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Article
Publication date: 12 August 2019

Shane Anthony Van Dalsem

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether family firms (FFs) differ from non-family firms (NFFs) in their propensity and likelihood of repurchasing shares. It…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether family firms (FFs) differ from non-family firms (NFFs) in their propensity and likelihood of repurchasing shares. It focuses on the effects of voting control and managerial control of family members and economic conditions on repurchasing activity.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper employs pooled Tobit and probit models for a sample of 982 US firms for the period 2006 through 2015 and separates the roles of voting control and managerial control on influencing share repurchase decisions.

Findings

This paper provides evidence that FFs have a decreased propensity to repurchase shares relative to NFFs over the sample period. In general, the decreased propensity to repurchase shares is driven by the decision whether to repurchase shares and not the percentage of outstanding market value of equity repurchased.

Practical implications

For critics of share repurchases, this paper provides support for existing literature that FFs provide good long-term stewardship to their firms. In general, it demonstrates that FFs are less likely to repurchase shares than NFFs. Investors that have a preference for or against repurchases can use this information to improve their security selection process.

Originality/value

To date, the effects of family voting and managerial control on share repurchases in the USA has not been considered in the finance literature. This paper adds to the literature by providing evidence that family influence generally results in a lower propensity to repurchase shares.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 45 no. 8
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

Keywords

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Article
Publication date: 31 July 2009

Shane van Dalsem

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of executive severance contract maturity policies on the likelihood of forced turnover and the length of tenure for…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of executive severance contract maturity policies on the likelihood of forced turnover and the length of tenure for CEOs who are forced from their positions.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper utilizes logistic and accelerated failure time models to test the hypothesis that severance contracts decrease information asymmetries resulting in an increased likelihood of forced turnover and a shortened tenure for those CEOs who are forced out.

Findings

The results provide evidence that fixed‐term severance contracts increase the likelihood of forced tenure and decrease the length of tenure for CEOs who experience a forced turnover during the period, while time‐independent contracts do not.

Research limitations/implications

The limitation is the possibility that an omitted variable jointly determines the likelihood of the presence of a severance contract and the effect on forced turnover. Future research should investigate other possibilities beyond the CEO coming from outside of the firm.

Practical implications

The findings confirm that the maturity policies of severance contracts affect forced turnover. The results suggest that there may be a benefit in designing severance contracts to expire to encourage more efficient turnover of underperforming CEOs.

Originality/value

This paper contributes to the empirical corporate finance and accounting literature by differentiating between forced and unforced turnover when analyzing the effects of severance contracts and demonstrating that the time dimension of severance contracts may provide the desired result of encouraging the identification of CEO‐firm mismatches.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 35 no. 9
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

Keywords

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Article
Publication date: 11 May 2010

Thomas M. Krueger, Mark A. Wrolstad and Shane Van Dalsem

The purpose of this paper is to examine the contemporaneous relationship between changes in corporate reputations and stock prices.

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the contemporaneous relationship between changes in corporate reputations and stock prices.

Design/methodology/approach

The Harris Interactive Reputation QuotientTM is used as a measure of corporate reputation. Stock return and risk measures are evaluated for each Reputation QuotientTM survey period for the years 1999‐2007.

Findings

The results provide evidence that, in the aggregate, firm reputations are procyclical. Additionally, firms with improved reputations enjoy lower volatility in their stock prices than firms with diminished reputations.

Research limitations/implications

Due to the Harris Poll Online methodology, it is not clear that the price changes occur concurrently with the change in reputation.

Originality/value

This paper contributes to the finance literature by examining the effect of a change in corporate reputation on stock price.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 36 no. 6
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

Keywords

Content available
Article
Publication date: 11 May 2010

Monzurul Hoque

Abstract

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 36 no. 6
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

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