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The purpose of this study is to explore the perception of Turkish citizens of the severity of bribery relative to other crimes and violations.

A questionnaire survey was administered to 545 Turkish people respondents. A five-point Likert scale that measures attitudes and behaviors using answer choices was used to categorize the degree of seriousness of each crime for data analysis.

The results of the study show that bribery ranked 16th among the 33 offences surveyed, that is, it lies in the middle in terms of seriousness. The results also indicate that the average person views bribery as not a very serious crime. When compared to violent crimes, bribery is significantly less serious. As for the property crimes, bribery is significantly less serious than arson and carjacking, but it significantly more serious than damage to public property, shoplifting and bike theft. When compared to white-collar crimes, bribery is remarkably less serious than embezzlement and appreciably more serious than welfare fraud, insider trading, child labor, minimum wage and insurance fraud. The results of this study are substantial; general public do not perceive bribe as a serious crime.

This is an important study in relation to Turkey. This is as a pioneer study that indicates the relationship between bribery as a crime and other offences in Turkey. The results of this study should be useful to policy-makers in Turkey and elsewhere. Another important sight of this study is the fact that the results show different correlations with similar studies put through in the other countries. According to the studies, bribery was the least serious crime in Australia and New Zealand; it ranked in the middle in terms of seriousness in Mexico, similar to Turkey; and it was also less serious than the average offense in the USA.

This paper adds to a growing body of research which explores the relationship between aggressive police strategies and serious crime. For one month, police enforced disorder crime in a small section of one community. An interrupted time series analysis was utilized to evaluate the effects of this intervention on robbery and aggravated burglary in a target area and a control area. The strategy was found to be unrelated to levels of aggravated burglary and robbery in the target area. There was no spatial displacement of crime. Explanations for the findings are offered.

There have been very few attempts in the economics literature to empirically study the link between criminal and corrupt behaviour due to lack of data sets on simultaneous information on both types of illegitimate activities. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The present study uses a large cross-country data set containing individual responses to questions on crime and corruption along with information on the respondents' characteristics. These micro-level data are supplemented by country-level macro and institutional indicators. A methodological contribution of this study is the estimation of an ordered probit model based on outcomes defined as combinations of crime and bribe victimisation.

The authors find that: a crime victim is more likely to face bribe demands, males are more likely victims of corruption while females are of serious crime, older individuals and those living in the smaller towns are less exposed to crime and corruption, increasing levels of income and education increase the likelihood of crime and bribe victimisation to be reported and a stronger legal system and a happier society reduce both crime and corruption. However, the authors find no evidence of a strong and uniformly negative impact of either crime or corruption on a country's growth rate.

This paper is, to the authors' knowledge, the first in the literature to explore the nexus between crime and corruption, their magnitudes, determinants and their effects on growth rates.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (the Act), in particular, the sections of the Act that establish the serious organised crime agency (SOCA) and to anticipate the effectiveness of the Act against organised and serious crime in the UK.

The methodology employed is to examine Parts 1 and 2 of the Act, in light of the response of concerned professionals to the Act's passage through Parliament, concerns expressed both in the press and in legal journals, and to critically examine the novel features of the Act from the perspective of a professional who has worked in this same field (organised and serious crime) in Hong Kong for more than 20 years.

The Act is to be welcomed, in particular, gathering the investigative and intelligence functions of the police, customs and immigration service in one body SOCA, an elite limit to assist other UK police forces and law enforcement agencies. The introduction of statutory mechanisms to promote the co‐operation of defendants as potential witnesses is also to be welcomed. However, it is feared that the investigative powers created will be ineffective as the judiciary are not directly involved and the powers that are given to SOCA will be easily evaded by ruthless or experienced criminals.

It is hoped, the paper will promote interest in SOCA when it is “rolled out” operationally in April 2006. It is also hoped that SOCA will be appreciated from the outset as only a half‐hearted adoption of the US organised crime “model”. The UK has decided not to use telephone taps as a source of evidence, nor has it granted effective investigative powers to SOCA. Furthermore, there has been no comprehensive clean‐up of the present confusion of objectives that is so obvious in the sentencing policy as it concerns offenders who commit serious crime or are involved in organised criminal behaviour in the UK.

Organised Crime is notoriously difficult to identify and measure, resulting in limited empirical evidence to inform policy makers and practitioners. The purpose of this paper is to explore the feasibility of identifying a greater number of organised crime offenders, currently captured but invisible, within existing national general crime databases.

All 2.1 million recorded offenders, captured over a four-year period on the UK Police National Computer, were filtered across three criteria associated with organised crime (co-offending, commission of specific offences, three years imprisonment or more). The 4,109 “organized crime” offenders, identified by the process, were compared with “general” and “serious” offender control groups across a variety of personal and demographic variables.

Organised crime prosecutions are not random but concentrate in specific geographic areas and constitute 0.2 per cent of the offender population. Offenders can be differentiated from general crime offenders on such measures as: diversity of nationality and ethnicity, onset age, offence type and criminal recidivism.

Using an offence-based methodology, rather than relying on offenders identified through police proactive investigations, can provide empirical information from existing data sets, across a diverse range of legislative areas and cultures. This allows academics to enhance their analysis of organised crime, generating richer evidence on which policy makers and practitioners can more effectively deliver preventative and disruptive tactics.

This is the first time an “offence based” methodology has been used to differentiate organised crime offenders from other offenders in a general crime database.

The purpose of this paper is to explore crisis management in terms of the spiritual aspects of victim recovery. The paper focuses, in particular, on victims of serious crime.

The paper reviews the available literature on crisis management, serious crime, spirituality and pastoral support to determine their impact on trauma recovery. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with a number of police chaplains and a hospital chaplain, in addition to police family liaison officers and witness care officers, who have in-depth involvement with victims of serious crime, to explore the support available and identify gaps against existing theory.

Spiritual/pastoral support is available to police officers in the form of police chaplains. Their support is reported to be valuable in the crisis recovery process. Hospital patients report such support as integral to mental and emotional well-being and recovery. Victims of serious crime are not offered such pastoral services through the criminal justice system, though other more practical needs are provided for. This gap could have implications for the effectiveness of the criminal justice process.

The research is an exploratory study and seeks to open up debate in this arena. The research is localised to a specific region and may not generalise nationally/internationally.

The paper evaluates the role and import of spiritual support in trauma recovery, makes a number of recommendations to plug the gap in current provision to victims of serious crime and suggests directions for further research in this area.

There are limited social implications.

There has been very limited research conducted in this specific area and this paper seeks to redress this gap and suggests opportunities for further research to enhance victim crisis recovery and participation in the criminal justice process.

This study tests assumptions implicit in many of the policy developments around hate crime reporting that concern the social context and some of the psychological processes behind decisionmaking on victim reporting. Results suggest that official concern over reporting all hate crimes for service planning requirements is not shared by the overwhelming majority of respondents and would not be feasible to deliver. If reporting is to be increased it needs to deliver a more tangible and personally experienced outcome for the individual.

Politicians justified the introduction of the illiberal and liberal parts of the UK's anti‐money laundering and asset recovery regime by reference to the extra‐ordinary threat posed by organised crime. This paper attempts to evaluate the extent to which the financial measures contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002 and the Serious and Organised Crime and Policing Act 2005 are actually used against this threat.

The objective is achieved by reference to four distinct datasets found on the use of these measures. The first consists of the regular, usually monthly, bulletins on the Proceeds of Crime produced by the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA). The second – which reveals the length of sentences given to those convicted of money laundering offences under the POCA – was gathered from the Financial Action Task Force, the Home Office and Justice Office in Scotland. The third consists of the value of the cases which had been, and which were being, dealt with by the ARA at the time the National Audit Office produced it's report on the institution. The fourth is the number of financial reporting orders which have been imposed upon criminals, follows the discovery of an earlier version whilst examining parliamentary records.

The triangulated results suggest that the POCA powers – originally used by use against organised crime – were used against this alleged threat only on a small minority and number of occasions.

This infrequent use raises major questions of either the ability of the policing agencies including the Serious and Organised Crime Agency to take on organised crime and/or the credibility of those who exaggerated a threat of organised crime to justify the (often illiberal) powers.

This paper questions whether the POCA will achieve one of its original aims. It will interest politicians and practitioners concerned with the combating of organised crime and/or anti‐money laundering and asset recovery as well as criminologists and those interested in civil liberties.

The purpose of this paper is to consider how the national intelligence model (NIM) of policing in Britain has been affected by changing patterns of mobility, since its inception in 2004.

Conceptually, the paper draws on the “new mobilities paradigm”. Empirically, it is based on a small, exploratory study, comprising analysis of investigations carried out over a three‐month period in 2007 and 2008, by a serious and organised crime unit in a police force in England, and 11 interviews carried out in three police forces in England. The data are used for illustrative purposes only.

It is argued that increased levels of mobile criminality are impacting significantly on British police forces, placing considerable strain on the practical structures which underpin the NIM, and posing serious challenges to operational efficiency and effectiveness.

This paper makes a contribution by linking the social changes documented in the emergent social science field of “mobilities study” with changes in the organisation of criminality, particularly evident in the organisation of mobile criminality, which have presented routine opportunities for organised, transnational as well as “lower level” crime. Examining this phenomenon enables us to see that despite the attention paid to transnational policing in the organised crime literature, the burden of policing both organised and opportunistic crime continues to fall upon local police forces.