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Social security is one of the most significant political‐economic issues in America. It is loaded with controversy and is of deep concern to millions of Americans, both the elderly, who have been receiving benefits since they became payable in the late 1930s, and also younger people, who are deeply concerned and troubled about two problems. The first has to do with the increasing costs, that is, the amount of the so‐called “contributions” being required in order to finance social security. Their second worry grows out of their decreasing confidence in the social security system. Will benefits be available to them when they reach age 65? Is the system sound? Is it bankrupt? If not now, is it likely to go broke?

The present social security system has reached a point where it has outgrown its traditional structures. The system envisaged for the future is one in which the state decides what minimum protection everyone must receive and how much tax this entails, and in which a body representing all workers decides on how much of their income they will pay to insure themselves. Policy recommendations for restructuring social security systems in Europe should take into account the fact that social security benefits enjoy a privileged status within the context of public spending; that every country adopts a minimum level of expenditure in line with its considered minimum standard of social protection; and that greater efficiency of social security budgets should be aimed at, through rationalisation of choices, structures, means and services.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

Welfare states are sets of rules and policies that redistribute resources across social classes and across generations. In nearly all western nations, social spending on the aged has surpassed spending on all other age groups combined. In 1992 alone, spending in the U.S. on Social Security topped $250 billion and on Medicare $130 billion.

Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we examine behavioral responses to a new generation of retirement policies that on average are actuarially neutral. Although many conventional models predict that actuarially neutral policies will not affect retirement behavior, our model allows those with high-time preference rates to find that the promise of an actuarially fair increase in future rewards does not balance the loss from foregone current benefits. Thus together with liquidity constraints facing those with high-time preference, we find that actuarially neutral policies do affect retirement behavior. One such policy follows on the elimination of the Social Security earnings test for those over normal retirement age, and would eliminate the earnings test between early and normal retirement age. Another of these policies would increase the ages of benefit entitlement. Still another such policy emerges from a central focus of the past few years on the adoption of personal accounts. Although Social Security benefits are currently paid in the form of an annuity, benefits from either defined benefit plans or from personal accounts may be made available as an annuity or as a lump sum of equivalent actuarial value. A related policy choice between actuarially equivalent benefits emerges on the pension side. There has been discussion of relaxing the current IRS prohibition against paying a pension benefit when a person remains at work, instead allowing partial pension benefits to be paid to those who partially retire on a job.

Most public finance analysts recognized the significant redistributive aspects of our current social security system — intragenerational and intergenerational transfers. The intragenerational redistribution is fairly straightforward and well documented. Even though the intergenerational transfers are easily understood and generally agreed upon, the magnitudes of these transfers are not so well reported. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the size of the intergenerational redistribution that has occurred and will continue to occur as a result of our pay‐as‐you‐go system of social security. Based upon average earnings, tax rates, and benefits received under social security, it is possible to estimate the relationship between taxes paid and benefits received for representative individuals who have worked and retired under social security. The preliminary analysis suggests that the usual conclusion about intergenerational redistribution is fundamentally correct, but needs modifying. This research shows that although the earliest retirees received the highest internal rates of return, in terms of real benefits in excess of taxes paid, those individuals who retired between 1970 and 1980 received the largest inflation adjusted transfers. Further, according to the analysis, social security has paid retirees in the aggregate more than $4.5 trillion dollars in benefits above what the recipients have paid in taxes. By the year 2020, when retirees are expected to receive in benefits the amount paid in taxes, this cumulative excess is projected to be about $9.2 trillion.

Increased life expectancies and decreased birthrates have placed enormous financial pressure on the Social Security system. Because significant reforms are needed to ensure its financial solvency, our study examines the acceptability of proposals to reform the system. Given the potentially divergent views suggested by prior research, we selected participants from the following four groups (1) younger black taxpayers, (2) younger white taxpayers, (3) older black taxpayers, and (4) older white taxpayers. While there was agreement among the groups on several of the proposals, in general, the differences between the generations were more pronounced than the differences between the racial groups.

An Act to amend the law relating to benefit under the Ministry of Social Security Act 1966 and to certain benefits under the National Insurance Act 1965 and the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1965; to increase the penalties for failure to pay contributions under the said Acts of 1965; to abolish local advisory committees under the said Act of 1966; and for purposes connected with those matters. [5th August 1971]

Within the last few years a number of articles and other studies have been published dealing with various aspects of Social Security in developing countries in general and with Africa in particular. The intention of this article is to set out an analytical framework within which Social Security policy in developing countries, especially as related to income maintenance, might be appraised. Particular attention will be given to the inter‐relationship between state Social Security policy and household economic behaviour, since this aspect appears to be the least well covered in the literature.

The Social Security Administration publishes a series of pamphlets and leaflets designed to distribute information about Social Security programs and policies. In general these publications are of high quality: succinct, well‐written, informative, and highly readable. Most of these publications are frequently revised, many on an annual basis.