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Blockholders can behave opportunistically because small shareholder voting suffers from coordination problems. In this chapter, we investigate the features of small shareholder voting using a theoretical framework. Specifically, we investigate when defeating a blockholder’s resolution is optional for shareholders. Regulatory initiatives that facilitate communication between small shareholders or focus on institutional investors and corporate governance tools that alter or add the threshold in the voting game also contribute to solving the coordination problem. These corporate governance initiatives can increase the relevance of AGMs in Europe.

This chapter investigates which factors contribute to (small) shareholder attendance using a hand-collected panel data set with information about turnout rates, voting behaviour and ownership structures of companies that are listed in seven Member States. We document how ownership concentration positively affects total shareholder turnout, but has a negative effect on small shareholder turnout. Voting power also affects small shareholder turnout rates; the greater small shareholder voting power, the greater their eagerness to vote. In addition, total and small shareholder turnout is higher the more important the meeting agenda. And, small shareholders tend to free-ride on large institutional shareholders and corporate insiders, but the magnitude of the free-rider effect is larger for the latter category of blockholders. Our results provide some important insights for the debate on shareholder rights and the role of the AGM in corporate governance. The results show that, despite the criticism, the AGM still plays an important role in small shareholder monitoring. Some topics seem to clearly motivate small shareholders to attend, while others are less relevant. Policy makers can stimulate shareholder monitoring by focusing on the factors that are determined in this study, but it is important to consider possible endogeneity issues as well.

In this part of the research, we consider the costs of the turnout decision and evaluate whether the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36/EC), which aimed at lowering voting costs, has had a positive impact on (small) shareholder attendance. For this, we investigate turnout rates in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. We find strong indications that the Shareholder Rights Directive indeed had a positive impact on (small) shareholder attendance in these countries. The findings of this study may encourage policy makers to further reduce the costs of (cross-border) voting. It shows that the introduction of the new Shareholder Rights Directive may contribute to (small) shareholder engagement.

In this part of the book, we investigate the practical characteristics of AGMs in an extensive empirical analysis. For this, we consider the turnout rates of AGMs of seven European Member States between 2010 and 2014 in this chapter. We show that, although there are large differences in total and small shareholder turnout rates among Member States, there is an overall increasing trend in the 2010–2014 period. In contrast to what economic theory predicts, a substantial and increasing part of small shareholders actually participate in AGMs.

The purpose of this paper is to explore unequal dividend payment policies called differentiated dividends (DDs) in Korea. The characteristics of firms are examined which allocate higher dividends to small shareholders than large shareholders within the same share class.

Logit analysis is used to compare firms that initiate DDs with those that pay conventional equal dividends. The abnormal market reaction to news of initiation of DDs is also examined.

Managers of firms facing cash insufficiency are more likely to initiate DDs. The DD scheme is used as a method to cater to high dividend demands in the market. The stock price reaction to the initiation of DDs is positive when the total dividend payments are increased, signifying that the market interprets it as good news.

Firms facing cash insufficiency can avoid an increase in the cost of capital by retaining extra cash from DDs rather than borrowing external funds. Additionally, managers can foster favorable market reactions by using DDs which helps firms in attracting new capital investments. Finally, regulatory bodies can consider encouraging managers to adopt unequal dividend schemes to allow higher dividend payments to small shareholders, especially in countries with weak legal protection for minority shareholders.

Similar unequal dividend policies exist in European countries but there is a lack of research conducted on those policies. The paper provides implications for the strategic use of unequal dividends to maximize firm value.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship among ownership structure, information disclosure and benefits of control under Lab‐experimental frame, based on the ownership structure in China's stock market.

Theoretical Shapley value of shareholders was used as the representative of control right, and benefits of control in different experimental treatments were studied.

Experimental results show: first, more counterbalance of shareholders' control rights, less benefits of their control right. Accordingly, more chance to form core alliance for the major shareholder with small shareholders, less chance for them to get control right; second, the effect of information on benefits of control are mainly reflected in forming and maintaining the alliance; third, Shapley value of the major shareholder and the information determine the alliance type; fourth, control premium may be the cost of keeping the major shareholder's benefits safe and fifth, imperfect information is not always bad, concealing information partly can improve the distribution efficiency of a corporation.

The paper provides experimental analysis of the behavioral logic behind the benefits of control, which would help to explain the relationship among ownership structure, information disclosure and benefits of control.

From a theoretical agency perspective, the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders (‘AGM’) is an important corporate law solution for mitigating agency problems between shareholders and managers in large public corporations. At the AGM, shareholders are informed, they are offered a venue to discuss and ask questions, and they are involved in decision-making. Despite these theoretical important functions, the AGM is largely criticized in practice. Criticism contains, for example, rational apathy and free-rider behaviour that lead to low shareholder turnout, a lack of (meaningful) dialogue and side-stepping behaviour. Yet, fundamental empirical research on the AGM in practice is lacking, which makes this book highly relevant. This chapter provides the outline of the research that is conducted in this book.

Before it was fully nationalized in 1945, the Banque de France was a listed company that distributed dividends to its shareholders and was listed on the Paris stock exchange. By comparing with other stocks and indexes, I show that, in spite of large earnings, Banque de France’s stock was a lackluster but popular investment. By examining the distribution of profits between the state and ordinary shareholders, I show that the state began to exert an influence over the Bank well before its nationalization, in the nineteenth century, amounting to a stealthy takeover. I then go on to analyze the Bank’s formal governance framework and the power of its regents (directors). Using a novel method to compute the shareholders’ statistical distribution, I conclude that small new shareholders who were less sophisticated bought predominantly shares from old larger shareholders. Eventually, most of the shareholders were “petit-bourgeois” passive rentiers who accepted the mediocre performance and kept reelecting the regents. I conclude by saying that the power of the 200 largest shareholders (“200 families”) was a political myth with little foundation in reality.

In this paper, we explore an extensive panel data set covering more than 4,000 listed firms in 16 European countries to study the effects of shareholder protection on ownership structure and firm performance. We document a negative firm-level correlation between shareholder protection and ownership concentration. Differentiating between shareholder types, we find that this pattern is mainly driven by strategic investors. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between shareholder protection and block ownership of institutional investors, in particular when we restrict the analysis to independent institutional investors. Finally, we find that independent institutional investors are positively associated with firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. The opposite applies for strategic investors. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that (i) high shareholder protection and (ii) limited ownership by strategic investors make small investors and investors interested in security returns more confident in their investments.