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This paper aims to study the pricing problems on the two-sided market for cases of monopoly and duopoly competition, specifically investigating the impact of platform…
This paper aims to study the pricing problems on the two-sided market for cases of monopoly and duopoly competition, specifically investigating the impact of platform service quality on the market. Theoretical analysis and computational studies are conducted to investigate the impact of different parameters on the system outcomes.
Mathematical formulations are proposed for cases of monopoly and duopoly competition. For monopolistic market, the optimal pricing and service quality strategies are obtained using mathematical programming method. For duopolistic market, the equilibrium outcomes are derived by game theory. Sensitivity analysis and numerical studies are also adopted to investigate the impact of different parameters.
For monopolistic market, the platform will provide a low service quality when the service cost parameter is large. However, when the cost parameter is small, the platform provides a higher service quality and higher registration prices. Furthermore, the sum of the optimal prices is proportional to the service quality and inversely proportional to the user price sensitivity. For duopolistic market, the competitive equilibrium prices exist under a certain condition. The determinants of equilibrium prices are the gap between the service qualities of two platforms and the cross-group externalities.
For monopolistic market, this paper specifies the role of platform service quality in determining the platform’s pricing strategy. For duopolistic market, this paper presents a market sharing mechanism between two platforms and explores the equilibrium pricing strategies for platforms with different service quality level.
Over the past three decade, China has established a housing finance system that borrows from the collective experiences of advanced economies. After examining the…
Over the past three decade, China has established a housing finance system that borrows from the collective experiences of advanced economies. After examining the evolution of China’s housing finance system, the paper focuses on analyzing its challenges and recent changes. The paper argues that China’s highly-centralized financial system prefers financial stability but neglects financial liberalization, and then resulted in severe financial repression, which hurts the efficiency and equality of the housing finance service. After recovering from the 2008 financial crisis via high-cost financial intervention, China took some policy innovations to promote a decentralized finance mechanism, expand finance resources, and support affordable housing financing, through which China hopes to provide a more stable, affordable, and equal housing finance service to help more households own homes.