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Considering the standards developed by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), this study aims to examine whether the link between material sustainability and financial performance depends on the extent to which the company is oriented toward stakeholders.

To test the predictions, 13,942 firm-year observations from 43 different countries are used, covering the period from 2010 to 2019. Using a hand-mapping approach to match the indicators suggested by the SASB with those of the ASSET4, the authors realize that there are 170 material sustainability indicators among 466 indicators of the ASSET4. The authors use three different methods to verify if the materiality matters, including the alphas obtained from the Fama and French factor models, comparing the average abnormal returns of the portfolios and the bootstrapped Cramer technique.

The findings show that companies investing in material sustainability activities perform better than those investing in immaterial activities. Also, consistent with the theoretical foundations, the authors find that the effect of investing in material sustainability activities is more pronounced in stakeholder-oriented countries than that in shareholder-oriented countries. The results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests.

Owing to COVID-19 in late 2019, data from 2020 to 2022 have not been used to obtain reliable results.

The results obtained in the current research provide valuable guidance for investors to make investments considering the degree of materiality of sustainability activities in different industries. It also helps managers to increase the company’s financial performance, make efficient decisions related to investment in sustainability activities and find investment strategies on the material sustainability issues in their industries.

This study provides a clearer understanding of investment in sustainability activities in different industries by separating material and immaterial sustainability activities in stakeholder and shareholder-oriented countries, and the results obtained can change the perspective of investors and company managers regarding investing in such activities in different countries. Investing in more materiality sustainability activities than the immateriality dimension can be new opportunities for companies to achieve predetermined goals, help retain and attract business partners or be a source of innovation for new product lines or services. Internal morale and employee engagement may increase while increasing productivity and firm performance. This discussion opens the way for future research.

This study provides insight into the effect of investing in material and immaterial sustainability activities in different industries on the company’s performance in shareholder and stakeholder-oriented countries.

This study aims to examine the effects of dialect connectedness between the chairman and the chief executive officer (CEO) (DCCC) on the tunneling activities of controlling shareholders.

This study uses abnormal related-party transactions (ARPT) as a proxy for tunneling activities and traces dialects of chairmen and CEOs based on the respective birthplace information. Baseline results are examined using a fixed-effects model. The results remain robust when using the instrumental variable approach, propensity score matching (PSM) technique, changing the measurement of tunneling and Heckman two-step selection model.

The results show that DCCC reduces tunneling activities. This negative association is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises and firms whose chairmen and CEOs work in the respective hometowns. DCCC restrains tunneling activities through mechanisms by establishing an informal supervisory effect on CEOs because the CEOs fear reputational damage and strengthening cooperation between chairmen and CEOs. Further analyses suggest that this negative association is more significant when chairmen and CEOs are non-controlling shareholders, but the association is weakened during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) crisis.

As dialect is a carrier of culture, this study's results imply that cultural proximity can replace formal mechanisms to enhance corporate governance.

The purpose of this study is to use an empirical model to investigate the effects of eight types of shareholders on corporate social responsibility (CSR) investments in terms of the monetary amount and ratio of each investment.

Cross‐sectional data obtained from Japanese companies in 2010 were used and three equations were estimated which reflect the effects of various shareholders on three types of CSR using ordinary least squares (OLS).

The study finds that the effects of shareholders on CSR investment are different depending on shareholder types. Investment funds and top management shareholders decrease each CSR investment, while the government, foreign companies and individuals, financial institutions, brokerages, and domestic companies and individuals increase CSR investments. Moreover, different shareholder types are interested in different CSR. Most shareholders are concerned with environmental policies, while foreign shareholders are also concerned with work‐life balance policies. Investment funds shareholders pay attention to all kinds of CSR. In addition, most outside shareholders are only concerned about individual CSR investments rather than a company's entire CSR resource allocation strategy.

This study empirically analyzes various types of shareholders, determining which hypothesis is valid and what type of shareholder increases or decreases CSR investment. This study considers shareholders' effects not only on each CSR action, but also in terms of an overall CSR strategy. This study provides guidance for managers that they should take into account in order to respond to each type of shareholder when they make decisions on CSR.

This paper aims to assess the impact of the presence/absence of risk management practices on the risk of merger and acquisition (M&A) failure.

An agency theoretic perspective is adopted, along with a mixed-methods approach to study managerial complexity beyond simply “good” and “bad”. The focus is on an agency conflicts.

The authors first present an integrated framework that classifies managerial behaviour and risk management, where M&A bids can become vehicles for maximising managerial benefits rather than shareholder value. The authors proceed to consider M&A activity that benefits both managers and shareholders in the presence of risk management strategies.

The paper highlights the benefits of multiple paradigms and research paths that address dimensions captured by an agency theoretic perspective.

The authors regard this paper as having particular significance in that the global financial crisis has impacted M&A activities and objectives, shifting the employment and related risks faced by managers.

The paper suggests future research paths to advance the understanding of the complex behaviour of managers involved in M&A activities that go beyond the classification of “good” and “bad” managers.

Scanning both the academic and popular business literature of the last 40 years puzzles the alert reader. The variety of prescriptions of how to be successful (effective, performing, etc.) 1 Organizational performance, organizational success and organizational effectiveness will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.1 in business is hardly comprehensible: “Being close to the customer,” Total Quality Management, corporate social responsibility, shareholder value maximization, efficient consumer response, management reward systems or employee involvement programs are but a few of the slogans introduced as means to increase organizational effectiveness. Management scholars have made little effort to integrate the various performance-enhancing strategies or to assess them in an orderly manner.

This study classifies organizational strategies by the importance each strategy attaches to different constituencies in the firm’s environment. A number of researchers divide an organization’s environment into various constituency groups and argue that these groups constitute – as providers and recipients of resources – the basis for organizational survival and well-being. Some theoretical schools argue for the foremost importance of responsiveness to certain constituencies while stakeholder theory calls for a – situation-contingent – balance in these responsiveness levels. Given that maximum responsiveness levels to different groups may be limited by an organization’s resource endowment or even counterbalanced, the need exists for a concurrent assessment of these competing claims by jointly evaluating the effect of the respective behaviors towards constituencies on performance. Thus, this study investigates the competing merits of implementing alternative business philosophies (e.g. balanced versus focused responsiveness to constituencies). Such a concurrent assessment provides a “critical test” of multiple, opposing theories rather than testing the merits of one theory (Carlsmith, Ellsworth & Aronson, 1976).

In the high tolerance level applied for this study (be among the top 80% of the industry) only a handful of organizations managed to sustain such a balanced strategy over the whole observation period. Continuously monitoring stakeholder demands and crafting suitable responsiveness strategies must therefore be a focus of successful business strategies. While such behavior may not be a sufficient explanation for organizational success, it certainly is a necessary one.

Director interlocks, with their extended resources and shared experiences, have the potential power to go beyond the basic role of providing advice and monitoring the activities of an organization. Interlocked directors can have a cross-cultural role in manipulating corporate choices and strategies in several areas, including capital structure, based on learned behavior in their internal company. Shareholders and creditors are the two main capital providers for a company. However, their risk return horizons are very different, and policies that benefit one group may not be optimal to the other. Interlocks can act as carriers of sub-par practices that affect the behavior of several organizations. Such transactional and relational activities may increase short-term value for equity shareholders, but increase the risk for the creditors. The purpose of this paper is to examine cross-cultural effects of interlocks on corporate strategies that affect this essential agency relationship.

This paper surveys the extant literature on board interlocks, board practices, equity valuation and credit risk to develop a link between such interlocks and creditor protection. Based on a brief survey of the central concepts of governance and the role of directors, this paper then provides various propositions on the role of interlocking directorships and their effect on the shareholder–creditor agency problem.

Director interlocks, through their linked common practices, have the potential to increase or worsen shareholder–creditor conflicts by magnifying strategic practices like short-termism, earnings management or through its effects on chief executive officer compensation. Such cross-cultural effects persist across ownership structures and cultural differences in governance.

The paper is not an empirical study of the conflict. This paper uses a literature review to arrive at propositions that may impact shareholder–creditor conflicts.

Several studies have shown cronyism and the dense corporate network has been a large factor in the financial crisis that affected both shareholders and creditors. As the influence of creditors grows with the current availability, and therefore increase in debt levels, this conflict can be magnified through homophily inherent in interlocks. For an organization to be successful in its role of protecting all stakeholders, especially the two major providers of equity capital, factors that cause conflicts must be taken into account while developing the tenets of governance policies and, on a regular basis, during the strategic planning process within the organization. Regulations affecting interlocks, including governance policies, must therefore take into account such influences.

Board interlocks act as channels of information between companies, creating a social network where processes and polices are shared and implemented as defined by the concept of homophily. Such management actions reduce both the quality of information available to creditors and their monitoring capabilities. This juxtaposition of shareholder and creditor interest can, therefore, be worsened by director interlocks.

Prior literature has not specifically linked director interlocks and their mutual impact on the culture and strategy of linked corporations to the shareholder–creditor conflict.

Purpose – This study explores the probability of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders in the form of CEO compensation under an imperfect governance institution by using a novel Chinese dataset over 2001–2010.

Design/methodology/approach – We use a direct method to gauge controlling shareholders’ tunneling and expropriation of minority shareholders, and we present a simple model to link corporate governance and the degree of entrenchment by the largest shareholder. We use both Logit and Probit models to predict the likelihood of tunneling and use two-stage least square (2SLS) regression to address the endogeneity issues.

Findings – There are significant deterioration effects between controlling shareholder's tunneling and firm performance. Firms with more tunneling activities typically have larger controlling ownership, greater evidence of state control, less balance of power among large shareholders, and weaker board characteristics.

Research limitations/implications – The positive relationship between controlling shareholders’ tunneling and executive compensation implies that the controlling shareholder might divert personal benefits from the public firms at the expense of minority shareholders.

Originality/value – We focus on the effects of corporate governance restructuring on executive compensation and controlling shareholders’ tunneling in the Chinese context, and we also investigate whether these effects are stronger with the involvement of state ownership. We empirically address the issues between executive compensation and expropriation of minority shareholders.

This paper aims to examine the nature of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) costs incurred by subsidiaries of USA parent companies, and considers whether any value flows to non-USA subsidiaries. Deductibility is analysed under both the general deductibility provisions and the transfer pricing regimes of Australia and New Zealand (NZ). Reference is also made to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) transfer pricing guidelines and the US transfer pricing regulations. Australasian and New Zealand subsidiaries of US parent companies frequently incur costs related to their parent’s regulatory reporting requirements under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Tax authorities, generally, view these costs as “shareholder activities”, i.e. activities performed for the benefit of the parent only. As such, they are considered non-deductible to the subsidiaries of USA parents because an independent party dealing at arm’s length would not pay to receive similar services. We consider circumstances in which some costs may be deductible.

Legal analysis.

We conclude that there can be circumstances where these so-called shareholder activities do provide value to subsidiaries and, accordingly, may (or should) be deductible in the local jurisdiction.

This analysis is limited to a consideration of Australian, NZ, OECD and US sources.

This paper provides an analysis of the deductibility of a type of expenditure commonly encountered by subsidiaries of US parent companies.

Limited research is available that deals with this issue. In most cases, only general statements on deductibility of similar types of expenditure are available to taxpayers.

There is a debate between sound Shariah-compliant firms engaging in social good as a moral obligation and behaving ethically in terms of increasing corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and those firms that are not Shariah-compliant. The purpose of the present study is to contribute to this debate by empirically investigating the effect of the profitability of firms on CSR activities and shareholders’ dividends and the interaction effect of a firm’s Shariah compliance with religious and ethical principles.

The data used in this study were collected from the annual financial reports of 74 Pakistani listed companies over 2012-2016 (N = 370). An epistemological model of the unity of knowledge was applied to determine the contribution of Shariah-compliant enterprises to community well-being. Furthermore, the Tawhidi string relation methodology was used to establish the circular causal model. To check the robustness of our findings, we also analysed the data using fixed and random effects regression models to test the effect of firm profitability on CSR activities and dividends, whereas moderation regression analysis was applied to test the moderating effect of Shariah-compliant firms.

The results show that the profitability of firms has a significant impact on shareholders’ dividends in both Shariah and non-Shariah firms. Furthermore, the relationship between firm profitability and CSR is stronger for non-Shariah-compliant firms than Shariah-compliant firms. This indicates that Shariah firms are less involved in doing CSR activities than non-Shariah firms. This implies that Shariah status does not play an important role in ensuring managers’ ethical behaviour.

The results suggest that the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan should attach more importance to Shariah compliance by firms in developing their CSR policies to improve social development and human well-being. These findings have important implications for many Islamic countries irrespective of whether they are developed or developing.

The present study provides a new addition to the prior literature by investigating the relationship between profits and CSR activities and the interaction effect of Shariah-compliant firms. From an Islamic ethical perspective, this study can also contribute to the growing discussion on Shariah compliance and CSR activities.

This paper characterizes the role of the board of directors in a more specific way than has been done previously, and uses this characterization to support the argument that, in some cases, the mandate of an effective board should go beyond the prevention of self‐interested behavior by management. The enlarged role for the board of directors that this paper contemplates carries with it the need to ensure shareholders that the board of directors is not engaging in self‐interested behavior of its own, and posits that requiring the board of directors to report to shareholders on its activities and effectiveness is a potential solution to this problem. The paper seeks to present theoretically grounded ideas on how this might be done in a meaningful fashion.

This conceptual paper proposes a “short list” of reporting items for boards of directors, derived from a theoretical model that examines board of director performance from a group dynamics perspective.

This paper proposes measure for board of director performance reporting that are based upon potential active agency roles. The authors suggest that future dialogue regarding board of director performance reporting might be well served by recognizing the limitations of previous research that has found differing and questionable links between board characteristics and organizational outcomes.

The authors suggest that the items derived from the theoretical model for examining board of director performance reporting need to be empirically assessed in terms of their usefulness in a variety of industries and contexts.

The authors argue that active agency roles and functional group dynamics should form the backbone of a board of director performance reporting process.

This paper extends the board of director performance reporting literature by providing a theoretically grounded rationale for measuring and conceptualizing board effectiveness.