, age to marry, number of desired children, age to have children, perceptions of divorce, willingness to cohabit, openness to blended marriages, and gender roles within marriage. If a global convergence of cultures is occurring, then similarities should be found throughout the views of all respondents towards the institution of marriage. Dissimilarities in views could be interpreted as evidence of the entrenchment and uniqueness of culture, an outcome advanced by those who question cultural homogenisation. Hundreds of college students in several large universities in China and one regional university in the United States were surveyed at convenience. The Chinese students were found to prefer marrying and to plan having children a year later in age compared to the Americans. They also desired having nearly one fewer total number of children on average compared to the Americans. Surprisingly, the Chinese were more agreeable with divorce. The Americans were more likely to support gender equality within marriage and to accept blended types of marriage. Both groups equally approved of the overall idea of couples cohabiting if they plan on marrying. However, the Americans were far more willing to say that they themselves would cohabit. Visions of the benefits of married life were similar across countries. Overall, far more significant differences were found than no differences. The results suggest that elements of marriage norms in the world’s largest economies are somewhat constrained by social forces in their ability to completely converge.

This paper examines diverging views on the Chongqing model, the policy experiment led by Bo Xilai from 2007 to 2012 that was famous for its “red songs” and the campaign against organized crime. It has impressed both the supporters of socialist identity of China and the supporters of liberal identity and led to an intense debate concerning China’s path of development. This paper attempts to discuss and clarify to what extent the Chongqing model represented a genuine socialist experiment and the implications of the model for China’s future.

In this chapter we explore the nature of leadership in Mainland China in two studies using personality and personal values data of Mainland Chinese managers and executives. This perspective provides insight into the leadership prototypes that exist in Chinese culture and the behaviors that signal leadership to other members of the culture. In the first study, we compare the personality and values profiles of Mainland Chinese managers to those of managers in the United States, Germany, and Australia, representing some of China's largest economic trading partners. These comparisons suggest a distinctive leadership prototype for Mainland Chinese managers characterized by more cooperative behaviors, a high concern for managing one's own image and an emphasis on execution and task focus. Certain characteristics in the leadership prototypes were linked to the Chinese concepts of “face” and “guanxi.” The second study examined differences in leadership prototypes within Mainland China by comparing the profiles of Chinese managers working for multinational corporations (MNCs) with those working for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The findings in this study revealed a pattern of SOE managers conforming more closely to the Mainland Chinese leadership prototype found in Study 1. The profile for MNC managers, where different, often differed in the direction of closer resemblance to more “Western” leadership profiles. The implications of the findings from each study and future research directions are discussed.

China’s swift economic rise, as symbolized by the first Chinese Olympics and by surpassing Japan to become the world’s second largest economy despite the recent global financial meltdown, has been accompanied by a transformation of Chinese foreign policy behavior. After spending the last decade emphasizing China’s “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development,” Beijing has begun to expound its policy preferences and territorial claims more forthrightly, even assertively. The purpose of this chapter will be to consider the origins, consequences, and likely future of the new Chinese foreign policy in the wake of the leadership transition at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 and the 12th National People’s Congress in 2013.