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The purpose of this paper is to investigate how different types of social capital contribute to the satisfaction with democracy (SWD) in Greece. Understanding the relationship between different variants of social capital and SWD allows one to situate the Greek democracy in the continuum of democracy types, from primary to modern.

The study uses microdata extracted from the European Values Surveys of 2002-2010 and multivariate regression analysis.

The results are compatible with a conception of the Greek political organization as a civil virtue democracy. A change in the nature of the relationship is observed after the recent economic crisis in the country.

The study contributes to the empirical knowledge regarding the relationship between different variants of social capital and SWD.

Using a typology approach, the micro-relationship between democracy and social capital is analyzed as embedded in a continuum of different democracy types. In addition, this is the first study that uses microdata to analyze the effect of social capital upon SWD in Greece. The results of the study provide valuable understanding of the social and institutional arrangements that might sustain Greece’s efforts to meet its overall developmental challenges.

This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and economic democracy, which centres around the establishment of a new sector of employee‐controlled enterprises, is presented. The proposal would retain the mix‐ed economy, but transform it into a much better “mixture”, with increased employee‐power in all sectors. While there is much of enduring value in our liberal western way of life, gross inequalities of wealth and power persist in our society.

Scholars have shown many ways that social movements and democracy are deeply connected. Here, we demonstrate a previously unexplored process by which social movements alter democratic practice. Democratic movements are often experienced as insufficiently democratic by the very activists who participate in them, impelling new practices. We present examples from recent research on democratic movements and then contend that this is a common occurrence. Building on Hirschman's analysis of organizational change, we develop a theoretical account of why activists find movements for democracy disappointing and try to correct this, either by transforming the organizations they are in or creating new ones. Hirschman categorized responses to organizational challenges as Voice and Exit; we define a combination of these we call Semi-Exit as a useful extension. We then show in some detail how both disappointment and creativity have been generated in two major movement arenas: transnational activism that links social justice with environmental concerns and the Occupy Movement.

This chapter seeks to reconcile divergent views about how globalization affects democratic governance at the national level. Despite numerous studies on this subject, the resulting literature has not reached an overarching consensus. Some scholars conclude that globalization usually promotes democracy by fragmenting the political power of entrenched elites, by creating powerful demands for the rule of law, and by making democracy the global norm for governance. Other scholars, however, draw very different conclusions. They argue that globalization generally weakens democracy by reducing the autonomy of national governments, by generating “democratic deficits” between international policy makers and ordinary citizens, and by significantly enhancing the class power of transnational capital. To bridge these two literatures, the present chapter highlights that democracy has at least two normative charges: (1) it should promote civil and political liberties (its liberal dimension) and (2) it should promote social and economic equality (its social democratic dimension). When viewed from this perspective, it appears that globalization does indeed promote democracy, albeit a particular form of democracy in which the maintenance of civil and political liberties takes precedence over the realization of socioeconomic equalities. Furthermore, this perspective suggests that globalization can simultaneously promote democracy in some parts of the world (i.e., by encouraging authoritarian countries to adopt civil and political liberties), while undermining it elsewhere (i.e., by impeding political actors seeking to promote socioeconomic equality).

Did the expansion of democratic institutions play a role in determining central government spending behavior in the 19th and 20th centuries? The link between democracy and increased central government spending is well established for the post-Second World War period, but has never been explored during the first “wave of democracy” and its subsequent reversal, that is 1870–1938. The main contribution of this paper is the compilation of a dataset covering 24 countries over this period to begin to address this question. Utilizing various descriptive techniques, including panel data regressions, we explore correlations between central government spending and the institutional characteristics of regimes. We find that the data are consistent with the hypothesis that democracies have a broader need for legitimization than autocracies as various measures of democracy are associated with higher central government spending. Our results indicate that the extension of franchise had a slight positive impact on central government spending levels, as did a few of the other democracy variables. We also find that early liberal democracies spent less and monarchies more than other regimes; debt increases spending; and participation in the Gold Standard reduced government spending substantially.

Arguably democracy and globalization are among the most debated topics in contemporary scientific, political and cultural circles. Indeed, for some optimistic observers, these two phenomena are end points. Globalization is a process that generates economic prosperity and provides fresh opportunities for the emancipation of selves. Democracy is a product of previous phases of the evolution of society, but it has reached its most advanced form in this post-Fordist, post-cold war, global society (e.g. Friedman, 2000; Fukuyama, 1992). For critical thinkers, however, the growth of globalization problematizes the existence and practice of democracy. In an interesting convergence of opinions, this latter group includes radical conservative and progressive theorists alike. Radical Conservatives have argued that globalization engenders a crisis of democracy and that this situation is to be addressed through a retreat to the local and the ethnic. This new tribalism (Antonio, 2000; de Benoist, 1995) features attacks against the “move to the center” (the Clinton-Blair centralism) of many historically leftist and progressive liberal groups. The critics contend that the mainstream parties have converged and that neither the conventional left or right offer alternatives to the dominant neo-liberal approach, crisis-ridden post World War II idea of socio-economic development, or the erosion of sovereignty entailed by globalization. In this regard, the radical right proposes the replacement of “demos” with “ethnos” as the key organizational concept for contemporary society.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, Social Democrats around the world have been the victims of drastically changing fortunes. After 2015, these mixed fortunes took in several instances, in Greece, France and the Netherlands most prominently, the form of an outright collapse in terms of electoral support. At the same time, the world economy is increasingly dominated by an unfettered brand of international financial capitalism, leading to a progressively more ruthless exploitation of workers around the world. Both these trends entail that Social Democrats need to come up with new answers to the most pressing political issues of our time. In this introductory chapter, the first order of business is to provide the reader with an idea of what Social Democracy might signify in the twenty-first century, focussing on the basic ideas of human rights, democracy and personal freedom. The chapter then moves on to describe and discuss some of the problems facing the world today. Global warming and resource depletion, poverty and economic inequality, as well as sudden shocks to the political system such as the coronavirus pandemic of 2020 will likely continue to set a large part of the political agenda for the remainder of this century. If Social Democrats continue to be part of a truly world-transforming labour movement, they must address and engage with these issues, and with the yet unknown political problems of tomorrow.

Although the concept of ‘social capital’ is not a new concept, its rise coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic. This concept of sociology, left in a controversial and secondary position, was reborn both in the social, political and economic fields and in the scientific world, with the increase of the COVID-19 outbreak cases. Social capital is a form of socialisation and a way of performing social relationships. The COVID-19 outbreak led to the understanding that physical capital and human capital would not be sufficient to sustain social life, and, therefore, social capital started to rise. The expected private earning from social capital is not individual profit, but collective welfare and mutual benefit. In short, social capital is the capital spent on society and is for common good. On the other hand, social capital has a volume in proportion to the density of the capitals in the society. Social capital, with its intensity, has attracted the attention of different disciplines on Corona days and has exceeded the limits of sociology. Another issue to be emphasised in this study is the relationship between social capital and democracy. In societies where tutelary democracy is dominant, civil society cannot become functional enough. In this difficult environment, social capital is shaped as paternal (tutelary) and a healthy social network cannot be functionalised in society. On the one hand, the horrors of the pandemic are experienced, and, on the other hand, a social capital model that is ineffective in healing social wounds emerges.

The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the impact of conservatism on political liberty and liberal democracy in contemporary society. It applies Weber's description of capitalism as the “most fateful” social force in modern society to analyzing conservatism in relation to political liberty and liberal democracy. The paper posits and finds that conservatism primarily (with secondary variations) negatively impacts political liberty and so modern liberal democracy. Alternatively, it argues and shows that conservatism almost invariably generates political repression and elimination or subversion of liberal democracy and society. It concludes that conservatism, especially in America, becomes from the “most fateful” to the “most fatal” social force on the account of its adverse impact on political liberty and democracy.

The paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of conservatism and its essentially destructive effects on political liberties and liberal democracy in contemporary society.

The paper finds that conservatism, especially in America, becomes from the “most fateful” to the “most fatal” social force on the account of its adverse impact on political liberty and democracy.

The paper posits and finds that conservatism primarily (with secondary variations) negatively impacts political liberty and so modern liberal democracy. Alternatively, it argues and shows that conservatism almost invariably generates political repression and elimination or subversion of liberal democracy and society.