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1 – 10 of 430Carlo D'Augusta, Francesco Grossetti and Claudia Imperatore
The authors study the effect of increasing environmental awareness on shareholders' activism. Specificallly, this study aims to examine whether growing environmental awareness is…
Abstract
Purpose
The authors study the effect of increasing environmental awareness on shareholders' activism. Specificallly, this study aims to examine whether growing environmental awareness is reflected in more aggressive environmental shareholder proposals.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster as an exogenous event that increased shareholders' environmental awareness. This study analyzes the spill’s effect on the tone of proposals about environmental issues and nonenvironmental topics.
Findings
After the disaster, the tone of environmental proposals (i.e. the treatment group) is significantly more negative. In contrast, the tone of nonenvironmental proposals (i.e. the control group) is unaffected. This study interprets this finding as direct evidence that the oil spill led to increased shareholder environmental activism through proposals that targeted the environmental risks surrounding the business more aggressively. By contrast, this study finds no effect of the oil spill on the tone of managers' responses to the proposals, consistent with managers refraining from emphasizing environmental threats.
Originality/value
Anecdotal evidence and recent studies suggest a link between environmental disasters and shareholder pressure for corporate change. However, no prior research has investigated the channel through which shareholders could have exerted such pressure or has looked for direct evidence of it in the negotiations between shareholders and managers. By finding such evidence in shareholder proposals, this study fills in this gap.
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Carine Girard and Stephen Gates
This paper aims to demonstrate that state shareholders are confronted with contradictory logics leading to institutional contradictions that activist shareholders can exploit. The…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to demonstrate that state shareholders are confronted with contradictory logics leading to institutional contradictions that activist shareholders can exploit. The competing logics of the state as shareholder and their impact on corporate governance and shareholder activism offer fertile grounds for research advances in Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs).
Design/methodology/approach
Through an extensive literature review of state ownership, institutional contradictions and shareholder activism, this paper analyzes two case studies involving the French State as shareholder.
Findings
In the French context, these two cases illustrate how institutional contradictions result in opportunities for shareholder activism. By focusing on the institutional contradictions of the state shareholder, this investigation suggests a need for experimental research to observe how shareholder activists adapt to each institutional change in CMEs. This experimentation can help policymakers to avoid creating additional conditions that shareholder activists can exploit.
Research limitations/implications
This focuses only on France and its state shareholdings. To generalize results, studies of other CMEs and state shareholders are needed.
Practical implications
Policymakers should consider all legislative proposals for their potential to deviate from corporate governance practice by experimenting with them in a laboratory setting. Shareholder activists can compare state shareholders’ actions against the state’s legislation to emphasize institutional contradictions that counter minority shareholders’ rights.
Originality/value
This research is the first to analyze how the state as shareholder can exploit its competing logics to resist against shareholder activism and support management or to become itself a shareholder activist.
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Marilee Van Zyl and Nadia Mans-Kemp
Companies around the globe increasingly receive immense shareholder scrutiny due to perceivably excessive executive director remuneration. The debate in South Africa intensifies…
Abstract
Purpose
Companies around the globe increasingly receive immense shareholder scrutiny due to perceivably excessive executive director remuneration. The debate in South Africa intensifies due to severe pay inequality. The authors thus accounted for the perspectives of asset managers and listed financial services companies in South Africa pertaining to the impact of voting and engagement on director pay policies and practices.
Design/methodology/approach
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with selected asset managers, chief executive officers, chief financial officers and remuneration committee members of listed financial services companies to gauge their views on the impact of shareholder activism endeavours on remuneration governance. The qualitative data was analysed by conducting thematic analysis.
Findings
Most of the asset managers and financial services representatives preferred proactive, private engagement on pay concerns, given the impact thereof on voting outcomes, and ultimately director remuneration practices and policies. Independent remuneration committees have a prominent role in facilitating engagements with investors to ensure fair remuneration.
Research limitations/implications
The consequences should be clearer if organisations receive substantial votes against their pay policies and implementation reports. South African regulators can consider the “two-strikes” rule to ensure that action is taken in response to shareholder voting on director remuneration matters.
Originality/value
Representatives of asset managers and listed financial services investee companies offered valuable insights on remuneration governance deliberations in an emerging market. This in-depth analysis highlights the importance of proactive engagement to ensure that corporate leaders are paid fairly.
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This study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and financial performance in the case of publicly listed companies in Vietnam for the period from…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and financial performance in the case of publicly listed companies in Vietnam for the period from 2019 to 2021. The topic is crucial in understanding how effective governance practices can influence the financial outcomes of companies. The study sheds light on the link between CG practice and firm financial performance. It also provides insights for policymakers and practitioners to improve CG practices.
Design/methodology/approach
Due to the potential dynamic endogeneity in CG research, this study uses the generalized system methods of moments to effectively address the endogeneity problem. Financial performance is measured by Tobin’s Q, return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). Based on organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD) standards, these indices were calculated to assess the influence of CG practices on corporate financial performance, namely, for accounting information (ROA and ROE) and market performance (Tobin’s Q and service à resglement différé (SRD) – stock price volatility) for the period 2019–2021. In addition, the study examines the relationship between changes in the CG index and changes in financial performance.
Findings
The study’s main objective is to determine the relationship between CG performance scores and financial performance. The study found a positive relationship between transparency disclosure and financial performance and a positive correlation between CG and company size. The COVID-19 pandemic caused a decrease in transparency and information index scores in 2021 compared to 2019 and 2020 due to delayed General Meetings of Shareholders. The study failed to find a relationship between shareholder rights index (“cg_rosh”) and board responsibility (“cg_reob”) and financial performance, concerning which the findings of this study differ from those of previous studies. Reasons are put forward for these anomalies.
Originality/value
Policymakers need to develop a set of criteria for assessing CG practices. They also need to promulgate specific regulations for mandatory and voluntary information disclosure and designate a competent authority to certify the transparency of company information. The study also suggests that companies should develop CG regulations and focus on regulations relating to the business culture or ethics, as well as implementing a system to ensure equal treatment among shareholders. The study found that good CG practices can positively contribute to a company’s financial performance, which is crucial for investors to evaluate the quality of CG practices for each listed company so that investment risks can be limited.
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Giacomo Morri, Rachele Anconetani and Luciano Pistritto
Corporate governance principles are living a positive momentum in light of the megatrends reshaping the world. An effective company based on sound governance principles can…
Abstract
Purpose
Corporate governance principles are living a positive momentum in light of the megatrends reshaping the world. An effective company based on sound governance principles can prevent issues and corporate scandals as the company ensures greater transparency and accountability. Accordingly, this paper aims to investigate the relationship between shareholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms, value and performances in the real estate sector.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, performance and value in a sample of 111 USA real estate firms. After collecting data from 2014 to 2018, this paper tests the research hypothesis using the linear fixed-effect model.
Findings
The results demonstrate a positive impact of shareholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms on performance and value. In particular, firms with no chief executive officer (CEO) duality and staggered board mechanisms and recognizing excess variable compensation to the firms' executive have a significantly higher Tobin's Q, return on assets (ROA) and price-to-book performance.
Practical implications
The implications are twofold: on the one hand, this motivates shareholders to establish new corporate control mechanisms to maximize value, attract more capital and improve operating performance. On the other hand, this allows investors to direct the investors' resources toward real estate firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms that may return higher performance and value.
Originality/value
Focusing on the real estate industry, where governance is expected to have a lower impact due to solid regulation, especially in real estate investment trusts (REITs), the research allows the formulation of industry-specific inferences that may be generalized for the general market.
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