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The present essay re-examines the scope of Sraffa’s critique of Marshall’s supply curves that the former developed in his 1925 and 1926 articles showing that neoclassical supply curves derived from non-proportional returns are not robust both in the short and in the long run. After examining what a short-run and a long-run equilibrium means both for the original Sraffa’s articles and for Marshall’s pioneer contribution, the chapter discusses the common procedure in conventional economics to introduce the limitations to the growth of the firm. The argument of the chapter will be based on the 1920s articles as well as on the ‘Lectures on Advanced Theory of Value’ delivered in 1928–1931 by Sraffa at Cambridge University, now publicly available online by the Wren library, Trinity College, Cambridge. For short-run analysis, it must be assumed that the number of firms is fixed. This assumption entails serious problems with regards to the notions of competition and competitive behaviour. For long-run analysis, the sources of increasing costs are problems of management and control. However, this idea is untenable both on logical and empirical grounds. We argue that contemporary mainstream microeconomic treatment of costs and supply in the context of perfect competition still presents several problems. These problems, rather than being superficial, lie at the root of the supply and demand approach of value and distribution.

The purpose of this study is to examine backsourcing, which refers to the full or partial re-internalization of a firm’s previously outsourced activity. Researchers have primarily focused on the drivers of backsourcing, but this paper builds on that prior research to develop a typology of backsourcing.

Drawing on transaction cost economics and the resource-based view (RBV), the paper posits that firms backsource because of two factors – changes in their short-run total costs and changes in their internal capabilities for re-internalization. By using the interactions between these two factors, the authors propose four types of backsourcing.

The paper presents a typology for backsourcing: profitability-backsourcing, operational-backsourcing, strategic-backsourcing and failure-backsourcing. Only one (failure-backsourcing) of these four types of backsourcing suggests failure, while the other three indicate strategic flexibility. The authors also present mini-cases to support the typology.

The paper presents a conceptual model of backsourcing. This is a limitations of the study and further research is needed to empirically test the proposed model.

From a managerial perspective, this framework can be used as a decision-making tool for firms that are considering backsourcing. Given the complexity involved and the perceived stigma, decision-makers may find it difficult to backsource. Thus, a framework to avoid biases leading to decision-making errors, as well as to understand if backsourcing is a viable option, is needed.

This paper is one of the first to present a typology of backsourcing which can be used to understand when it is a failure of the outsourcing strategy and when it is a signal of strategic flexibility. This paper contributes to the growing stream of research on backsourcing by moving the literature beyond determinants and bringing attention to the outcomes of backsourcing. Additionally, the proposed framework can be used as a tool by decision-makers to examine whether backsourcing is favorable for their firm based on costs and capabilities for re-internalization.

This chapter examines the main methodological issues involved in the comprehension of the cost structure of the airport industry and suggests considerations for future airport cost analyses. Such understanding has become a crucial concern for policy makers, regional planners, and managers in order to deal with optimal market design (e.g., regulation and market configuration) and airport strategies (e.g., pricing, investments, and alliances). An in-depth analysis of the economics of cost functions is presented, together with a description of the relevant multi-output cost economies measures (average incremental costs, scale and scope economies, and cost complementarities). We also discuss the assumptions underlying estimates of total versus variable cost functions and the importance of estimating a sufficiently flexible functional form. Moreover, we provide a critical survey of the international empirical literature on the cost structure of the airport industry, which highlights how econometric estimates strongly depend on the sample choice and the empirical model considered. Indeed, while econometric studies on international samples based on long-run cost function estimates show that long-run scale economies are never exhausted, single country studies mostly estimate variable cost functions and find lower values for scale economies at median sample points that tend to decrease with size. We discuss why we believe that studies based on the estimation of short-run variable cost functions offer more reliable results, given the reasonable assumption of airport overcapitalization in the short run. We conclude our work by noting that underlying policy issues related to planning and regulation, as well as to the optimal market structure of the airport sector, need to take into account the role played by vertical relationships between airports and airlines.

Inflation is really a hydra‐headed monster as Cagan named it. There have been numerous theoretical and empirical studies on the causes, costs and policies of inflation and unemployment. However, there has been no critical solution yet.

Theeuwes and Adriaansen (1994), among others, have asserted that activity-based costing (ABC) is inappropriate for operational decision-making. In this article, ABC is modified to reflect separate flexible and committed cost driver rates for an activity. This enables the model to reflect the difference in the behavior of an activity’s flexible and committed costs needed for operational planning decisions. The modified ABC facilitates determining the resources required to produce the product mix developed from the firm’s strategic plan and the excess capacity that will result. The modifications made to ABC aid in determining an optimal product mix when the firm has excess capacity, while the traditional ABC may not. Equally important, it facilitates measuring the financial implications of the resource allocation decisions that comprise the firm’s operational plan. As the operational plan is implemented, operational control is used to ensure that it is performed in an efficient and effective manner. The modified ABC enables the firm’s managers to compute the different types of deviations that arise from using flexible and committed resources at the unit, batch, and product levels of the firm’s operations. This aids in understanding problematic aspects of the firm’s operations and identifying where management resources are needed to improve operational efficiency.

The purpose of this paper is to show that general‐ and special‐purpose properties have to be dealt with differently by the public sector.

Application of standard economic theory concerning pricing of properties and infrastructure. The issues are analyzed based on experiences from Swedish state‐owned properties.

The distinction results in quite different public property management strategies. Special‐purpose properties have no short‐run alternative use and have limited rental and capital values, unlike general‐purpose properties. Thus, to apply a required rate of return based on assumed capital values universally will lead to inefficient use. For special‐purpose properties, short‐run marginal costs (SRMCs) should be charged – no more.

General properties owned by the state represent a suitable case for privatization. For special‐purpose properties, only SRMCs should be charged.

The paper makes a distinction between two kinds of state‐owned properties; general‐ and special‐purpose properties, and analyzes the important consequences in property management.