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The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Pyrotechnic effects and spectacular death belong to the symbolism of terror and political assassination – bizarre techniques of miscommunication through fear practiced on the innocent and designed to effect social change. While focusing on the use of terror in 9-11, this article deals with both terror and political assassination as closely related communicative practices of death. It outlines a theory of terrorism that suggests September 11 may be an example of expedient terrorist destruction ordered from within the state, a macabre instance of a state protection racket. Commentators on the left tend to see terrorism as a blow extended by the oppressed against exploiters. However, terrorism is much less likely to be a manifestation of a revolt by – or on behalf of – the underprivileged than a demonstration of brute force by the state or its agents. Machiavellian state terrorism is terror/assassination performed for reasons different from the publicized ones; often initiated by persons or groups other than those suspected of the act; and – most important – secretly perpetrated by, or on behalf, of the violated state itself. Machiavellian state terror advances the ruling agenda, while disguising itself as the work of individuals or groups opposed to the state's fundamental principles. As an example, the article reviews a mysterious 1971 assassination in Paris that obliquely foreshadows some critical elements of the official story of 9-11. The article underlines the importance of oppositional theorizing: questioning government and looking for connections between events are critical features of what it means to be vitally active in the political universe.

The purpose of this paper is to explore whether organizations have increased their crisis response planning in response to the terrorist attacks of 9‐11. While organizations were encouraged to implement crisis response plans or improve their existing plans after the events of 9‐11, there is mixed research on whether firms have taken such actions.

This study used a survey to explore if the number of firms implementing crisis response plans had increased since 9‐11. The survey also looked at employee perceptions of their company's preparedness for a crisis. By using subjects in New York and California, the survey also explored if there were geographical differences to the crisis response planning which occurred after 9‐11.

The survey found that firms have not responded as well as researchers and the government had hoped. The survey did find that the west coast firms seem to be responding quicker than the east coast companies.

Limitations of the survey include asking people to recollect the past. Another limitation is not having control over who filled out the survey since the survey was e‐mailed to the executives. The respondents also may have been susceptible to the social desirability bias.

This paper should impress upon organizations the need for an organizational crisis response plan. After the events of 9‐11, Hurricane Katrina has more recently focused attention on how firms were not prepared for a natural crisis and that firms may not be prepared for the Avian Flu.

The value of this paper is that it shows empirically the need for organizations to prepare crisis response plans. Future research should focus on exactly which elements should be included in a firm's crisis response plan.

This paper argues that the nation's immigration laws are being misused to craft a system of preventive administrative detention of immigrant men, predominantly of Middle Eastern background. These detentions give rise to imprisonment without charge for weeks and months, denial of access to lawyers, physical and psychological abuse and ultimately deportations without a fair initial hearing or the exhaustion of available appellate recourse. I argue that this expanded use of civil immigration detention is designed to weaken constitutional due process protections, bringing into the U.S. detention tactics adopted abroad under the rubric of the war on terror. This paper also highlights similarities between the evolving administrative detention system in the United States and longer-standing practices in Israel.

The purpose of this paper is to examine evolution of the American strategy toward terrorism in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. In other words, this study revolves around a key question: How and why the American security strategy toward terrorism evolved in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001? Based on the neorealist approach in international relations, this paper attempted to answer that question: first, through defining the concept of terrorism and how the Americans perceive it; second, via pinpointing the characteristic of the American counter-terrorism strategy before September 11 attacks; and third, through examining the effects of those terrorist attacks on that strategy.

The nature of the subject of this study calls for reliance on the analytical descriptive approach to highlight the role and strategy of the USA in the fight against terrorism following the events of September 11, in addition to the use of the system analysis methodology, which can identify the inputs and outputs of the system that had an impact in formulating the US counter-terrorism strategy.

This study has come up with seven findings. The first finding was that the 9/11 attacks served as a turning point of the US counter-terrorism strategy and restructured its agenda. Confronting the communist threat had been its primary objective, until terrorism came to the fore and became its first and foremost priority. The USA vowed that terrorism is its enemy and waged the war on terror to thwart its risk as a global threat. The second finding revolves around the idea of double standards in the American foreign policy. True to its long-standing tradition of favoring its own interests, in complete disregard of the interests of any other party, the USA continued to uphold the double-standards policy.

This study adds a new study to the Arab Library in the field of counter-terrorism studies, national security strategies and American foreign policy. In addition, the researcher seeks to complete the scientific effort to study the US strategy against terrorism, with a clear impact on the development of the situation in the region. This study contributes to the study of how one of the great powers in the international system, the USA, deals with the terrorist organizations that have become widespread in the Arab region.

The paper seeks to draw lessons for effective policy and regulatory responses to protect financial systems in the face of terrorist attacks.

The paper presents data on the reaction of financial markets to the terrorist attacks in New York (2001) and Madrid (2004). It describes the authorities' crisis management responses and analyses their effectiveness. The paper describes the subsequent regulatory responses to protect the financial systems from abuse by terrorists.

Diversified, liquid, and sound financial markets were efficient in absorbing the shocks of terrorist attacks when supported by well organized crisis management responses.

The paper is limited in its coverage to the reaction of the financial markets to the 11 September 2001, terrorist attacks in New York, and 11 March 2004, attacks in Madrid.

The paper highlights the importance of effective contingency planning by the authorities and financial firms in mitigating the risks of disruption from terrorist attacks.

This paper provides an overview of the issues, challenges and responses in dealing with the risks posed by terrorism to financial systems. It combines empirical evidence with an institutional perspective, and notes some of the regulatory challenges in combating terrorist finance.

Questions about the short- and long-term effects of the trauma of 9/11 on students with special needs and the coping strategies used by their teachers to deal satisfactorily with the effects prompted the creation of a survey to examine these issues. While the survey was in its inception and before its completion, a consultation was held with a counselor from the Behavioral Studies program at the University of South Alabama to ensure that the survey was thorough and relevant to post-traumatic stress.

Inconsistencies and contradictions in the US government's story of hijackers and their masterminds are examined to account for what happened on 9-11. A little-known initial FBI list of 19, scrutinized for four names not on its final list, calls into question the FBI naming process. We discovered 11 of the FBI-named finalists could not have been on those planes, with 10 still alive and another's identity improvised by a double. The Dulles videotape, essentially the government's case that hijackers boarded the 9-11 flights, is found to have serious problems including authentication, as does the so-called bin Laden “confession” video.

Were “hijackers” known to be in the US before intelligence alleges it knew? Evidence is examined which shows that they were closely monitored by agencies which denied this knowledge; in particular, an undercover FBI agent lived with them the prior year.

Noting government refusal to disclose evidence called for by investigators, we find some pieces altered or fabricated and others confiscated or destroyed. Other revelations point to hijackers with national security overrides, protection in their alternate roles as drug traffickers, and deep political connections with government elites. We investigate patterns, reminiscent of historical intelligence involvement, revealing the presence of a covert intelligence operation disguised as an outside enemy attack.