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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and firm value of the listed companies in China. Does the better corporate governance lead to the higher firm value? Or does the higher firm value make it easy to choose a better governance mechanism? Or they affect each other? In other words, this paper tries to answer whether the corporate governance mechanism is only decided by institutional arrangement, or by market choice according to firm value or performance or by the interaction of institutional arrangement and market choice? It tries to answer whether institutional arrangement maximizes the firm value, or an invisible hand pushes them to arrive at its maximum.

This paper establishes an analytic framework of simultaneous equations based on causality, which includes five endogenous variables: ownership of larger shareholders, managerial ownership, director compensation, debt financing and firm value. It adopts 1,644 data samples from 274 Chinese listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2007- 2012 after the non-tradable shares reform. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of single equation, 2SLS and 3SLS estimation of simultaneous equations are respectively done to show the differences of these three kinds of estimations.

The empirical results show that differences exist among OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS estimation. Finally, 3SLS estimation should be adopted because the OLS and 2SLS estimation are biased. There are endogenous relationships between corporate governance mechanism and firm value. Through the 3SLS estimation, it is found that first, ownership concentration and firm value affect each other positively. Second, managerial ownership and firm value affect each other positively; third, director compensation and firm value affect each other negatively, while director compensation and firm performance affect each other positively. Finally, debt financing level and firm value are negatively related to each other.

It means that ownership of large shareholders, managerial ownership, director compensation and debt financing in the Chinese listed companies are found to have a root in the interaction between institutional arrangement and market choice. It is also found that adverse selection occurs when creditors loan to the listed companies. Managerial compensation is positively related to accounting profit, but it is negatively related to firm value because managers increase profit due by earning management. This could only increase the accounting profits and obtain huge cash compensation, but not increase firm value and even harm the interests of shareholders.

This paper not only shows the difference between OLS and 2SLS estimation but also compares the estimation of 2SLS and 3SLS in terms of empirical methods. It gives answers to the following questions: whether the relationship is one-way causality or bilateral causality between ownership concentration, managerial ownership, director compensation and firm value; whether governance mechanism affects firm value by institutional arrangement, or market drives both of them to strike a balance by an invisible hand. In other words, does it make them arrive at equilibrium through the competitive selection process when shareholders, directors, managers and creditors attempt to maximize themselves of their interests?

The observation that different national stock markets are interrelated to different degrees is well established in the literature on global market integration. This literature documents that different national markets display more or less sensitivity to movements in other national equity markets, depending on various factors such as: their geographic proximity, their trade relationships, their relative importance to world economic activity, and the time period under scrutiny. While equity values in a few major markets, such as Japan, the UK and the US, tend to lead global price movements, the nature of these intermarket relationships appears to vary at different points in time. Roll (1989), for example, documents that October 1987 is the only month in recent experience during which all markets moved in the same direction. This result suggests that intermarket price relationships differ in periods of normal market activity from those in periods of extreme price moves, such as October 1987.

Veneer is one of the most important products in the wood‐based panel industry, therefore, to provide needed information for the development of this industry, it is necessary to provide better understanding of the forces driving the demand and supply of veneer. The purpose of this paper is to describe how supply and demand can be estimated by using a simultaneous equations model.

A theoretical framework is proposed based on a systematic approach of iterative 3‐stage least squares (I3SLS). The reason for using simultaneous equations is the existence of reciprocal relations between economic variables in this research.

Applying this theoretical framework is a useful tool to study the situation of veneer as one of the most important wood‐based panel products in Iran. For example, based on the results, it can be understood that veneer is a normal and essential commodity, and any increase in the price of veneer can lead to a considerable rise in total income for producers. To satisfy the excess demand, extensive investment is needed in establishing new plants.

There are many restrictions in applying other approaches, because of no access to research data. The present study provides a starting‐point for further research using other econometric models on different aspects of forest products marketing.

The framework (econometric models especially simultaneous equations) has proven to be useful in studying and improving forest products marketing. The use of such procedures was new and this research was done for the first time in Iran.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the accurate cause and effect relationships among strategic objectives and also to demonstrate how decision makers can be guided in the process of defining quantitative strategic target values in the framework of balanced scorecard (BSC) and performance measurement system.

Based on the proposed method in this research, after determining strategic objectives and developing an initial strategy map according to decision makers’ opinions, simultaneous equations system (SES) was used to determine the significance of the relationships among strategic objectives in higher perspectives of the BSC and corresponding strategic objectives in lower perspectives. Afterward, desirable values for performance measures were determined based on the equations and relationships obtained through SES and were optimized by goal programming method.

By applying the proposed method, a clearer picture of the associations among strategic objectives is obtained and the influence of strategic objectives on one another is determined. Afterward, optimal values for strategic objectives are determined to achieve the organization’s goals.

This paper proposes a framework for constructing a strategy map and setting quantitative targets in the framework of BSC. Indeed, this paper presents a case study to demonstrate the applicability and effectiveness of the proposed approach. However, SES technique requires a greater amount of data to generate more accurate results. Although the advent of the Information Age has forced organizations’ decision makers to provide sufficient information and data for business analysis, the data requirements are met.

The presented quantitative approach is a supporting approach for improving decision makers’ opinions and enabling them to reach a more accurate picture of the relationships, valuing strategic objectives and achieving strategic goals. This research also presents a case study to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed approach. The application and implication of the proposed method in banking services show that the contributions of the paper are not only theoretical, but also practical.

The proposed method provides a novel approach for determining the most appropriate targets and applies a comprehensive and scientific model together with decision makers’ opinions and experiences and has two main contributions: first, the associations among strategic objectives are investigated and obtained in an effective way by conducting the SES for the first time in the framework of BSC. Second, quantitative targets have been determined to help in achieving the long-term goals. This task has been accomplished through a combination of SES, the three-stage least squares regression analysis and optimization by using weighted goal programming method.

This paper aims to investigate whether audit fees and financial report readability are bi-directionally related.

The authors test their hypotheses with empirical data. Specifically, they adopt a two-stage simultaneous equation regression model to assess the bi-directional relationship between audit fees and financial report readability.

While poor readability increases the fees charged by the auditor, higher audit fees improve the readability of the financial reports.

This study is based on US data. Future research may extend this study to other countries.

Poor financial report readability encumbers stakeholders of the firms. Understanding the interaction between financial report readability and audit fees will help both auditors and firm managers.

Audit committees aggressively negotiating for lower audit fees should be aware of the link of low audit fees, potentially indicative of poor quality, to less readable reports. Investors and regulators too should be concerned about this relationship, especially in instances when auditors low-ball audit fees or when firms aggressively negotiate for lower audit fees.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to document the bi-directional relationship between financial report readability and audit fees and assess the positive impact of audit fees on financial report readability.

While there have been extensive empirical investigations of pay-performance sensitivity, the perspective of performance-pay has received less attention to date. While executive compensation is sensitive to firm performance, firm performance is also likely to be affected by executive compensation. Adopting multiple theoretical perspectives, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether executive compensation has a greater influence on firm performance or whether the latter has a greater influence on compensation.

Using data from a five-year period (2010-2014) for Financial Times and Stock Exchange 350 companies, the authors employ a set of simultaneous equation modelling to jointly investigate, after accounting for endogeneity problem, the mutual association of executive compensation and firm performance by employing four control variables (board size, non-executive directors, leverage and boardroom ownership).

The authors find strong evidence for the greater influence of executive compensation on firm performance than the pay-performance framework. This finding supports the tournament theory compared with the agency perspective.

Inevitably, there are limitations in a wide-ranging study of this nature that could be addressed in future research. As any empirical study utilising company data, there may be concerns to the effect of survivorship bias and the manner in which companies have reorganised, if there is any, themselves during the period under examination. There are also issues as to missing data, some measures relating to both executive compensation and corporate governance are not provided by the BoardEx database.

The study results provide evidence that using the tournament perspective by remuneration committees as a guide for determining executive compensation helps in achieving better performance. This helps in developing appropriate mechanisms for setting executive remuneration.

This paper combines an empirical investigation of the frameworks of pay-performance and performance-pay and develops a system of six simultaneous equations to examine the associations between executive compensation and firm performance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between state ownership and firm profitability in developing countries by considering the endogenous nature of state ownership and firm profitability.

A simultaneous equation analysis is applied to study 232 Tunisian firms over the 2001-2013 period. This analysis is compared with OLS estimates to show its power in terms of an endogenous setting and its potential to improve estimation.

Unlike the OLS estimates that show a non-significant relationship between state ownership and firm profitability, the simultaneous equation analysis reveals a non-symmetrical concave relationship. Specifically, state ownership affects positively firm profitability when it is relatively small and negatively when state ownership dominates. Specification test indicates that both state ownership and firm profitability are endogenous. Furthermore, the simultaneous model’s explanatory power exceeds that of OLS estimates and proves to be a suitable estimation technique.

Taking into account public firms’ categorization, the authors implicitly examine the effect of privatization and corporatization on firm profitability. The findings imply that privatization is not the only solution to the operational problems of public firms, but an internal governance system restructuring can also be favorable for these firms.

In addition to focusing on a new database of developing countries, the case of Tunisian firms, the main empirical analysis is conducted by considering the endogeneity issue. Thus, the findings improve understanding of the role played by state ownership and suggest that a partial state control appears to be beneficial to firm profitability.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of acquirer's earnings quality on the choice of payment method in mergers and acquisitions (M&A).

The paper applies a simultaneous equations model to address the concern of endogeneity between earnings quality and payment method in corporate acquisitions. In addition, a propensity score matching model is used for robustness purpose.

Previous studies imply that short‐term accruals have a significant impact on the choice of payment method in M&A. In this study, This paper shows that acquisition financing is not significantly affected by short‐term earnings quality once control variables are considered. Instead, this paper finds that it is the long‐term earnings quality of the acquirer that matters. Acquiring firms with poor (good) long‐term earnings quality prefer lower (higher) cash payment in acquisitions. Their results are robust to different definitions of earnings quality.

Researchers should consider the effect of long‐term earnings quality in their future investigations.

Investors should be aware of this issue when evaluating corporate mergers.

This is the first study to examine the impact of long‐term quality of earnings on the choice of payment method in M&A.

Tests a new series of models which attempt to describe the relationship between advertising and sales. Describes an attempt to obtain information of this kind by investigating the effect of advertising on sales and brand shares. States that a number of researchers are now attempting to develop models to explain the workings of the market for a particular product. Emphasises that the prime area of interest of the study is the effect of advertising on sales and brand shares. States the study does not have the objective of constructing a complete marketing model involving all the variables that are thought to influence a brand's share of a product. Concludes that many results herein are disappointing, but it is perhaps too optimistic to expect the models dealt with earlier to be successful.

In this study, the authors demonstrate the inherent connections between bank risk-taking, performance and executive compensation in the banking sector of China by developing a theoretical model and performing empirical tests with simultaneous equation models.

The authors construct a multi-task principal-agent model to capture agency problems in China, and the model can be extended to various cases. In empirical tests, simultaneous equation models are used to examine the theoretical predictions by eliminating endogenous concerns efficiently compared with the methods in the existing literature.

The results indicate that the regulator fails to provide bank managers with positive incentives to control risk, whereas the compensation guidance policy (2010) proposed by the CBRC alleviates this problem in China. Additionally, the authors established that shareholders reward bank managers for better and more stable performance. The authors propose the introduction of restricted stock options into the compensation design, as the existing compensation design fails to balance the performance and risk-taking of banks.

First, the executive compensation structure and details in China are not available. In addition, the equity-based incentive compensation is forbidden. Therefore, this paper cannot provide more details about how the compensation structure affects bank manager behaviours. Secondly, the database consists only 25 listed commercial banks. Luckily, the assets of these banks could account for the vast majority of China's banking assets. The authors also expect that new methodologies such as machine learning and deep learning will be adopted in the research on bank risk management.

First, the regulator should optimise the compositions and payment rule of bank executive compensations. Secondly, it is advisable to adopt restricted deferred share reward or stock option compensation in due course. Thirdly, the regulator can require the banks that undertake excessive risks and troubled by moral hazard to increase the independent director proportion on the bank board according to the authors' empirical tests that higher independent proportion prevents the risk accumulations effectively. Fourthly, except for absolute compensation, the gap between executives' salary and average employee's income should be taken account.

This study provides a theoretical framework that incorporates the manager behaviours, executive compensation and bank regulations, and it provides empirical tests by solving endogenous concerns. Additionally, this study examines the effects of China's compensation guidelines issued in 2010. The authors believe that this study adds value to the existing literature by illustrating the compensation mechanism in China.