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1 – 10 of over 24000In this chapter, we explore the legal framework of AGMs of listed companies in Europe, which forms the foundation for the empirical analyses in the subsequent chapters. We…
Abstract
In this chapter, we explore the legal framework of AGMs of listed companies in Europe, which forms the foundation for the empirical analyses in the subsequent chapters. We consider the decision-making rights, information rights (including forum rights) and procedural rights of shareholders at the European level. As this chapter shows, only a small part of the legal framework of AGMs is harmonized at the European level and this harmonization mostly consists of procedural rights. The recently adopted amended Shareholder Rights Directive will introduce more material European rights such as a say on pay.
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In this chapter, we explore the legal framework of AGMs in seven Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) of shareholder…
Abstract
In this chapter, we explore the legal framework of AGMs in seven Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) of shareholder decision-making rights. We find that, since only a small part of the decision-making rights is harmonized at the European level, there are numerous differences in shareholder rights among national laws. These decision-making rights are usually about the topics director (re-)elections, pay matters, share capital, amendments to articles of association, annual accounts, etc. To be able to conduct empirical research in the remaining chapters, we develop a categorization framework of 15 voting items.
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In this part of the research, we consider the costs of the turnout decision and evaluate whether the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36/EC), which aimed at…
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In this part of the research, we consider the costs of the turnout decision and evaluate whether the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36/EC), which aimed at lowering voting costs, has had a positive impact on (small) shareholder attendance. For this, we investigate turnout rates in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. We find strong indications that the Shareholder Rights Directive indeed had a positive impact on (small) shareholder attendance in these countries. The findings of this study may encourage policy makers to further reduce the costs of (cross-border) voting. It shows that the introduction of the new Shareholder Rights Directive may contribute to (small) shareholder engagement.
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Since we have seen in the previous chapter that only small part of the shareholder rights is harmonized at the European level, we explore the national regulations in this and the…
Abstract
Since we have seen in the previous chapter that only small part of the shareholder rights is harmonized at the European level, we explore the national regulations in this and the subsequent chapter. In this chapter, we focus in particular on procedural and information rights, including the organization of the meeting, forum rights and the disclosure of ownership information. We find that, inter alia, there are many differences in the national provisions regarding shareholder forum rights, despite article 9 of the Shareholder Rights Directive that provides shareholders with the right to ask questions. Also in the meeting’s organization there are large differences between countries, for example, regarding the use of EGMs.
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Otuo Serebour Agyemang, Mavis Osei-Effah, Samuel Kwaku Agyei and John Gartchie Gatsi
This paper aims to examine how country-level corporate governance structures influence the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in the context of Africa.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine how country-level corporate governance structures influence the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in the context of Africa.
Design/methodology/approach
Data are collected from the world competitiveness report for the period 2010-2015. To examine the validity of the study’s hypotheses empirically, the authors use ordinary least squares with correlated panel-corrected standards error (PCSE).
Findings
This paper offers additional empirical evidence on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in Africa. It highlights that country-level corporate governance structures such as efficacy of corporate boards, strength of investor confidence, regulations of securities exchanges and the operation of the Big 4 accounting firms have significant positive impacts on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.
Research limitations/implications
This paper fails to include all African countries because of non-availability of a report for some African countries. Thus, the findings on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in a country are applicable to the countries used in this study.
Practical implications
This paper emphasizes on the relevance of country-level corporate governance structures to ensuring a reasonable level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.
Originality/value
This paper partially fills the gap regarding the absence of an empirical cross-country study on how country-level corporate governance structures influence the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.
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An effective bank resolution regime requires taking action while the bank still has positive net worth and shareholder claims still have economic value. Such actions raise a…
Abstract
Purpose
An effective bank resolution regime requires taking action while the bank still has positive net worth and shareholder claims still have economic value. Such actions raise a number of legal issues with respect to the rights of shareholders. This paper aims to consider how to strike a balance between the need to protect the legitimate rights of shareholders and the need for a prompt and rapid action and a failure resolution mechanism that minimizes disruptions to the financial system and preserves market discipline.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper examines the nature of the shareholders' rights and the legal protection afforded to them. In the European context, the relevant sources of law are the European Convention on Human Rights and the applicable community legislation. It considers different options for resolution within this framework ranging from a pre‐packaged resolution decided by the shareholders ex ante to the outright divestiture of the shareholders once certain regulatory thresholds are breached while the bank still has positive net worth.
Findings
The curtailment of shareholder rights should seek to generate appropriate incentives for shareholders and other stakeholder and achieve broad objectives of enhancing predictability and maintaining public goods, while at the same time providing for due process, proportionality and adequate compensation.
Practical implications
The paper presents options on how to reform existing frameworks in order to facilitate bank restructurings in a crisis.
Originality/value
The paper discusses key elements that policy makers need to consider in the design of a regulatory framework for early intervention and resolution.
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A company that is registered with share capital may issue different classes of shares and may confer rights on members, which place them in different classes in the company’s…
Abstract
Purpose
A company that is registered with share capital may issue different classes of shares and may confer rights on members, which place them in different classes in the company’s organisational structure. This paper is concerned with the propensity for encroachment on such vested class rights as companies strive to wriggle out of business challenges spawn by the COVID-19 pandemic. The purpose of this study is to ascertain the extent of protection that the law accords to the different classes of shareholders and members in a company especially when the company seeks to vary the vested class rights.
Design/methodology/approach
A doctrinal methodology, which relies on existing literature, case law and statutory instruments, is adopted to explore the nature of class rights and the adequacies of the remedial measures availed by statute to the aggrieved bearers of class rights in the context of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 with inferences drawn from the UK companies statute and case law.
Findings
The findings indicate that accessing the remedies available to aggrieved shareholders under the relevant statutory provisions are fraught with conditionality, which could make them elusive to those who may seek to rely on such provisions to vindicate any encroachment on their class rights.
Practical implications
The paper embodies cogent information on the interpretation and application of the relevant statutory provisions geared at the protection of shareholders class rights, which should serve as guides to companies and the courts in dealing with matters that affect the vested class rights of shareholders and members of a company.
Originality/value
The paper shows that protections offered to classes of shareholders under the law can also be extended to classes of members who are not necessarily shareholders, and that shareholders who seek to vindicate their class rights may conveniently rely on Section 163 that provides for unfair prejudice remedy to avoid the onerous conditions under Section 164 of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008, which directly deals with class rights.
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Henry Huang, Quanxi Wang and Xiaonong Zhang
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether managerial ownership affects the association between shareholder rights and the cost of equity capital.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether managerial ownership affects the association between shareholder rights and the cost of equity capital.
Design/methodology/approach
Prior literature has shown that strong shareholder rights are associated with a lower level of cost of equity capital. This paper empirically tests the interaction between managerial ownership and shareholder rights on affecting the cost of equity capital, using Gompers et al.'s governance score and Ohlson and Juettner‐Nauroth's estimate of cost of equity capital. To mitigate the endogeneity arising from other governance variables affecting both shareholder rights and the cost of equity capital, the paper adopts both OLS and two‐stage regression.
Findings
The results indicate that managerial ownership aligns managers' interests with those of shareholders, leading to a lesser degree of agency problems and lower cost of equity capital. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that managerial ownership could substitute for shareholder rights in affecting the cost of equity capital, making strong shareholder rights less important in a high managerial ownership setting.
Research limitations/applications
Findings in this paper suggest that firms need to consider the interaction between managerial ownership and shareholder rights in designing their governance structure to minimize their cost of equity capital.
Originality/value
This paper reveals the interaction between two major governance variables in affecting firm valuation.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of individual provisions of firm‐level shareholder rights on the cost of equity capital in the USA setting.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of individual provisions of firm‐level shareholder rights on the cost of equity capital in the USA setting.
Design/methodology/approach
Prior literature has shown that strong shareholder rights, as measured by aggregated shareholder rights indices, could mitigate the agency costs and reduce the cost of equity capital. Stepwise regression method with control variables for financial risks and corporate governance risks is used to empirically test whether individual shareholder rights provisions have varying degrees of impacts on a firm's cost of equity capital.
Findings
Of the 24 shareholder rights provisions in the shareholder rights index, four provisions are found to be the most significant determinants of cost of equity capital with the absence of three provisions (poison pill, golden parachute, and control share cash out) and the presence of fair value provision reducing the firm's cost of equity capital.
Research limitations/implications
First, the results suggest that a few individual provisions are major determinants of firm value. Hence, investors and regulators should pay the most attention to these provisions. Second, the result that some provisions that limit shareholders' rights actually reduce cost of equity capital suggests that investors and regulators should not view all aspects of weak shareholder rights negatively.
Originality/value
This paper tests the impact of shareholder rights on cost of equity capital from an individual provision basis.
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Badar Nadeem Ashraf and Changjun Zheng
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of legal protection of bank minority shareholders (noncontrolling shareholders) and bank creditors (e.g. depositors or…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of legal protection of bank minority shareholders (noncontrolling shareholders) and bank creditors (e.g. depositors or debt-holders) on bank dividend payout policies using a panel data set of 5,918 banks from 52 countries over the period 1998-2007, after controlling for country-level deposit insurance coverage and bank- and country-level regulatory pressures.
Design/methodology/approach
Tobit panel regression models are used to examine the impact of legal protection of shareholders and creditors on bank dividend payout amounts. And, logit panel regression models are used to examine the impact of legal protection of shareholders and creditors on banks’ likelihood to pay dividends.
Findings
The authors support the outcome hypothesis by finding that banks pay higher amount of dividends and, are more likely to pay dividends in strong minority shareholder protection countries. However, the authors reject the substitute hypothesis by finding that banks pay higher dividends and are more likely to pay dividends in weak creditor rights countries, and banks do not substitute weak creditor rights with lower dividend payout amounts. Contrary, the authors support the literature which argues the importance of creditor rights for capital market development because one possible reason for low dividend payouts in strong creditor rights countries could be that the banks retain more profits for extending more loans.
Practical implications
By finding that creditor rights index has a negative relation with bank dividend policies in contrast to its positive relation with nonfinancial firms’ dividend policies, the authors support the literature which argues that managers of banks give less importance to factors such as current degree of financial leverage, the contractual constraints such as dividend restrictions in debt contracts, and the financing considerations such as the cost of raising external funds, while deciding about the dividend payments. The authors also suggest to keep financial and nonfinancial firms separate, to better understand the dividend puzzle.
Originality/value
Extant literature recognizes that legal institutions such as shareholder protection and creditor rights affect corporate firms’ dividend policies significantly but largely excludes banking sector. This paper, by examining the relations between legal protection of shareholders and creditors and bank dividend policies, fills this research gap.
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