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Focusing on internal corporate governance, the purpose of this paper is to apply the shareholder activism perspective to consider how large shareholder participation behaviors might influence firm innovation performance. Specifically, “confrontationally strategic intervention” and “cooperatively strategic consensus” participation behaviors are examined and hypothesized to have different effects on managers’ risk-taking and firm innovation performance.

Drawing on 182 Chinese firm samples, this paper applies hierarchical ordinary least-squares regression analysis to test the proposed hypotheses.

The results show that strategic intervention was negatively associated with managers’ risk-taking and firm innovation performance, while strategic consensus positively affected managers’ risk-taking and firm innovation performance. Moreover, managers’ risk-taking fully mediated the influence of strategic intervention on firm innovation performance, whereas it partially mediated the influence of strategic consensus on firm innovation performance.

The study extends research on shareholder participation by construing that large shareholders’ participation behaviors can significantly influence managers’ risk-taking and corporate innovation performance, further deepening the understanding of the influences of large shareholders on the firm-level outcomes. The theoretical and practical implications of this finding are also discussed.

The purpose of this paper is to test a catering theory by examining impacts of minority shareholders’ pressures on earnings management (EM), and attempt to answer: what is the role of minority shareholders participation (MSP) in corporate governance? and does MSP serve as an external monitor to managers, or does it put excessive pressure on them?

Using a novel online voting data set in China’s stock market, the author constructs the measure of MSP, and regress the EM on MSP. To address the endogeneity, the author introduces propensity score matching and difference-in-difference methods, instrumental variables, and Heckman estimation to show that the results are robust to different specifications and alternative measures.

The author documents that: MSP plays limited role in external monitoring; and firms facing high MSP levels tend to manage earnings more actively. In addition, information asymmetry, proposals’ importance, managerial incentives, and CEO financial expertise significantly affect firms’ catering behaviors.

This paper contributes to different strands of the literature. First, the finding significantly supports the catering hypothesis from a new perspective of EM. Second, the author contributes to a hotly debated issue in corporate governance: whether minority shareholders should be granted increased participation in corporate decisions? The results also provide timely empirical evidence for government regulators who are concerned about the costs and benefits of granting minority shareholders direct control over corporate decisions.

The purpose of this study is to provide a holistic view of the emergence of shareholder activism (SA) in India. However, specifically, this study aims at fulfilling the research gap by discussing the policy and legal advancement in the area of SA and investigating the chronological evolution of SA, manifestations of SA, motives of SA, outcome of SAs and impact of SA on the financial performance of the firm.

This study used a mixed methodology (both qualitative and quantitative) to draw inferences, including content analysis, descriptive statistics, independent sample t-test and paired sample t-test. The data has been collected from the annual reports of the sample companies and the Prowess database. Return on assets and return on equity have been used as measures of financial performance while investigating the difference in financial performance between firms subjected to SA and firms not subjected to SA.

The findings of this study suggest that there has been significant growth in the occurrence of SA incidents in India in the past decade, with shareholders prominently manifesting by opposing the proposals at annual general meetings/extraordinary general meetings, mostly involving governance-related demands. The findings from the independent sample t-tests revealed that there has been a significant difference in the financial performance of the sample subjected to SA and firms not subjected to SA. Furthermore, the results of the paired sample t-test provide strong evidence of significant improvement in the financial performance of firms’ post-SA.

The findings of this study have implications for various stakeholders. The findings of this study suggest that SA has been relatively more successful in the Indian context and may encourage minority shareholders to follow active participation through shareholder proposals and votes rather than a passive strategy to trade and exit. For firms, it can provide valuable inferences about the emergence of SA and how it has a positive impact on the financial performance of the firm, which can lead to a change in the perception of investors and promoters who perceive SA as a threat (Gillan and Starks 2000; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). For policymakers, it can act as a tool to investigate whether the regulatory changes have been able to bring the intended transparency, accountability and enhanced shareholder participation. This will encourage policymakers to be more agile, as their efforts are bearing fruit. This will also act as a guide to formulating future policies and regulations.

This study is an effort to provide a holistic view of SA scenarios in a developing economy setting like India, where SA is a very recent phenomenon. Although there are studies in the area of SA, there is a dearth of studies that have investigated the various dimensions of SA in the Indian context in a very systematic and extensive manner, investigating all the different dimensions of SA. Furthermore, this study also intends to investigate the impact of SA, which is normally perceived as a threat to financial performance and provide valuable contrasting evidence.

In this part of the research, we consider the costs of the turnout decision and evaluate whether the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36/EC), which aimed at lowering voting costs, has had a positive impact on (small) shareholder attendance. For this, we investigate turnout rates in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. We find strong indications that the Shareholder Rights Directive indeed had a positive impact on (small) shareholder attendance in these countries. The findings of this study may encourage policy makers to further reduce the costs of (cross-border) voting. It shows that the introduction of the new Shareholder Rights Directive may contribute to (small) shareholder engagement.

Shareholder activism is gaining popularity across the globe especially in today’s context where the option of giving up and selling shares to exit the company has become obsolete. Hence, the purpose of this research paper is two-fold, firstly, to investigate the extent to which the minority shareholders of companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius adopt and make use of the various tools of activism; and secondly, to compare the UK laws on shareholder activism with that of Mauritius.

To achieve these objectives, this study adopted the qualitative research method. Primary data was collected by conducting a survey on minority shareholders of Mauritian listed companies to figure out the extent to which they resort to activism tools, while secondary data was collected through a qualitative legal, document and content analysis to scrutinise regulatory provisions and existing literature on the researched topic.

The results show a moderate implementation level of shareholder activism by the minority investors in Mauritius although it was noted that minority shareholders are more likely to resort to the internal tools of activism rather than external methods. Further to the comparative study conducted, this research recommends a more active participation of the Mauritian regulatory bodies, amendments to the Mauritius Code of Corporate Governance and Mauritius Companies Act and the establishment of a commission responsible for overseeing the exercise of shareholders’ powers and promoting derivative lawsuits among minority shareholders.

Few researchers like Beebeejaun and Koobloll (2018) analysed shareholder activism through the lens of corporate governance with the view of providing recommendations to bring amendments in the Mauritian corporate law landscape. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no research has yet been effectuated on the extent to which shareholder activism is practised by the minority investors in developing countries, for which this existing study aims at filling in the research gap.

E-corporate governance or the use of technologies and information systems (ISs) in corporate governance, is still a subject that is too seldom addressed in business research. This paper is at the intersection between two fields of research (corporate governance and the management of ISs), which are interdependent in ways that are still unexplored. The paper analyzes the implications of internet voting (IV) at shareholders’ annual meetings (SAM) for the corporate governance of listed companies in France, in particular for the relationship between executives and shareholders. Most of the studies that have dealt with IV at SAM have focused on techno-legal issues and were often conducted by business law researchers. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the implications of the new voting system through the prism of corporate governance.

The authors proceeded by triangulation of methods. This qualitative study is based on observations, interviews and documentary analysis. It assessed the IV implications for both the issuing companies and the shareholders.

The new voting system brings undeniable competitive advantage to the issuing company and facilitates shareholders’ activism, yet it has serious risks both for the corporations and for certain categories of the shareholder. Interestingly, the authors propose an original and field-grounded typology that distinguishes the risks and benefits associated with IV in relation to executives’ attitudes.

The paper shows that the resolving of identified deficiencies with IV development could contribute to the alignment of companies’ interests with those of shareholders. Moreover, the study calls for policymakers to appoint an official body to regulate the practical implementation of the new system and to prevent its dissemination being held hostage to the executives’ willingness.

An original aspect of this research lies in the effective operationalization of the constructs of corporate governance effectiveness with a view to examining corporate governance as a set of technologically mediated practices. Moreover, this study emphasizes the key role of the construct of “executives’ willingness” in facilitating/impeding IV diffusion. This underlies their attempts to reverse the corporate governance relationship.

Purpose – This study focuses on the relationship between local governments and public sector joint ventures (JVs). Public sector JVs are separate administrative entities that undertake public service activities on behalf of local governments. The aim of this study is to examine the vertical management control packages that are used by local governments to control the relationship with their public sector JVs.

Design/methodology/approach – Two case studies have been conducted in two public sector JVs, owned jointly by more than 20 local governments. The analysis of the two cases is informed by an integrated conceptual framework describing how transactional and relational factors influence control, trust, and risk in the context of public sector JVs.

Findings – The case studies provide a nuanced understanding of the interplay between the vertical management control packages, trust between the parents and the public sector JVs, and risks as perceived by the local governments. The case findings not only reveal how local governments struggle with adequate outcome control but also highlight how and why they rely on behavioral control. A related finding is that while the probability of poor business performance does not have a significant impact on the design of the vertical control packages, the social impact of failure has the potential to create a sense of urgency with regard to changes in the design of vertical management control packages.

Originality/value – This study adds to the literature on interorganizational relationships by providing insight into the use of vertical management control packages in the specific, but relevant, setting of public sector JVs.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance at shareholders meetings on related party transaction (RPT) proposals.

This paper empirically examines the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance in shareholders’ meetings on the voting results of RPT proposals based on the hand-collected voting data of Chinese listed companies.

The empirical result shows a significant positive relationship between the attendance of minority shareholders and the nonagreeable vote rate of RPT proposals. Moreover, this positive relationship is strengthened when the corporate governance is poor, the negative media coverage is high, and the on-site attendance of minority shareholders is high. Conversely, good corporate governance and high positive media coverage can weaken this positive correlation. The additional analysis reveals that the number of RPTs and better market performance in the future can be significantly reduced when minority shareholders express their nonagreeable voice actively.

This paper analytically and empirically examines the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance in shareholders’ meetings on the voting results of RPT proposals based on the hand-collected voting data of Chinese listed companies. It provides direct and convincing evidence for the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance and exercise of voting rights in shareholders’ meetings on the outcome of RPT proposals. It complements the literature on the governance effects of minority shareholders’ attendance in shareholders’ meetings to exercise their voting rights in emerging capital markets. This study has practical value by guiding minority investors to participate actively in corporate governance.

The existence of controlling shareholders creates a remarkable difference between the corporate governance structures of Chinese firms and those of western firms. Despite the increasing importance of controlling shareholders, it remains disputable whether they are playing the “tunneling” roles or the “governance” roles. Therefore, more research is needed on what roles controlling shareholders are playing and how they play their roles. Previous empirical studies document a common phenomenon that directors play dual roles both on the board and in the top management team. Because of information asymmetry, the board of directors may not be able to perform its supervisory and strategic decision-making functions. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate whether controlling shareholders participate in firm management by appointing the executive directors and examine the economic consequences of controlling shareholder involvement.

In the empirical tests, the authors use the split share structure reform in China as a natural experiment. Using the data from Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2015 and difference-in-differences analysis, the authors examine the impact of the split share structure reform on the executive directors of controlling shareholders and the governance effect of controlling shareholders’ appointing executive directors to the management.

The authors find that controlling shareholders get involved in firm management by appointing executive directors to strengthen the supervision and incentives of managers. The authors also find that firms exhibit a lower level of earnings management and enhance and higher pay-performance sensitivity after controlling shareholders appoint executive directors to the top management team.

As the natural experiment of the split share structure reform enables us to mitigate endogeneity, the authors investigate the channels through, which controlling shareholders get involved in firm management from the unique perspective of executive director appointment. The study expands the literature on corporate governance and board functions. The findings provide new insights to the effect of controlling shareholder governance and casts light on a new way for controlling shareholders of Chinese firms to participate in firm management – by appointing executive directors.

This paper aims to elaborate on the extent to which the Indonesian legal framework has provided room for shareholder activism and the extent to which shareholder activism has been implemented in Indonesia.

This study combines normative and empirical legal research methods. Indonesian laws and regulations are analyzed aside from the analysis of empirical data and court decisions on shareholder activism implementation.

Indonesian laws and regulations have accommodated shareholders’ activism and shareholders have started to rectify mismanagement and abuse of power that causes loss to the company through derivative lawsuits. Despite this, Indonesian shareholders are still passive, shown by the number of questions asked in the general meetings of shareholders despite the high attendance percentage. Shareholders have also formed associations to gather more influence on the company’s decision-making process.

The empirical observation in this study was limited to LQ45 companies of the February to July 2021 period. This study can be useful to improve corporate governance and corporate communication in a company to encourage higher participation of individual/minority shareholders. This study also serves as an extension to numerous studies on shareholder protection, corporate governance and corporate law in Indonesia.

Study on shareholder activism in Indonesia is still rare, despite the rising urgency of company supervision and monitoring to prevent mismanagement. To fill in that gap, this research hopes to initiate discussion on shareholder activism in relation to shareholder protection, corporate governance and corporate law implementation.