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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the interaction between internal factors of corporate governance, especially the relationship between equity checks and balances and corporate social responsibility (CSR), and further analyze the mediating of green innovation performance and the moderating role of environmental uncertainty.

This study adopts a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2012 to 2020 constructed a regulated mediation effect model, empirically tests the impact of equity checks and balances on CSR and the mediation and mediator roles of green innovation performance and environmental uncertainty.

(1) Equity checks and balances among shareholders have a significant positive impact on CSR. (2) Equity checks and balances have a positive impact on green innovation performance, green innovation performance has a positive impact on CSR and green innovation performance plays a partial mediation effect between equity checks and balances and CSR. (3) Additionally, environmental uncertainty not only moderates the relationship between Green Innovation Performance and CSR but also moderates the direct effect between equity balance and CSR, which verifies the existence of a moderated mediation effect.

The study only considers listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as the research sample and does not include unlisted and gem enterprises.

The present research can offer some managerial implications about implementing equity checks and balances among shareholders, actively fulfilling CSR and developing new products.

This study complements previous studies on the role of green innovation in corporate governance by exploring the impact of green innovation on equity checks and balances and CSR. And this study explores the dynamic moderating of environmental uncertainty within enterprises and provides another explanation for the mixed results of equity checks and balances, green innovation performance and CSR.

By demonstrating the influence of the ownership structure of A-shares listed companies on CSR, this paper provides a new and comprehensive theoretical framework to examine the interaction between equity checks and balances, green innovation performance, environmental uncertainty and CSR. The results can be used as a reference for corporate governance, improving innovation performance and fulfilling CSR.

This monograph reports the growth in ownership of ordinary shares in UK registered and managed companies by institutional shareholders and assesses the implications for corporate management. Combined holdings of insurance companies, pension funds, investment trust companies, and unit trusts amounted to 45 per cent of quoted UK equities in 1974 and will approach 50 per cent by 1977. Despite exhortations from the Bank of England, the Press, academics and private shareholders, institutions have been reluctant to use their voting strength. French and German companies are familiar with managerial participation by financial institutions. In the United Kingdom the persistent increase in institutional shareholdings presents management with opportunities to mobilise institutional support for the board, particularly in takeover situations; to involve financial institutions in corporate planning and the development of industrial democracy; to use institutions as a source of funds; and to use the financial resources of institutions to maximise the market capitalisation of the firm.

The purpose of this study is to investigate reporting incentives for accounting conservatism in the context of asset and equity tunnelling and to provide empirical evidence that accounting conservatism can be reported for opportunistic reasons rather than efficiency reasons.

A cross‐sectional analysis of data from the period 2002 to 2004 is conducted.

This study provides empirical evidence that firms undertaking asset or equity tunnelling transactions report higher conservatism than firms undertaking other kinds of connected transactions. Further tests document a positive association between accounting conservatism and the private benefits gained by controlling shareholders from asset and equity tunnelling.

Contrary to the prevalent view that accounting conservatism signifies better quality accounting and benefits financial statement users, this study shows that accounting conservatism is influenced by institutional factors and the incentives of financial statement preparers. Researchers should exercise caution in interpreting higher accounting conservatism as an indication of better accounting information quality, especially in cross‐country research involving different institutions.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on comparing the influence of majority and minority shareholders on executive compensation under conditions of CEO duality, examining majority and minority shareholder influences by measuring their investment and return activity. The paper seeks to uncover how CEO duality changes the impact the two categories of shareholders have on executive compensation, especially in an emerging nation.

In total, 30 corporations out of the 70 corporations listed on the BM&F Bovespa (a Brazilian stock market) were used for the paper. Quarterly data were collected on the companies from the Datastream database. The paper conducted a moderated regression analysis on the data to determine the conditional effects of majority and minority holders’ investment and returns on executive compensation.

There are incentives for executives meeting majority shareholder objectives, but minority shareholders’ influences act as a disincentive for executives. Only the influence of blockholders by their returns is affected by the separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman. The effect is such that firms with a separation of the roles have their executives rewarded in line with increments to the returns made to blockholders, but firms that have the roles merged pay a high wage that is inconsistent with managerial performance. Finally, the majority of variation in executive pay levels can be attributed to individual company traits.

The paper’s sample is biased to firm which had publicly available data on the total compensation payable to their top executives.

Advocates of minority shareholder rights may need to exercise patience with the implementation of more formalised governance structure, as they are not providing protection for minority shareholders within the period studied.

The paper provides empirical evidence within the Brazilian context of minority shareholder effects on executive compensation and the effect of CEO duality on the relationship.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how a shareholder association prepares for and later act at the annual general meeting. It focusses on how the association evaluates corporate proposals to pay dividends and how they vote on equity distributions at the annual general meeting.

This paper relies on observation of the shareholder association before the annual general meeting as well as at the meeting. The analysis is informed by institutional analysis as a way to make sense of how the association experience tension in the setting of the stock market and how it activates responses to these tensions.

The shareholder association failed to target companies that comply with an institutionalized view of good ownership despite those companies distributing more equity than the association deems to be in line with sound governance. This the authors understand to result from institutional tensions between a traditional stewardship model of governance and the more recent financial investor logic that emphasizes equity distributions as mean to create shareholder wealth. As good ownership is often equated with long-term committed owners, which makes the association fail to target non-traditional companies that are similar to companies with traditional ownership in terms of dividend ratios.

The paper demonstrates how institutional logics influence micro-level action in offering guidance to individual members. There are two relevant aspects to this. First, it offers guidance in terms of how to identify whether a corporate proposal is in line with the associations’ policy. Second, institutional logics influence micro-level action because deviations from it require explanations.

There are so far little qualitative research on how participants in governance mechanism use accounting to take decisions. In this way, the paper adds insight to both investor communities as well as behind the doors of the AGM.

Director interlocks, with their extended resources and shared experiences, have the potential power to go beyond the basic role of providing advice and monitoring the activities of an organization. Interlocked directors can have a cross-cultural role in manipulating corporate choices and strategies in several areas, including capital structure, based on learned behavior in their internal company. Shareholders and creditors are the two main capital providers for a company. However, their risk return horizons are very different, and policies that benefit one group may not be optimal to the other. Interlocks can act as carriers of sub-par practices that affect the behavior of several organizations. Such transactional and relational activities may increase short-term value for equity shareholders, but increase the risk for the creditors. The purpose of this paper is to examine cross-cultural effects of interlocks on corporate strategies that affect this essential agency relationship.

This paper surveys the extant literature on board interlocks, board practices, equity valuation and credit risk to develop a link between such interlocks and creditor protection. Based on a brief survey of the central concepts of governance and the role of directors, this paper then provides various propositions on the role of interlocking directorships and their effect on the shareholder–creditor agency problem.

Director interlocks, through their linked common practices, have the potential to increase or worsen shareholder–creditor conflicts by magnifying strategic practices like short-termism, earnings management or through its effects on chief executive officer compensation. Such cross-cultural effects persist across ownership structures and cultural differences in governance.

The paper is not an empirical study of the conflict. This paper uses a literature review to arrive at propositions that may impact shareholder–creditor conflicts.

Several studies have shown cronyism and the dense corporate network has been a large factor in the financial crisis that affected both shareholders and creditors. As the influence of creditors grows with the current availability, and therefore increase in debt levels, this conflict can be magnified through homophily inherent in interlocks. For an organization to be successful in its role of protecting all stakeholders, especially the two major providers of equity capital, factors that cause conflicts must be taken into account while developing the tenets of governance policies and, on a regular basis, during the strategic planning process within the organization. Regulations affecting interlocks, including governance policies, must therefore take into account such influences.

Board interlocks act as channels of information between companies, creating a social network where processes and polices are shared and implemented as defined by the concept of homophily. Such management actions reduce both the quality of information available to creditors and their monitoring capabilities. This juxtaposition of shareholder and creditor interest can, therefore, be worsened by director interlocks.

Prior literature has not specifically linked director interlocks and their mutual impact on the culture and strategy of linked corporations to the shareholder–creditor conflict.

Strategic plans need to be evaluated in rational economic terms. Earnings per share and book ROI no longer do the job. What is needed, the author contends, is a new shareholder value approach.

This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.

In recent years, many corporations have initiated downsizing programs to eliminate jobs, close facilities and withdraw from major lines of business. These initiatives have been justified in the name of creating “lean and efficient” organizations. In many cases, top management is rewarded with large bonus compensation packages. Such rewards are considered to be consistent with the goal of maximizing shareholder value. We compare stakeholder and shareholder value models of management accountability to gain insights into the broader economic and societal consequences of the current financial reporting model. Specifically, we examine downsizing at United Technologies Corporation to demonstrate how current financial reporting practices privilege shareholder/management interests over other stakeholders and favor actions that may result in detrimental effects to corporate stakeholders and society at large. This paper extends extant research by providing a concrete example of how “generally‐accepted” financial reports may be used to analyze economic events (like corporate downsizing) through multiple perspectives.