Search results
1 – 10 of over 5000Andrew Tylecote and Francesca Visintin
This paper is ambitious. Its central purpose is to examine how a number of developed economies, plus the largest developing economy, vary in terms of corporate governance: USA…
Abstract
This paper is ambitious. Its central purpose is to examine how a number of developed economies, plus the largest developing economy, vary in terms of corporate governance: USA, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, Switzerland and mainland China. We understand corporate governance in a very broad sense, descriptive not prescriptive: as who controls and influences firms, and how. We are thus dealing very much with varieties of capitalism. In a sense, we shall be seeking to characterise national systems of corporate governance, but we must stress that our concern is always with the situation of the individual firm. We shall find it convenient most of the time to give one label to a country's whole economy, but this will always be an approximation, which conceals variations among that country's firms. At other points, we shall distinguish types of firm and indicate the rough proportions of each type in a particular economy.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of corporate governance structures in the UK and Germany addressing the extent to which corporate governance structures may…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of corporate governance structures in the UK and Germany addressing the extent to which corporate governance structures may have been a contributory factor to the recent banking crisis. Following a review of shareholder and stakeholder theories of corporate governance and a comparative overview of corporate governance codes in the UK and Germany, the authors aim to provide some country level macroeconomic data and performance related data for a small number of large banks in the UK and Germany.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper is structured as follows. It first reviews the existing literature that underpins the stakeholder vs shareholder debate within corporate governance. It then reviews the current codes of conduct and governance structures implemented by UK and German banks. An analysis of the extent to which the banking crises can be attributed to failures in governance is presented and finally some conclusions and recommendations are outlined.
Findings
Findings suggest that while corporate governance in banks would appear to have been a significant factor in the recent banking crisis, based on the performance data, it cannot be said that a corporate governance approach based on either shareholder capitalism (UK) or stakeholder capitalism (Germany) is more at fault than the other. However, it is clear that UK and German corporate governance structures were not adequate to prevent the recent banking crisis and only time will tell whether the remedial actions taken have been sufficient. The present findings, in line with those presented in the Walker report in 2009, suggest that the codes of conduct in both countries were not adequate to deal with the complex issues caused by the financial crisis and that changes need to be implemented. The authors fully acknowledge that corporate governance only played a part in the financial crisis and in order to try to stop a repeat of this, the whole regulatory environment in both countries needs to be strengthened.
Research limitations/implications
The main limitation of the study lies with a lack of complex analysis undertaken to support the findings.
Practical implications
The findings from the study suggest that, regardless of the type of governance in operation, current corporate governance rules were not adequate and that a new set of rules is needed in both the UK and Germany. The findings also suggest that the stakeholder/shareholder debate may not be as important as previously claimed and that regulators need to find good governance rules, regardless of theoretical underpinnings.
Social implications
Governments across the world are currently cutting public spending in an extreme fashion and this is, partly, due to the banking crises. Therefore, poor governance in the banking sector is leading to massive social problems in the real world as governments cut services.
Originality/value
The paper is original as it is the first attempt to discuss the corporate governance failing and the banking crises from a shareholder/stakeholder perspective.
Details
Keywords
This “Masterclass” aims to guide executives through three complementary sets of insights into what is fundamentally wrong with the current model of capitalism, and the specific…
Abstract
Purpose
This “Masterclass” aims to guide executives through three complementary sets of insights into what is fundamentally wrong with the current model of capitalism, and the specific actions that they can take to create long‐term economic and social value.
Design/methodology/approach
Three sets of insights are compared: Fixing the Game by Roger Martin; “Creating shared value” in Harvard Business Review by noted strategists Michael Porter and Mark Kramer; and Higher Ambition by Michael Beer and his co‐authors.
Findings
Martin tracks the evolution of “shareholder capitalism” during the latter part of the 20th century and explains why it has become so detrimental. Porter and Kramer show business leaders how to restore credibility to capitalism by adopting a view of corporate social responsibility. Beer and his co‐authors explain “why” high performance over time results when business leaders simultaneously create economic and social value.
Practical implications
Some steps that executives can take are: focus – shifting the focus back to the customer and away from shareholder value, turning primary attention back to the real market and away from the expectations market; executive compensation – restoring authenticity to the lives of executives by eliminating stock‐based compensation and creating new models that focus executives on real and meaningful goals; and the civil foundation – defining and institutionalizing a more expansive societal goal for business executives ‐ to be a force that improves the society in which they live and work.
Originality/value
The author synthesizes three sets of cutting edge insight about how to transform a company to achieve long‐term value and social responsibility.
Details
Keywords
Focuses on what can be referred to as the “fundamental philosophical issues of corporate governance”. Outlines the interdependence of various kinds of governance. Demonstrates…
Abstract
Focuses on what can be referred to as the “fundamental philosophical issues of corporate governance”. Outlines the interdependence of various kinds of governance. Demonstrates that corporate governance is part of a bundle of governances and that, in this respect, it occupies a leading place to the degree that its principles are becoming consolidated. Then discusses in a more detailed manner what is meant by the term “dominant functionalism”. Then deals with the question of the equilibrium between sovereignty and legitimacy from the point of view of corporate governance. In effect, rules of governance (considered as the designation of a sovereign power) are searching for a legitimizing instance originating outside the framework of those rules. Finally, covers the proprietarialist origins of stakeholder theory, origins which correspond to a moderate liberal tradition.
Details
Keywords
Patrizio Monfardini, Paolo Quattrone and Pasquale Ruggiero
This paper narrates the efforts made in Italy after the end of the Second World War to develop an economic and social model in between corporate capitalism and planned economy, on…
Abstract
This paper narrates the efforts made in Italy after the end of the Second World War to develop an economic and social model in between corporate capitalism and planned economy, on the one hand, and shareholder versus stakeholder capitalism on the other. The result was the institutional infrastructure that supported the Istituto per la Ricostruzione industriale (IRI), a state-owned public holding in charge of managing the funds of the so-called Marshall Plan. The history of IRI illustrates the importance of a pragmatic approach to dealing with institutional constraints and opportunities when faced with the need to reconstruct destroyed economies in a context of very fragmented societies such as those of post-war Italy. The result was the resistance to an acritical adoption of the corporate American model and the definition of a more balanced form of capitalism. In an era of new recovery plans, there is a lot we can learn from IRI’s history.
Details
Keywords
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the theory and practice of stakeholder democracy. After examining the liberal notion of representative democracy, the paper seeks to…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the theory and practice of stakeholder democracy. After examining the liberal notion of representative democracy, the paper seeks to identify the democratic deficit associated with the shareholder and stakeholder approaches to corporate governance. Investigating stakeholder democracy in nationalized industries in both market‐ and state‐capitalist societies, the argument presented is that neither type of society has significantly increased stakeholder involvement in decision making.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper uses a Hegelian dialectical approach to stakeholder democracy; relying on such modes of analysis as identifying internal contradictions.
Findings
The paper concludes that stakeholder democracy is both real and nominal in the political sphere, but restricted and contested in the private and public sectors in the economic sphere.
Practical implications
The paper calls for the setting‐up of democratic structures to oversee the production and distribution of the goods and services necessary for human wellbeing.
Originality/value
The paper investigates the relatively neglected topic of stakeholder democracy, using a Hegelian dialectical methodology. In the context of the 2007/2008 financial crisis and its recessionary aftermath, the paper calls for a radical re‐evaluation of corporate governance.
Details