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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship among ownership structure, information disclosure and benefits of control under Lab‐experimental frame, based on the ownership structure in China's stock market.

Theoretical Shapley value of shareholders was used as the representative of control right, and benefits of control in different experimental treatments were studied.

Experimental results show: first, more counterbalance of shareholders' control rights, less benefits of their control right. Accordingly, more chance to form core alliance for the major shareholder with small shareholders, less chance for them to get control right; second, the effect of information on benefits of control are mainly reflected in forming and maintaining the alliance; third, Shapley value of the major shareholder and the information determine the alliance type; fourth, control premium may be the cost of keeping the major shareholder's benefits safe and fifth, imperfect information is not always bad, concealing information partly can improve the distribution efficiency of a corporation.

The paper provides experimental analysis of the behavioral logic behind the benefits of control, which would help to explain the relationship among ownership structure, information disclosure and benefits of control.

Concentrated ownership implies greater alignment between ownership and control, mitigating the agency problem. However, it may also engender governance challenges such as funds appropriation through related party transactions and the oppression of minority shareholders, especially in the context of weak legal systems. We draw from legal theory (the tradeoff controlling shareholder model and private benefits of control) and from organization theory (socioemotional wealth), to suggest that concentrated ownership can be beneficial in both robust and weak legal systems for different reasons. We advance theory on the effects of controlling shareholders and suggest that the longer-term outlook associated with engaged concentrated ownership can aid the shift of the corporation toward Berle and Means' (1932, p. 355) “third possibility” of corporations serving the interests of not just the stockholders or management but also of society.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentives of controlling shareholders in the market for corporate control. The author investigates the takeover premiums paid by a sample of European acquiring firms with voting rights structures that are highly concentrated. The results show a positive relationship between takeover premiums and the bidder’s concentration of both voting rights and excess voting rights over cash-flow rights. The author argues that with higher levels of entrenchment, takeover premiums reflect the private benefits of control which controlling shareholders in bidding firms seek to extract from a public transaction.

This paper uses cross-sectional regression analyses to examine the relationship between takeover premiums and the extent to which bidding firm shareholders exert control as well as the arrangement which underlie this. The sample is composed by 210 deals. The data are collected from various databases (Thomson Financial’s Mergers and Acquisition; Faccio and Lang’s (2002); Datastream/Worldscope, LexisNexis).

The premium paid in European M&A transactions is affected by the level of ownership exerted by the controlling shareholder. The results show premiums are positively and significantly associated with higher levels of voting rights, as well as, the level of separation of ownership and control when controlling shareholder ownership is low. Pyramiding structure seems to be the means of separation the most associated with takeover premiums.

This paper can be improved by other specifications. First, it would be interesting to analyze premiums paid by firms with dispersed ownership structure and to compare these premiums with those paid by firms with controlling shareholders. Second, the author suggests to examine whether a controlling shareholder occupy the seat of a CEO or a chairman. In these cases, the author assumes that the controlling shareholder can benefit from more discretion and can extract more private benefits. Third, the author suggests extending the sample period to 2007 at least to include the sixth wave. This wave was even more significant than the high-tech wave and has not been studied much. In these cases, the author assumes that the controlling shareholder can benefit from more discretion and can extract more private benefits.

Previous studies show that the premium reflects the private benefits of control in privately negotiated transactions (mainly block transactions). In the present study, the author shows that the premium can also reflect private benefits in public merger transactions.

This study aims to investigate the relationship between the ownership structure of firms and the private benefits of control through an analysis of Chinese listed firms.

Using a sample of Chinese firms, cases were examined where there had been a transaction involving non‐tradable stock. The cases where there had been stock transactions which both did and did not involve the transfer of control within a single year were selected. The difference between these two types of transaction was used to estimate the private benefits of control in Chinese listed firms. Regression analysis was used to explore the relationship between ownership structure and private benefits of control in Chinese listed firms.

The results show that the average private benefit of control is 18.52 percent in China. The regression results show a significant, positive relationship between the controlling shareholders, the combined shareholdings of the second to fifth largest shareholder and private benefits of control. However, there is a negative but insignificant relationship between the tradable share value and private benefits of control. With regard to the relationship between managerial shareholding and private benefits of control, the regression results show a positive but insignificant relationship.

Further insights into the private benefits of control can be obtained by inspecting the change around major corporate events involving significant ownership changes. In this study, the focus was on non‐tradable stock. Investigating all stock would be a fruitful area for future research.

In China, firms should optimize the ownership structure and curb expropriation by controlling shareholders. This would help to promote a sound development of Chinese listed firms and the capital market.

The research provides useful information on the impact of ownership structure on private benefits of control in a sample of listed firms in China.

The mainstream framework for corporate governance is that all corporate activity should be directed towards shareholder wealth maximization. This article posits that public policy should move away from shareholder primacy and instead recognize employees as key contributors to corporate value-creation. One way to implement this approach is to require the creation of Employee Equity Funds (EEFs) at large corporations, which would pay employees dividends alongside external shareholders and establish a collective employee voice in corporate governance. EEFs may reduce economic inequality while improving firm performance and macroeconomic stability. This article provides an original estimate of average employee dividends, illustrating the potential of employee equity funds.

Analysis of employee dividends for Employee Equity Funds at large U.S. corporations, using publicly available corporate finance data.

Based on historic dividend payments and employee counts in public 10-K filings, I find that, if EEFs held 20% of outstanding equity, the average employee dividend across this sample would be $2,622 per year, while the median is $1,760. This indicates that employee dividends can be a small but meaningful form of redressing wealth inequality for the low-wage workforce, though it should emphatically not be seen as a replacement for fair wages.

Original data analysis of a proposed policy reform to increase the benefits of employee equity in the United States.

Mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) aims to protect the long-term benefit of shareholders; therefore, this study aims to seek empirical evidence for the benefit of mandatory CSR from the perspective of shareholders.

Consistent with the objective of this study, the long-term shareholder benefit is measured using the sustainability perspective. Companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange that have at least five years of CSR implementation, as its mandate and have retroactive earnings data for minimum six years before the observation year are selected as the study’s sample.

The findings support that mandated CSR protects long-term shareholder value; there is a significant association between CSR and sustainable shareholder value. Industry profiles are an essential aspect of the association model. The results are robust through testing the association for various scenarios of time.

This study uses a single measurement of shareholder value based only on accounting measurement. Further, due to limitations in accessing internal company data, this study relies on annual reporting information to measure CSR implementation.

This study is the first to provide empirical evidence of the long-term benefit of mandatory CSR from the shareholders' perspective. This study also contributes to the existing literature by evaluating the success of mandatory CSR in developing countries. Those that successfully implemented mandatory CSR can serve as a model for other developing countries interested in creating similar policies to encourage socially responsible companies.

The purpose of this study is to investigate reporting incentives for accounting conservatism in the context of asset and equity tunnelling and to provide empirical evidence that accounting conservatism can be reported for opportunistic reasons rather than efficiency reasons.

A cross‐sectional analysis of data from the period 2002 to 2004 is conducted.

This study provides empirical evidence that firms undertaking asset or equity tunnelling transactions report higher conservatism than firms undertaking other kinds of connected transactions. Further tests document a positive association between accounting conservatism and the private benefits gained by controlling shareholders from asset and equity tunnelling.

Contrary to the prevalent view that accounting conservatism signifies better quality accounting and benefits financial statement users, this study shows that accounting conservatism is influenced by institutional factors and the incentives of financial statement preparers. Researchers should exercise caution in interpreting higher accounting conservatism as an indication of better accounting information quality, especially in cross‐country research involving different institutions.

Scanning both the academic and popular business literature of the last 40 years puzzles the alert reader. The variety of prescriptions of how to be successful (effective, performing, etc.) 1 Organizational performance, organizational success and organizational effectiveness will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.1 in business is hardly comprehensible: “Being close to the customer,” Total Quality Management, corporate social responsibility, shareholder value maximization, efficient consumer response, management reward systems or employee involvement programs are but a few of the slogans introduced as means to increase organizational effectiveness. Management scholars have made little effort to integrate the various performance-enhancing strategies or to assess them in an orderly manner.

This study classifies organizational strategies by the importance each strategy attaches to different constituencies in the firm’s environment. A number of researchers divide an organization’s environment into various constituency groups and argue that these groups constitute – as providers and recipients of resources – the basis for organizational survival and well-being. Some theoretical schools argue for the foremost importance of responsiveness to certain constituencies while stakeholder theory calls for a – situation-contingent – balance in these responsiveness levels. Given that maximum responsiveness levels to different groups may be limited by an organization’s resource endowment or even counterbalanced, the need exists for a concurrent assessment of these competing claims by jointly evaluating the effect of the respective behaviors towards constituencies on performance. Thus, this study investigates the competing merits of implementing alternative business philosophies (e.g. balanced versus focused responsiveness to constituencies). Such a concurrent assessment provides a “critical test” of multiple, opposing theories rather than testing the merits of one theory (Carlsmith, Ellsworth & Aronson, 1976).

In the high tolerance level applied for this study (be among the top 80% of the industry) only a handful of organizations managed to sustain such a balanced strategy over the whole observation period. Continuously monitoring stakeholder demands and crafting suitable responsiveness strategies must therefore be a focus of successful business strategies. While such behavior may not be a sufficient explanation for organizational success, it certainly is a necessary one.

One aspect of agency theory suggests that dominant shareholders use the firm’s assets for their personal benefits and 1thus expropriate minority shareholders (tunneling). Accordingly, this paper aims to examine the effect of capital structure and cash holding decisions on minority shareholders' expropriation for short and long periods.

Data of 16 years (2000-2015) has been obtained from 200 non-financial firms registered at Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). The study used fixed effect and autoregressive distributed lagged to obtain the results.

The results suggest that the presence of more debts in capital structure is positively associated with minority shareholders' expropriation, whereas a negative association has been found between the level of cash holding and minority shareholders expropriation. These results have been observed as significant both for the short and long run.

This study also suggests some important measures to control minority shareholders' expropriation by the dominant shareholders and thus to protect their rights.

There is a lack of literature for this severe issue in the developing countries especially Pakistan, so this study narrates the potential measures to the regulatory authority of the market to curb tunneling and to protect minority shareholders.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether large blockholders are associated with financial statement fraud at their companies. Although a substantial body of prior studies has focused on chief executive officers’ motivations to manipulate financial statements, the correlation between majority shareholders and financial statement fraud has received little attention. This paper aims to fill this gap by investigating whether the sample firms have controlling shareholders or executives (i.e. blockholders vs management) and whether financial statement fraud schemes, motivations and consequences differ between blockholder- and management-controlled firms.

Using a clinical approach, the authors Study 12 Canadian financial statement fraud cases uncovered by the Ontario Securities Commission between 1997 and 2020.

First, the authors find blockholder control in six cases. These findings infer that these large shareholders received private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. The comparative analyzes suggest that fraudulent firms controlled by blockholders go bankrupt more often than those controlled by managers. The authors also find that improper disclosure is the most common fraud scheme in blockholder-controlled firms.

The authors conduct a deep analysis of financial statement fraud cases to examine the of blockholder control on the likelihood of financial statement fraud. This paper adds new insights to the research on financial crime by investigating whether large shareholders affect the probability of fraud and the extent to which they might do so.