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Nuclear proliferation in Asia is basically rooted in psycho-cultural complexes of their ruling elites who are engaged in a frantic search for national security, national identity, and influence by developing n-weapon capability. A propensity for acquiring a credible nuclear deterrence as a security guarantee against any potential threat from adverse or hostile neighbours, political and military elites in volatile regions such as South Asia, Middle East, and Northeast Asia are perpetually indulged in producing artificially insecurity syndrome among their people to legitimize the imperative of nuclear weapon building programme. Inter-Asian regional nuclear collaboration, for instance, between North Korea and Pakistan, between North Korea and Myanmar, between Iran and Pakistan, between Pakistan and China are alarming signs of fomenting the nuclear armament and missile race in Asia. Alexei Arbatov, Director of the Centre of International Security, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences; writes that with the ceasing of ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the two superpowers, nuclear proliferation has gained momentum in the horizontal proliferation in countries of volatile regions of Asia – India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya – with the flawed support systems of the NPT, IAEA, and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). For instance, NPT does not offer any tangible benefits to those countries renouncing acquisition of nuclear weapons, nor does it “envision serious punishment for military nuclear activities” (Arbatov, 2004).

This chapter analyzes Mao Zedong’s decision-making code in foreign policy decisions made during his years as China’s leader: 1949–1976. I examine six decisions in China’s foreign policy during Mao’s tenure: China’s involvement in the Korea war (1951), Annexation of Tibet (1951), attacking the Taiwanese islands (1954), China’s war with India (1962), its involvement in the Vietnamese war (1964), and 1969 incident with the Soviet Army. This, in order to shed more light on the decision-making of leaders from the Far East, and to try and understand insights pertaining to the current foreign policy of China.

The analysis was conducted using the Applied Decision Analysis (ADA) method, based on historical materials, testimonies, and reports. The analysis demonstrates that Mao followed the poliheuristic decision rule in these decisions. Chairman Mao was making his decisions while choosing the most rational, cost-effective decision among alternatives that did not place his political status at risk.

On November 26, 1996, China and India signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas. It was a follow-up to the Agreement between India and China on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, signed on September 7, 1993. Signatories to the 1996 document agreed that neither side would use military capability against the other. No armed forces would be deployed by either side in the border areas along the line of actual control. Further, no military strength would be used by one side to attack the other or to engage in military activities that would threaten the other side or undermine the peace, tranquillity and stability in the India-China border areas. As part of the agreement, each side reconfirmed its determination to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the border dispute. Each country also reaffirmed its commitment to respect strictly the line of actual control. Finally, each country reaffirmed that, in mutually agreed to geographical zones, it would reduce or limit military forces to levels compatible with friendly and good neighborly relations, consistent with the principle of mutual and equal security.

India became a NWS (Nuclear Weapons State) most reluctantly in May 1998 despite her demonstration of nuclear weapons capability 24 years earlier in May 1974. Having assumed the new status as the sixth overt nuclear weapons state, India also declared her principled policy governing use of nuclear weapons in the event of a national security threat. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine was called “minimum deterrence” by the BJP-led NDA government, but the Congress-led UPA government in 2004 renamed it as “credible deterrence.”

But the heart of the vibrant Indian nuclear doctrine is its commitment to No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were invented by the United States (U.S.). First-ever use of atom bomb is also made by the Americans and a philosophic foundation for the discussion on NFU was also laid in the U.S. However, having put the NFU in the philosophic parlance, the U.S. in the Cold War International environment professed the doctrine for First Use (FU) of nuclear weapons. It is China that made a first public commitment to the NFU after it became the fifth nuclear weapons state.

This chapter proposes to discuss Indian commitment to NFU as a first step on the long path toward global nuclear disarmament—or No Use (NU) of nuclear weapons. India saw Partial Test Ban treaty of 1963 as a step toward NU and also saw the discussions on NPT as another step toward nuclear disarmament as much as it wanted the big powers to see the CTBT too as a device aimed at putting world into NU bind. West, led by the U.S., was however only interested in using the CTBT to deny nuclear weapons status to threshold states, particularly India.

As a self-declared nuclear weapons state, India has, in nuclear doctrine, committed itself to nuclear disarmament. Can there be an international treaty between the declared nuclear weapons states? Can India and Russia come together on the issue? Can they convince China to join? With three Asian nuclear weapons states committing themselves to NFU, U.S. can see economic sense in an international treaty on NFU. Is it possible to create a global public opinion in favor of NU of nuclear weapons? The questions will be answered based on research conduct on the subject.

The chapter provides a theory of war and conflict issues, and applies the theory to the arms race and the possibility of war in the South Asian subcontinent. We try to give a new perspective on an old question: wars are not rational since they destroy the contestable resource over which disputes arise; yet, states that are rational frequently undertake them rather than going for the less costly option of settlement. In the chapter, a war game is played in which two states first build armaments and then, if they cannot achieve a settlement, fight a war, the outcome of which depends on strength of armaments, where at stake is a contestable resource. The anticipated outcome determines the bargaining threat point. “Technology” is a factor in any war, and so too is the cost of building armaments. States typically differ in technology and may also miscalculate their own relative technical position and war-fighting capability. Alternative models of settlement and war are presented in which states either believe the opposing state has the same perception of technical advantage, or else know the opposing state’s differing perception. Dynamic models, which include the effects of decay in information over time and strategic concerns, are examined. Finally, the results of the models are applied to the stylized facts of India-Pakistan rivalry and conflict, paying particular attention to institutional issues. It is demonstrated that the stylized facts of the Indo-Pakistani conflict and wars fit well with the theoretical conjectures of the analytical models. External conflicts and wars in South Asia are often related to internal causes, which allow the possibility of incomplete information; the two contending states miscalculate their own power in terms of war-fighting capability, so that war occurs.

This chapter justifies India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons on the basis of an ancient Roman dictum: Si vis pacem, para bellum, which means, ‘if you want peace, prepare for war’. However, Indian leaders were far more imbued with idealism than realism. Nehru’s successors were not able to overcome Nehru’s idealistic commitment to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes alone.

However, the government led by the BJP changed Indian nuclear policy by conducting five nuclear tests in May 1998 and declaring India as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS). India also came out with its nuclear doctrine.

This chapter discusses the basic principles of the Indian nuclear doctrine. Though there are several principles of the doctrine, only such principles which have a bearing on the ultimate goal of achieving nuclear disarmament are discussed in this chapter. India has pledged not to use nuclear weapons ‘against states which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned’ with other NWS. India adheres to the concept of no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. This is the heart of the nuclear doctrine. The principle of NFU says that the nation would resort to the use of nuclear weapons only as a weapon of self-defence and only in a second strike.

India as a reluctant NWS has also committed its nuclear doctrine to ‘global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament’ as a national security objective. Indian nuclear doctrine is conducive in promoting nuclear disarmament. The chapter also proposes an international treaty around NFU as a first step towards nuclear disarmament.