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In this paper, we investigate the New Zealand stock market reactions to both on-market and off-market share repurchase programmes for the period 1995–2004. Share repurchases have become more frequent in New Zealand in recent years, though the size and the number of repurchases are still small by international standards. The main reason appears to be the presence of the dividend imputation system which diminishes the tax consequences of cash dividends compared to capital gains. On the whole, we observe that the market reacts positively and significantly to the share repurchase announcements. The magnitude of average abnormal returns for the on- and the off-market repurchases on the announcement day are 3.25 and 3.12% respectively. We further observe the reasons companies undertake stock repurchase are consistent with the investment and free cash flows agency hypotheses.

This study investigates whether corporations consider shareholder-level taxes when setting corporate distribution policy. I investigate the relation between the tax-rate differential on dividend and capital gains income and its effect on firms’ distribution policies. I find that firms consider shareholder-level taxes and that this association varies with the percentage of the firm owned by individual shareholders. Hence, firms increase share repurchases and decrease the percentage of total corporate payout in the form of a dividend as the tax-rate differential increases. Thus, an increased substitution effect occurs as capital gains become relatively more tax-advantaged compared to dividends. Furthermore, I find a positive association between the percentage of the firm owned by individual investors and the percentage of total corporate payout distributed as a repurchase. These findings are consistent with personal income taxes influencing managerial decisions regarding the payout of excess corporate funds.

This research is one of the first studies to examine the effects of CSR disclosures on a firm’s decision to purchase back their own shares of stocks. Additionally, the authors examine whether the effect of CSR disclosures is stronger than the effect of CSR performance on the decision to repurchase shares. Examining firms in the United States, the authors find that total CSR disclosures and the CSR disclosures related to the dimensions of social, environmental, and governance are significantly and positively related to the number of shares that a firm buys back. Additionally, the authors find that the effects of CSR disclosures are stronger for total and the CSR dimensions of social and governance than for CSR performance. For the environmental dimension of CSR, both disclosure and performance scores are significant. This research expands our understanding of the impact of CSR disclosure by showing the importance it plays in the decision to buy back stock and implies that firms that repurchase their stock are more socially responsive than firms that do not. Finally, it contributes to the growing literature on how CSR disclosure has a different impact than CSR performance on firm decisions and outcomes.

This paper examines stock prices reaction to open market repurchases announcements at the São Paulo Stock Exchange between May 30, 1997 and October 31, 1998. This institutional scenario is a good testing ground for some theoretical hypotheses about stock repurchases announcements, because during this period there were taxes on capital gains but not on dividends. Using an event study methodology, we examined 110 episodes and found very small abnormal returns. Those results can not be explained by two main competing theoretical explanations. The Cumulative Abnormal Returns pattern found clearly suggests that repurchase announcements affected the behavior of stock prices in ways not described in previous studies.

The resolution of conflicts between shareholders and managers, at minimal cost, is the goal of corporate governance. In 1999, an intriguing series of events occurred that dramatically reshaped the Canadian airline industry. This clinical study considers these events in relation to four corporate governance mechanisms. The results of this clinical study suggest that these four mechanisms may not be sufficient to control a management team that is committed to a course of action and to retaining their positions. In practice, corporate governance can be severely limited, even when the majority of board members are outside directors. In addition, institutional shareholders may not be the disciplining force that theory and logic suggests. Overall, the results imply that managerial entrenchment is a powerful motivating force that may be impossible to counter even for a large, poorly performing corporation that is subject to a very attractive takeover offer.

The manner in which publicly traded companies’ management teams handle their firm’s free cash flows (FCF) has been an issue for many decades, because it is difficult to determine whether these management teams work for their own benefit or for that of their shareholders. Recent financial scandals have heightened mistrust of management. This mistrust, in turn, may have increased the pressure to reduce the portion of FCF left under management’s control. Boards of directors control dividend payout decisions, thus determining the portion of FCF available to corporate management. This paper examines whether the 2002 legal response to corporate financial reporting scandals, which came in the form of many new initiatives and requirements imposed by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on all publicly traded firms, was relevant to dividend payouts. This question is investigated by noting that the impact of these new requirements differed among firms. Some firms had already introduced the use of independent directors and fully independent committees prior to SOX making them compulsory in 2002. This paper examines whether these “pre-adopters” experienced less change in their dividend payout policies than those firms that were forced to change the composition of their board and committees.

This investigation examines the effect on dividend payouts for listed firms attributable to the SOX and concurrent changes in stock exchange regulations that compelled increased use of independent directors and fully independent committees. To study the impact of SOX and the associated, required, changes in the composition of boards of directors for many firms, the difference-in-differences methodology is employed to overcome the endogeneity concerns that have consistently challenged prior governance studies. This was accomplished by examining the effects on dividend payouts associated with the exogenously forced addition of independent directors to the boards of publicly listed firms. The results reveal that there is a significant positive relationship between firms that were compelled by law to change their boards and increases in average changes in dividend payouts and percentage changes in dividends paid, when compared to firms that had pre-adopted the Sarbanes–Oxley corporate board composition requirements. A further exploratory analysis showed that the same significant positive relationship is detected for increases in average changes in total dollars distributed, where stock repurchase dollars are combined with dividend payouts. These findings imply that these board composition changes led to decisions that increased dividend payouts in percentage terms, as well as dividend payouts and total dollars distributed in aggregate dollar amount terms.

In practice, it is increasingly common for companies to use NON-COMPETITION covenants in employment contracts that put restrictions on post-employment activities. Making use the variation of legal enforcement of NON-COMPETITION agreements in different states (NON-COMPETITION index) across the U.S., this chapter empirically examines whether and to what extent labor market concern will affect firm payout policy when managers are bound to their firms by NON-COMPETITION agreements. We find that the likelihood for a firm to pay DIVIDEND or conduct repurchasing is positively related to NON-COMPETITION index. We directly measure PAYOUT RATIO and find a significant positive relation between firm PAYOUT RATIO and NON-COMPETITION index. Our results indicate that managers with increased stability and reduced job opportunity in the external labor market are more likely use cash payout as a pre-commitment device and send a signal that they will not entrench themselves.

The purpose of this chapter is to study corporate strategies and their evolution over the last few decades (1970–2020). The strategic issues are examined through the lens of the following activities: portfolio scope (diversification versus specialisation), structuring (integration versus outsourcing) and financing, debt-related policies (leverage) and equity (dilution versus relution). The financialisation of corporate strategies is evident at various levels (specialisation, outsourcing, leverage, relution) to the detriment of the other stakeholders concerned. It weakens the latter and calls for stronger regulation of the financial markets (particularly share buyback operations).

The purpose of this article is to analyze the present state of employee ownership in Russia and reasons for its decline due to the drawbacks of economic reforms on the country.

The design of the article includes the analysis of the Russian model of ESOP and its differences from the U.S. analog. The author also describes the practical experience of the Russian people’s enterprises and the drawbacks in the legal foundations of their work.

The key finding of this work is that the correction of these drawbacks would lead to broader development of employee owned companies in Russia.

The author’s ideas of changing focus of the market reforms in Russia and facilitating the development of economic democracy in the country constitute the major social implication of her research.

It may have practical implications both for developed market economies and economies in transition.

The originality of the paper is determined by drawing a logical link between the development of employee ownership and overall market reform in Russia, as well as by presenting a comparative analysis of the U.S. and Russian models of ESOP.

In this chapter, we explore the legal framework of AGMs in seven Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) of shareholder decision-making rights. We find that, since only a small part of the decision-making rights is harmonized at the European level, there are numerous differences in shareholder rights among national laws. These decision-making rights are usually about the topics director (re-)elections, pay matters, share capital, amendments to articles of association, annual accounts, etc. To be able to conduct empirical research in the remaining chapters, we develop a categorization framework of 15 voting items.