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Researchers have proposed a variety of models to depict, explain, and understand ethical decision-making processes. Rest (1986) proposed a four-stage, individually oriented model, in which a person who makes a moral decision must (1) recognize the moral issue, (2) make a moral judgment, (3) establish moral intent, and (4) make moral decisions. Similarly, Ferrell, Gresham, and Fraedrich (1989) developed a five-stage model that included awareness, cognitions, evaluations, determination, and actions. Finally, Trevino (1986) proposed a slightly different model that begins with the recognition of an ethical dilemma and proceeds to a cognition stage in which individuals make moral judgments that further affect their ethical or unethical decisions (see Jones, 1991, for a review).

Both uncertainty reduction theory and uncertainty management theory suggest that uncertainty reduction during organizational change is imperative as it may influence positively employees’ attitudes and behaviors. By drawing on the theory of planned behavior that links individual’s beliefs and behavior, the study seeks to examine how employees’ self- and other-interest in change may reduce perceptions of change uncertainty and consequently, foster their behavioral change support (i.e. compliance, cooperation and championing).

The study hypothesizes that employees’ self- and other-interest in change mediate the relationship between perceptions of change uncertainty and behavioral change support. The research was conducted in two large IT companies co-located in a big science park in an EU country in South-eastern Europe. Data were collected from 105 employees and their supervisors in three sequential phases.

The research findings suggest that both self- and other-interest in change partially mediate the negative relationship between perceptions of change uncertainty and behavioral change support.

The findings indicate that change management practitioners will benefit considerably if they try to decrease employees’ perceived change uncertainty by increasing their self- and other-interest in change to provoke supportive behaviors. Relevant suggestions are made.

The findings provide new insights into how perceptions of change uncertainty and self- and other-interest in change can affect employees’ change participation. Further, the research findings add to the uncertainty reduction theory and uncertainty management theory as well as, other related notions.

We review previous research on intergenerational conflict, focusing on the practical implications of this research for organizational leaders. We explain how the interaction between the interpersonal and intertemporal dimensions of intergenerational decisions creates the unique psychology of intergenerational decision-making behavior. In addition, we review the boundary conditions that have characterized much of the previous research in this area, and we examine the potential effects of loosening these constraints. Our proposals for future research include examination of the effect of intra-generational decision making on intergenerational beneficence, consideration of the role of third parties and linkage issues, investigation of the effects of intergenerational communications and negotiation when generations can interact, examination of the role of social power in influencing intergenerational interactions, investigation of the interaction between temporal construal and immortality striving, and exploration of the ways in which present decision makers detect and define the intergenerational dilemmas in their social environments.

This chapter makes a case for Adam Smith’s description of the market as a moral exemplar. More specifically, it argues that the behavior of the individual agents who inhabit Smith’s market is indeed morally exemplary.

The basis for this argument is that economic self-interest drives market participants to look beyond any inherent prejudice or tendency to discriminate on the basis of preconceived opinions or beliefs. Some historical context is provided that illustrates conservative opposition to this perspective from unlikely sources.

A simple moral framework is created to provide one possible representation of Smith’s interpretation of the market. In this framework self-interest is characterized as a “trump” that overcomes potential prejudices. It is further argued that this framework can be considered a moral exemplar, and that it is also important in facilitating exchange between participants.

The central argument is tested when the self-interest criterion is exposed to competition from the alternative moral value of altruism. The moral framework presented, and the principle of economic self-interest in particular, is resilient against this moral challenge.

The social implications of this argument relate directly to our normative understanding of how individuals should behave in a market context. The chapter establishes a link between this moral framework and the functioning of the market.

The chapter is original in its attempt to defend the underlying morality of Smith’s market without recourse to his other works, such as the Theory of Moral Sentiments. It also links an understanding of market egalitarianism with a broader moral framework of market activity. Furthermore, it offers a clarification of why economic self-interest, and not altruism, is the appropriate motivation for market activity.

A species of moral malaise afflicts the professions today, a malaise that may prove fatal to their moral identities and perilous to our whole society. It is manifest in a growing conviction even among conscientious doctors, lawyers, and ministers that it is no longer possible to practice their professions within traditional ethical constraints. More specifically, the belief is taking hold that unless professionals look out for their own self‐interest, they will be crushed by commercialization, competition, government regulation, malpractice actions, advertising, public and media hostility, and a host of other inimical socio‐economic forces. This line of reasoning leads the professional to infer that self‐interest justifies compromises in, and even rejection of, obligations that standards of professional ethics have traditionally imposed.

The aim of this paper is to critically explore the behavioral assumptions of organizational politics, as well as to reconsider and redefine the premises of political behavior in the workplace. The main objective is examination of the presuppositions associated with the possibility of constructive politics in organizational settings.

The deficiencies of explaining managerial activity as solely regulated by self‐interest are discussed, as well as a revised version of self‐interest that may enrich current understanding of workplace politics. Drawing on the respective literature, the authors develop some propositions and suggest, assess and discuss a conceptual framework that integrates self‐interest and constructive politics.

The paper represents an attempt toward inferring positive political behavior through adopting an alternative view of established behavioral assumptions. This view purports to reduce the existing discrepancy between different types of political behavior in defending the possibility of an inclusive, participative and welfare‐enhancing political process, founded on the pro‐social and reciprocating aspects of human interaction. Boundedly selfish organizational members are expected to demonstrate these qualities that are in position to transform the very nature of political activities to the direction of greater organizational good.

The paper reevaluates the self‐interested nature of organizational politics through the introduction of a bounded self‐interest assumption as more representative of actual human behavior. This new construct embodies those constraints that make trust formation, networking and reciprocities operative in environments effectively embedding political behavior in broader, organizational goal‐oriented processes and structures.

Challenges of teamwork in online classes may adversely affect students’ future attitudes toward teamwork. Further, there is a concern about whether online programs foster students’ teamwork skills. To answer these questions, the purpose of this paper is to compare online and face-to-face students’ attitudes toward teamwork, interest in learning teamwork skills and teamwork self-efficacy.

The authors developed a conceptual model explaining how students’ background, engagement in learning teamwork, teamwork self-efficacy and interest in learning teamwork affect attitudes toward teamwork and rigorously tested the model for a meaningful comparison between online and face-to-face students. Attitudes toward teamwork, teamwork interest and teamwork self-efficacy of 582 online and face-to-face students who attend the same academic program were compared.

The results suggest that online students have less positive attitudes towards teamwork compared to face-to-face students although online students have a higher level of teamwork self-efficacy. Therefore, online students’ relative less positive attitudes toward teamwork cannot be explained by the lack of engagement, teamwork skills or interest.

The homogeneity of the sample population is one of the limitations of the paper although it provides the opportunity for a comparative study of online and face-to-face students by controlling the majors.

Instructors should evaluate the appropriateness of team assignments while incorporating teamwork in online classes.

Concerns about online teamwork are discussed but have not been rigorously investigated in the literature. The authors conducted a comprehensive study involving 582 undergraduate students. The findings of this paper suggest that new approaches are needed to incorporate teamwork in online classes. The results also show that importance of building teamwork self-efficacy.

In his influential study The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1971 [1959]), Erving Goffman provides an insightful account of the formation of social selves. Goffman’s work has been extensively discussed in the sociological literature. Yet, the presuppositional underpinnings, let alone the socio-ontological implications, of his conception of personhood have not been rigorously scrutinized.

The main reason for the lack of methodical engagement with the principal assumptions that lie at the heart of Goffman’s theory of the self is that his approach is widely regarded as an eclectic narrative that, while drawing on different sociological traditions, does not make any claim to universal validity.

The persuasiveness of the contention that Goffman’s analysis of the self cannot be reduced to a general theory of human personhood appears to be confirmed by the fact that both supporters and detractors of his sociological project tend to agree that it would be erroneous to deduce a foundational framework of investigation from his numerous studies concerned with the interaction between self and society.

Attention will be drawn to several controversial issues that arise when faced with the task of assessing both the strengths and the weaknesses of Goffman’s understanding of the self.

The aim of this paper is to challenge the aforementioned contention by demonstrating that Goffman provides a fairly systematic account of human personhood. More significantly, this enquiry suggests that a fine-grained examination of his key concepts permits us to propose an outline of a general theory of the human self.

The attractiveness of dynamic systems perspectives for expanding thinking about motivation, more particularly interest, lies in the central proposition that the individual is a self-organizing system in which “novel forms emerge without predetermination and become increasingly complex with development” (Lewis, 2000, p. 36). As Lewis further points out, “self-organization is not a single theory or model. Rather it is an idea … that promises coherent explanation in the study of pattern, change and novelty” (Lewis, 2000, p. 42). Thelen and Smith (2006) have proposed that self-organization is a “fundamental property of living things” and “by self-organization we mean that pattern and order emerge from the interactions of the components of a complex system without explicit instructions, either in the organism itself or from the environment” (p. 259). They suggest that understanding change and development concerns “the elaborate causal web between active individuals and their continually changing environments” (p. 271) and refer to specific units of organization within the system as “patterns assembled for task-specific purposes whose form and stability depended on both the immediate and more distant history of the system” (p. 284). To date, dynamic systems perspectives have been applied to a wide range of psychological phenomena, for example, the development of perceptual, motor and cognitive systems in infancy and early childhood (see e.g., Thelen & Smith, 2006). Jörg, Davis, and Nickmans (2007) have argued for a similar approach for the learning sciences. They propose a new complexity paradigm suggesting that more attention needs to be given to understanding the dynamics of the complex systems that make up the science of education and teaching.

This paper aims to elucidate some of the arguments against egoism in the current debate, as well as to create some new arguments, or rather objections (epistemological and ontological from the position of egoism as moral solipsism), and to explicate some arguments against egoism (descriptive, normative, and ideological) as being not so convincing. It also aims to explicate Jesus's second commandment in a fashion similar to that of Adam Smith when he tried to combine self‐love with sympathy.

This paper is based on the premise that some foundational philosophies, worldviews, or paradigms exemplify at least one type of egoism/selfish strategy. In that light the analysis of egoism and the objections are formulated.

They paper finds that present arguments in favour of egoism in business, and especially as certain “business ethics”, are not acceptable, at least on the practical and theoretical grounds on which they are presented as sound arguments.

The paper implies that there is fundamental difference between theoretical and practical egoism, and that practical egoism sometimes uses the theoretical one as its “quasi‐justification”.

The paper can be summarized in a series of general advices about an altruistic attitude and practices which in the long term show more benefits than costs for any group, and consequently for business organizations as well.

The paper presents ontological and epistemological interpretations and objections against egoism, emphasizing the somewhat neutral or at least bivalent position of Adam Smith regarding the matter in question, and introducing altruistic strategies as being compatible with the basic ideas of a free‐market system.