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This study aims to identify the sources of laundered money in Iran and the destinations to which it is transferred, independently verified by auditors. Based on such data, the study aims to develop a simple model of endogenous and exogenous factors facilitating money laundering in developing countries, which can inform domestic and international legislative and regulatory responses.

Questionnaires were sent to Iranian certified public accountants who worked for auditing firms in 2019 and who have encountered suspected money laundering during their work with clients.

The government and public officials are the primary sources of money laundering activity in Iran. The main destinations of laundered funds are investments abroad, gold, foreign currencies, real estate and purchases of luxury goods. Domestic legislation, while bearing similarities with that found in other jurisdictions such as the UK and the USA, is flawed in several ways, including an inability to determine beneficial ownership of funds and weak enforcement.

Because of international sanctions and the prevailing political situation, it is difficult to obtain data for money laundering and other financial crimes in Iran. The data obtained is of importance to international bodies in understanding the nature of money laundering in Iran, and how to negotiate in the future to address mutual concerns. Given the country’s perceived high association with money laundering, the data obtained is of value in identifying the specific characteristics of the problem.

Iran has been ranked by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as one of the foremost countries in the world for money laundering. However, Iranian banks claim that they comply with international standards for reporting suspicious activity, risk management and training. This paper aims to investigate this dichotomy between perception and reality.

A Wolfsberg-style questionnaire was sent to partners in Iranian accounting firms, which have audited domestic banks over the past five years to investigate the adequacy of risk management systems.

Most Iranian banks have anti-money laundering (AML) systems, which compare favourably with those of international counterparties. Banks take a risk-based approach to potential criminal behaviour. The negative perception of Iranian banks is principally attributable to the government’s unwillingness to accede to “touchstone” international conventions. In spite of having in place AML laws, which are comparable in intent with those of the UK and the United States of America (USA), weak enforcement remains a significant impediment of which the political establishment is aware.

Measures required to bring Iranian banks into compliance with international standards may be less extensive than perceptions suggest. However, failure of the government to accede to conventions stipulated by the FATF means that banks may remain ostracised by foreign counterparties for the foreseeable future.

This study provides a unique insight into the extent of AML compliance in Iranian banks as verified by external auditors.

This paper aims to compare products traded in secular and Islamic banking environments prior to the credit crunch of 2007–2008; to locate the comparison in a Schumpeterian model of creative destruction of dynamic innovation in the capital markets; and to evaluate the implications for diversity of investor product choice.

Financial products are critiqued using qualitative criteria, including underestimation of risk implicit in mortgage-backed securities and securitisation, excessive speculative activity in credit default swaps and the magnification of leverage and volatility. Comparable Islamic products are considered for the extent to which they facilitate the same precursors of market crises.

Innovation in secular financial markets has traditionally led to asset bubbles, underestimation of risks and market exuberance. Islamic banking constrains creativity by prohibiting risk transference and disconnection of financing activity from social context and economic purpose. As such, the latter reduces Schumpeterian creative destruction but at the cost of reduced investor choice and market liquidity. Restriction of the reallocation of risk between those who do not wish to hold it and those who do dampens innovation but would have prevented the trading of products which contributed to the credit crunch.

The constraining effect of Islamic banking upon creativity and innovation is considered alongside its capacity to reduce market volatility, speculation and systemic instability. Schumpeterian theory deepens the analysis in terms of the drivers of innovation and market collapse.

Audit committees (ACs) have an important role to play in banks in Saudi Arabia in detecting and reporting weaknesses which may make financial crime possible. The Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Code of 2016 comprises recommendations for ensuring the effectiveness of these committees, but cultural and behavioural factors can constitute impediments. This paper aims to explore these factors and makes recommendations.

The methodology is qualitative, using data derived from responses to a questionnaire administered to 180 current and former members of internal and external audit teams of Saudi Arabian banks.

ACs in Saudi financial institutions enjoy a high degree of functional independence of boards. Boards tend to regard ACs as part of the organisation: in contrast, AC members perceive their first duty as being owed to stakeholders. Disagreements between boards and ACs regarding disclosure of findings of systemic weaknesses which facilitate money laundering (ML) are made publicly available; this engenders transparency and avoidance of collusion. Professional qualifications and experience of AC members have improved substantially in recent years, equipping them to better discharge statutory duties regarding the detection and reporting of suspected ML.

The regulatory body, the Saudi Arabian Markets Authority, should be diligent in ensuring the presence of non-executive directors in sufficient numbers to counterbalance influence by boards. Disagreements between boards and ACs regarding internal systemic changes to prevent ML and other financial crimes should be formally recorded in minutes and made public as a matter of record.

Questionnaire responses by past and present members of ACs are unique and contribute to the literature.

This study aims to compare judicial and auditor expectations of audit in the detection and reporting of money laundering in Iran. It also aims to assess the implications of expectations gap for the reliability of data provided to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in its blacklisting policy.

Questionnaires were administered to auditors to determine perceptions of their anti-money laundering (AML) reporting obligations. These were also completed by Iranian judges who hear money laundering prosecutions and who agreed to participate in the research. The group was created through the “snowballing” technique.

There is significant divergence between judges and auditors regarding the latter’s AML reporting obligations. Self-perception among auditors regarding investigative duties is insufficiently aligned with expectations of the FATF, particularly where there is use of corporate structures, charities and trusts in which identity of true owners, of payers and payees of funds cannot be accurately verified. This gap presents a significant terrorist financing risk.

The expectations gap makes training in forensic accounting, as well as compliance with international reporting expectations, a matter of urgency for the Iranian auditing profession. The judiciary needs to be more aware of international expectations.

Data regarding judicial expectations of auditors’ AML reporting obligations is difficult to obtain and of a highly sensitive nature. This research has obtained such data which has relevance to the FATF blacklisting policy, and to international organisations tasked with disrupting terrorist financing networks.

The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is widely applied as a performance measurement and strategy implementation tool by organizations. Research has revealed that the term “balanced scorecard” may be understood differently by managers both within as well as across organizations implying that the performance measurement systems implemented in organizations may not be similar to the construct envisioned by Kaplan and Norton. Using Kaplan and Norton's Balanced Scorecard construct as a basis, the paper aims to develop and test a five‐level taxonomy to classify firms' performance measurement systems.

A Balanced Scorecard taxonomy is validated using a large sample of professional accountants working in Canadian organizations.

The five‐level taxonomy is used to categorize the performance measurement systems of 149 organizations. It is found that 111 organizations' (74.5 percent) performance measurement systems met the criteria to be classified as a Basic Level 1 BSC, while 61 (40.9 percent) organizations have structurally complete Level 3 BSCs, and 36 (24.2 percent) organizations have fully developed Level 5 BSCs. The paper also discusses differences between Level 1 and Level 5 BSC organizations.

While many researchers assume that organizations' performance measurement systems are similar in implementation level and use, the paper demonstrates that organizations are at different levels of BSC implementation and use, a factor that should be taken into consideration when designing empirical studies to test the efficacy of Kaplan and Norton's BSC.

The five‐level BSC taxonomy scheme provides managers working with Kaplan and Norton's BSC with a tool to plan their implementation steps and then benchmark their progress towards implementing a fully developed Level 5 BSC.

In developing and empirically validating a BSC taxonomy, the paper builds on and extends previous research on BSC implementation and its potential implications.

The dual importance of centrally induced strategic intent and the ability to engage in autonomous strategic initiatives has been demonstrated in both qualitative and quantitative empirical studies over the past decades. However, the particular mechanisms required to facilitate the interaction between these strategy-making approaches and achieve better corporate performance are less clear. The authors argue that the commonly conceived but rarely examined role of the strategic control process is essential to the implied adaptive performance dynamic. Although the strategic control typically is conceived as the diagnostic monitoring of outcomes, the authors contend that an interactive control (IC) mechanism is conducive to superior performance outcomes. To examine this, the authors use the extant strategy literature to generate the basic hypothesized relationships and conduct an empirical study based on a large corporate sample to uncover the intricate strategy-making model. The analyses show that adherence to ICs is an essential mediator for the positive combined effects of strategic planning and autonomous strategy-making processes.

The purpose of this article is to explore how the strategic change following a corporate takeover impacted the nature and extent of use of the firm's management control systems (MCS), in particular its performance measurement system (PMS).

This paper uses Michael Porter's theory of competitive advantage and Robert Simons' levers of control framework to illustrate and interpret changes in the PMS within an Australian multinational subsidiary following its takeover by an overseas corporation. To provide empirical evidence on this issue, face‐to‐face interviews and archival data are used.

The findings reveal that the takeover resulted in changes in the firm's competitive forces (threat of potential entrants, bargaining power of buyers, threat of substitute products or services, bargaining power of suppliers, and rivalry among existing firms), and therefore the firm altered its strategy to change the rules of competition in its favor. Corresponding to the strategic change, the PMS was affected, with specific implications on Simons' four levers of control: interactive, diagnostic, beliefs, and boundary systems.

The findings suggest that a corporate takeover is an important phase for any organization, as it involves a change in the competitive environment and strategy, and needs to be facilitated by a change in the MCS to create and sustain superior performance.

This case study demonstrates how interactive and beliefs systems work together with diagnostic and boundary systems in the context of change in an organization. Past research devoted to strategic change and MCS has not documented this phenomenon.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically explore how the effect of intellectual capital (IC) on organizational performance is indirect and mediated through performance measurement (PM) systems.

Data were collected from a survey of 128 chief financial officers of Iranian publicly listed companies. Hypotheses were tested using partial least squares regression, a structural modeling technique which is appropriate for highly complex predictive models.

Results from the structural model indicate that, in general, companies with a higher level of IC place a premium on the balanced use of PM systems in a diagnostic and interactive style. Furthermore, the results provide some evidence that IC is indirectly associated with organizational performance through the intervening variable of the balanced use of interactive and diagnostic PM systems.

This study sheds light on the issue of how senior management should use PM systems to take full advantage of intellectual assets which could lead to improved organizational performance.

This is the first study of its kind to synthesize a model which examines IC, PM systems, and organizational performance. Although the effect of different types of intangible assets on performance has been substantially examined in the literature, less effort has been devoted to understanding the role of PM systems in leveraging an organization’s IC.