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The purpose of this paper is to bridge the gap between the pros and cons of a questionable finance-growth nexus.

Over 20 fundamental characteristics that have influenced the debate over the last decades have been examined. The empirical evidence is based on 196 outcomes from 20 studies. The author assesses the degree of heterogeneity and identify causes of the observed differentiation.

The findings also show evidence of publication bias. Overall, a genuine effect exists between financial development and economic growth. A finance-growth nexus might not be appealing in our era because of: endogeneity-based estimations, publication bias, and effects of financial activity. A historical justification has also been discussed.

Encouraging the publication of results with findings that are not consistent with the mainstream positive finance-growth nexus should provide new scholarly insights into the relationship. Depending on the specific context of sampled countries, the role of policy has also been to encourage financial development through measures that may expose countries to negative external shocks like financial crises. Policy makers that have been viewing the challenges of development exclusively from this point of view for the rewards of growth may not be getting the financial dynamics correctly.

Very few meta-analysis studies have focused on the finance-growth nexus.

Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across African countries? Why are some countries more effective at battling corruption than others? To assess these concerns this paper aims to examine the determinants of corruption control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption using panel data from 46 African countries for the period 2002‐2010.

The panel quantile regression technique enables us to investigate if the relationship between corruption control and the exogenous variables differs throughout the distribution of the fight against corruption.

Results could be summarized in the following. Greater economic prosperity leads to less corruption control and the magnitude of the effect is more important in countries where the fight against corruption is high. Regulation quality seems bimodal, with less positive effects in the tails: among the best and least fighters of corruption. There is support for a less negative consequence of population growth in countries that are already taking the fight against corruption seriously in comparison to those that are lax on the issue. Findings on democracy broadly indicate the democratization process increases the fight against corruption with a greater magnitude at higher quantiles: countries that are already taking the fight seriously. The relevance of voice and accountability in the battle against corruption decreases as corruption control is taken more seriously by the powers that be. Good governance dynamics of political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law gain more importance in the fight against corruption when existing levels of corruption control are already high.

The results of this study suggest that the determinants of corruption control respond differently across the corruption‐control distribution. This implies some current corruption‐control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt African nations. As a policy implication, the fight against corruption should not be postponed; doing so will only reduce the effectiveness of policies in the future. The rewards of institutional reforms are more positive in countries that are already seriously engaged in the corruption fight.

This paper contributes to existing literature on the determinants of corruption by focusing on the distribution of the dependent variable (control of corruption). It is likely that good and poor corruption fighters respond differently to factors that influence the fight against corruption. There are subtle institutional differences between corrupt and clean nations that may affect corruption‐control determinants and government efficacy in the fight against corruption.

A major lesson of the European Monetary Union (EMU) crisis is that serious disequilibria result from regional monetary arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks. The purpose of this paper is to assess these disequilibria within the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and Financial Community of Africa (CFA) zones.

In the assessments, monetary policy targets inflation and financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size while real sector policy targets economic performance in terms of GDP growth. The author also provides the speed of convergence and time required to achieve a 100 percent convergence.

But for financial intermediary size within the CFA zone, findings, for the most part, support only unconditional convergence. There is no form of convergence within the CEMAC zone.

The broad insignificance of conditional convergence results has substantial policy implications. Monetary and real policies, which are often homogenous for member states, are thwarted by heterogeneous structural and institutional characteristics, which give rise to different levels and patterns of financial intermediary development. Therefore, member states should work towards harmonizing cross‐country differences in structural and institutional characteristics that hamper the effectiveness of monetary policies.

The paper provides warning signs to the CFA zone in the heat of the Euro zone crises.

Natural disasters may inflict significant damage upon international financial markets. The purpose of this study is to investigate if any contagion effect occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese earthquake, tsunami and subsequent nuclear crisis.

Using 33 international stock indices and exchange rates, this paper uses heteroscedasticity biases based on correlation coefficients to examine if any contagion occurred across financial markets after the March 11, 2011 Japanese earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis. The sample period is partitioned into two sections: the 12‐month pre‐earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011) and the 2‐month post‐earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). While the stability period is defined as the pre‐earthquake period, the turbulent (turmoil) period is defined as the post‐earthquake period. In a bid to ensure robustness of the findings, the turmoil period is further partitioned into two equal sections: the 1‐month (short‐term) post‐earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011), and the 2‐month (medium‐term) post‐earthquake (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011).

Findings reveal that, while no sampled foreign exchange markets suffered from contagion, stock markets of Taiwan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and South Africa witnessed a contagion effect.

The results have two paramount implications. First, the paper has confirmed existing consensus that in the face of natural crises that could take an international scale, emerging markets are contagiously affected for the most part. Second, the empirical evidence also suggests that international financial market transmissions not only occur during financial crisis; natural disaster effects should not be undermined.

This paper has shown that the correlation structure of international financial markets are also affected by high profile natural disasters.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce previously missing financial components (efficiency, activity and size) in the assessment of the finance-investment nexus.

Vector autoregressive models in the perspectives of Vector Error Correction Model and short-run Granger causality are employed. There is usage of optimally specified econometric methods as opposed to purely discretionary model specifications in mainstream literature.

Three main findings are established: first, while finance led investment elasticities are positive, investment elasticities of finance are negative; second, but for Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Togo, finance does not seem to engender portfolio investment; and finally, contrary to mainstream literature, financial efficiency appears to impact investment more than financial depth.

Four policy implications result: first, extreme caution is needed in the use of single equation analysis for economic forecasts; second, financial development leads more to investment flows than the other way round; third, financial allocation efficiency is more relevant as means to attracting investment flows than financial depth; and finally, the somewhat heterogeneous character of the findings also point to shortcomings in blanket policies that are not contingent on country-specific trends in the finance-investment nexus.

First, contrary to the mainstream approach we use four measures of financial intermediary development (depth, efficiency, activity and size) as well as four types of investment flows (domestic, foreign, portfolio and total). Second, the chosen investment and financial indicators are derived upon preliminary robust correlation analyses from the broadest macroeconomic data set available on investment and financial intermediary flows.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate post‐crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to manage liquidity risk. It is based on the fact that the financial liquidity market was greatly affected during the recent economic turmoil and financial meltdown. During the crisis, liquidity risk management disclosure was crucial for confidence building in market participants.

The study investigates if Basel II pillar 3 disclosures on liquidity risk management are applied by 20 of top 33 world banks. Bank selection is based on information availability, geographic balance and comprehensiveness of the language in which information is provided. This information is searched from the World Wide Web, with a minimum of one hour allocated to “content search”, and indefinite time for “content analyses”. Such content scrutiny is guided by 16 disclosure principles classified in four main categories.

Only 25 per cent of sampled banks provide publicly accessible liquidity risk management information, a clear indication that in the post‐crisis era, many top ranking banks still do not take Basel disclosure norms seriously, especially the February 2008 pre‐crisis warning by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

Bank stakeholders should easily have access to information on liquidity risk management. Banks falling‐short of making such information available might not inspire confidence in market participants in events of financial panic and turmoil. As in the run‐up to the previous financial crisis, if banks are not compelled to explicitly and expressly disclose what measures they adopt in a bid to guarantee stakeholder liquidity, the onset of any financial shake‐up would only precipitate a meltdown. The main limitation of this study is the use of the World Wide Web as the only source of information available to bank stakeholders and/or market participants.

The contribution of this paper to literature can be viewed from the role it plays in investigating post‐crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to inform stakeholders on their management of liquidity risk.

This paper aims to explore the impact of information communication technology (ICT) use and government efficiency on the economic growth. It assesses empirically the impact of government success in ICT promotion and government efficiency to enhance economic growth and catalyzing corruption control through technology adoption.

This paper examines the relationship between ICT and economic growth in a large sample of 149 countries for the period 2012–2016. The empirical evidence is based on the generalized method of moments.

There is a significant relationship between e-government development, ICT development and institutional quality, and not ICT development and corruption. The empirical results show that a negative value of the interaction suggests that the impact of corruption on economic growth is smaller for countries with a higher level of technology adoption.

The differences in e-government success across countries in the world are influenced by the digital divide due to income and corruption control level.

The efficiency of technology adoption and promotion will ensure stronger effects of corruption control on economic growth. Relevant practical implications derive from the research that can guide public policy in the area of e-government.

This study aims to examine how the starting of business by females can be promoted by assessing critical levels of microfinance institutions (MFIs) penetration that policymakers must endeavor to maintain and/or attain in order for female unemployment not to represent a constraint in the doing of business. A constraint in doing business is understood in terms of the procedure that a woman has to go through to start a business.

The focus of the study is on 44 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2004–2018, while the empirical evidence is based on interactive quantile regressions.

The following findings are established. The validity of tested hypotheses is exclusively apparent in the lowest and highest quantiles of the conditional distribution of the procedure women have to go through to start a business. MFI penetration levels needed to reverse the unfavorable incidence of female unemployment in doing business are provided. These are minimum MFIs penetration thresholds that are required in order for female unemployment not to negatively affect the procedure that a woman should go through to start a business.

The study complements the extant literature by assessing critical microfinance penetration levels that are needed to promote female doing of business, contingent on existing levels of female doing of business.