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The main purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants and interrelations between corporate ownership structure and corporate performance.

The ownership of institutional investors are classified into government institutional ownership, financial institutional ownership, securities investment trust funds ownership, incorporated companies ownership, and other institutional ownership, so as to facilitate a detailed study. Ten‐year (1994‐2003) panel data of 569 Taiwanese listed companies are examined. Furthermore, this study applies the F‐test, LM‐test and Hausman test to determine the best statistical method (ordinary least squares method, fix effects model or random effects method).

The results show an inverse “U‐shaped” relationship between insider ownership and corporate performance. Government institutional ownership and incorporated companies ownership are found to have a significant negative correlation with corporate performance. However, securities investment trust funds and corporate performance are positively correlated.

These findings provide Taiwanese listed companies with a insights on how to improve their corporate control mechanisms. These results can also serve as a useful reference for companies and the academics concerning future competitive strategies and decision making.

This study further incorporates the ratio of mortgaged/pledged shares of directors and supervisors and different institutional ownership to analyze how the mechanisms of corporate governance function in Taiwan's industries, and whether these mechanisms can effectively lower agency problems to enhance corporate performance.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the relationships among chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, ownership and firm value. In addition, the determining factors of CEO compensation are examined.

This model is applied to data of the Taiwan stock market for 1995‐2004. The paper applies a two‐stage least squares regression for the panel data model and implements an F‐test, LM test and Hausman test to determine the best statistical method (that is, ordinary least squares method, fix effects model or random effects method).

The results offer some important insights that show CEO compensation, CEO ownership and firm value are interdependent. Firm size, board size, firm value, institution ownership and CEO ownership are positively associated with CEO compensation while firm age, research and development expenditure rates and firm risk are negatively associated with CEO compensation.

The on‐going expansion in the scale of the firm depends on managers having specialized knowledge. In particular, managers are responsible for the firm's entire operational conditions and future investment strategy. Providing an incentive compensation package can reduce agency costs between managers and shareholders. These findings also provide Taiwanese listed companies with a lesson, which suggests that the existence of the monitoring system can reduce the need for incentive alignment.

The study relies on data from publicly traded Taiwan firms, covering a ten‐year period. This study uses a simultaneous equation estimation procedure to investigate the relations among CEO compensation, CEO ownership and firm value. Two proxies for effective monitoring – board size and institutional ownership – are used. The paper attempts to discuss the influence on CEO compensation from the existence of the monitoring system.

Aims to distinguish among different levels of default risk for residential mortgage loans and to examine the significant factors for the different levels of default risk. Classifies the sample into default and non‐default groups and analyses the original mortgage loan data by factor and cluster analyses based on borrower characteristics, property characteristics and microeconomic variables in order to derive risk classifications from various likelihoods of default. Furthermore, applies logit, probit and discriminant analyses to examine the significant factors for all three clusters. The empirical results show that the three clusters may be ranked as follows, in order of risk, from the least to greatest likelihood of default: the owner‐occupied housing buyer, invester group and young buyer clusters. In addition, the factor “borrower’s education level” has negative impact for all three clusters.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of ownership structure on bank performance in EU-15 countries. Specifically, it examines to what extent shareholder type and the degree of shareholder concentration affect the banks’ profitability, risk and technical efficiency.

This study uses a sample of 1,459 banks operating in EU-15 countries from 2011 to 2015. It constructs a set of continuous variables capturing the ownership nature, the concentration and their interactions, and estimates an instrumental variable random effect (IV-RE) model. In addition, a panel data stochastic frontier analysis is conducted to estimate the time-varying technical efficiency for profitability and costs.

The empirical analysis shows that bank performance is affected by shareholder type. When regressed against the entrenchment behavior of the controlling owner hypothesis, banks with large-block shareholders are more profitable, less risky and more profit efficient. Further, ownership concentration reverts the negative effect related to the institutional, bank and industry ownership.

The results support the hypothesis that concentrated ownership helps to overcome agency problems. They also confirm that managerial involvement in banks’ capital enhances a bank’s profit and its volatility.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to consider the ownership nature, the concentration and their interaction using continuous variables, which allows for more precise inferences. The results provide new evidence that bank profitability, cost efficiency and risk are affected by the type of direct shareholders.