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Current US tax laws provide investors an incentive to time the sales of their bonds to minimize tax liability. This gives rise to a tax-timing option that affects bond value. In reality, corporate bond investors’ tax-timing strategy is complicated by risk of default. Existing term structure models have ignored the effect of the tax-timing option, and how much corporate bond value is due to the tax-timing option is unknown. In this chapter, we assess the effects of taxes and stochastic interest rates on the timing option value and equilibrium price of corporate bonds by considering discount and premium amortization, multiple trading dates, transaction costs, and changes in the level and volatility of interest rates. We find that the value of the tax-timing option accounts for a substantial proportion of corporate bond price even when interest rate volatility is low. Ignoring the timing option value results in overestimation of credit spread, and underestimation of default probability and the marginal investor’s income tax rate. These estimation biases generally increase with bond maturity and credit risk.

The role of money and monetary policy of the central bank in pursuing macroeconomic stability has significantly changed over the period since the end of World War II. Globalization, liberalization, integration, and transition processes generally shaped the crucial milestones of the macroeconomic development and substantial features of economic policy and its framework in Europe. Policy-driven changes together with variety of exogenous shocks significantly affected the key features of macroeconomic environment on the European continent that fashioned the framework and design of monetary policies.

This chapter examines the key basis of the central bank’s monetary policy on its way to pursue and preserve the internal and external stability of the purchasing power of money. Substantial elements of the monetary policy like objectives and strategies are not only generally introduced but also critically discussed according to their accuracy, suitability, and reliability in the changing macroeconomic conditions. Brief overview of the Eurozone common monetary policy milestones and the past Eastern bloc countries’ experience with a variety of exchange rate regimes provides interesting empirical evidence on origins and implications of vital changes in the monetary policy conduction in Europe and the Eurozone.

I will investigate the short-term and the long-term characteristics of Japanese daily overnight call rate between 1985 and 1999 and compare it with the U.S. federal funds rate during the same period. Such long-term data for the former has not been utilized in the previous studies. When we compare the short-term characteristics of these two rates with the corresponding long-term ones, those are found to be different. When we compare these two rates in the short-term as well as in the long-term, the long-term characteristics are found to be different, even though the short-term characteristics are similar in some sub-sample periods.

Long-term interest rates of small open economies (SOE) correlate strongly with the USA long-term rate. Can central banks in those countries decouple from the United States? An estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for the UK (vis-á-vis the USA) establishes three structural empirical results: (1) Comovement arises due to nominal fluctuations, not through real rates or term premia; (2) the cause of comovement is the central bank of the SOE accommodating foreign inflation trends, rather than systematically curbing them; and (3) SOE may find themselves much more affected by changes in USA inflation trends than the United States itself. All three results are shown to be intuitive and backed by off-model evidence.

The chapter first emphasizes the aspects which Steuart (1767), Thornton (1802), Tooke (1844, 1838–1857), and Keynes (1923) have in common about the relation between the exchange rate and the short-term rate of interest: they all considered a temporary unfavorable foreign balance caused by an asymmetrical exogenous shock, which called for a discretionary policy favoring international short-term capital inflows to overcome the consequences of the deficit. These aspects draw an unorthodox genealogy on this issue between the four authors, contrary to the tradition originating in Hume and developed later by the British monetary orthodoxy. Secondly, the chapter shows that there was an analytical progress from Steuart (1767) to Keynes (1923), which however faced a limit: if it reinforced an unorthodox genealogy, it did not integrate the modern idea according to which international short-term capital movements may themselves be a source of external disequilibrium. The origin of this limit was probably in the question raised, which was the adjustment to an exogenous asymmetrical shock.

The chapter presents an overview of major currency and international capital market movements after World War II, showing that the movements brought about by US investments in the fifties and sixties that created the offshore Eurodollar bear resemblance to what is now taking place between the United States as the world's investor and China. International money is created in a triangular process of long and short lending intermediated by short borrowing. The imbalances often recorded on US current account are to some extent counterbalanced by the huge returns accruing to businesses of the west. This follows the “dark matter” theory but with the twist that real value is extracted through foreign direct investment in line with the rationale of Eurodollar flows. However, threats are also created in this way. Rather than in superficial notions of instability in currency markets, the high returns on capital abroad have been instrumental both in the deindustrialization of the west and the maintenance of a high rate of consumption through the financialization of the housing market. The eventual overdrive precipitated the crisis starting in 2007, but the dollar relationship with China continues unabatedly.

Social scientists have increasingly turned to constructivist models to explain when, and how, international and world-level social forces constrain the policy-making autonomy of national states. While constructivists have shown that international ideational processes matter for domestic policy making, they have had a harder time explaining why some ideas gain prominence in policy discussions while others do not. This chapter develops an institutionally centered materialist model of idea selection, arguing that international relations of dependency give actors who control vital financial resources a greater capacity to shape the ideational agenda. This model is explored through a case study of the international sources of American monetary policy in the early 1960s. A detailed examination of archival materials shows that European officials at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development were able to advance their own ideas for American monetary policy because the United States was dependent on European cooperation to help resolve its mounting balance of payments problems.