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This article explores the ways in which hegemony and power impact on the emergence, development and conflict management function of regional organizations. It compares the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), both of which include a strong regional power. These powers have contrasting postures: South Africa is a keen regionalist, a reluctant hegemon and a pacific power, whereas India is a keen hegemon, a reluctant regionalist and a militarist power. The presence of the hegemon has stimulated regionalism in Southern Africa but retarded regionalism in South Asia. Despite these differences, SADC and SAARC have similarly failed to manage regional conflict effectively. This has been due in large measure to the conflictual relationship between the hegemon and another powerful state in each region, Zimbabwe in the case of South Africa, and Pakistan in the case of India. Some of these dynamics are well explained by neorealist theory, but other dynamics are best explained by constructivist and liberal positions. This supports the argument by Katzenstein and Okawara (2001–2002) that in the field of international relations an eclectic analytical approach is required to comprehend complex processes that combine material, ideational, international, domestic, contemporary and historical factors.

During the past two decades, both West Africa and Central Africa have suffered a large number of intertwined wars. In both regions, these ‘webs of war’ have included interstate conflicts and rivalry, as well as wars over the control of many of the involved states. Existing perspectives tend to reduce these intertwined wars to a series of parallel civil wars within each of the various states. They see states as operating at the regional level, whereas the armed opposition to those states operates only at the national level. This chapter argues that many armed, non-state groups in West Africa and Central Africa should be seen as regional actors, and thus that conventional two-level analysis does not catch the complexity of conflict in those regions. Although major violence continues in Central Africa, it has largely been contained in West Africa. This needs to be seen in relation to the level of institutionalization of security and military cooperation in the two regions. In both regions, regional organizations carried out military operations that were highly controversial among their member-states. In West Africa, a series of interventions strengthened both regional cooperation and cooperation with external partners, whereas in Central Africa this was not the case. In West Africa, peace support operations have increasingly been carried out within a regional perspective. Not so in Central Africa. The chapter concludes with an examination of efforts to build a capacity for peace support operations within the African Union, based on subregional organizations but with strong involvement by external actors.

This study aims to reveal the impact of the “Conference on the Future of Europe” (which was officially launched on May 9, 2021 and lasted for one year) on the European Union (EU) integration. The ultimate goal of the integration movement in Western Europe was defined in the founding agreements as political integration through the strengthening of economic cooperation among member states. It is a fact that very important steps have been taken toward this goal until today. The first of the two main trends that dominate European integration is deepening, which refers to diversifying the areas of cooperation, and the second is enlargement, which means increasing the number of member states by the participation of new ones. Theoretically, there are almost a dozen scenarios for the future of the EU. However, taking into account the EU's internal problems and developments in the current international political system, the strongest scenario emerges as intertwined flexible integration. Indeed, developments in today's world call for a revision of the EU's geopolitical perspective. In addition to the internal factors shaping the future of the EU, the roles of the United States, which is its strategic partner, and China, which has risen to become its largest trading partner, are also important in the international political system. Likewise, there is no doubt that the developments in the Maghreb and Mashriq countries as well as Russia and Turkey will affect European integration.

The European Union (EU) is commonly, and vaguely, labelled as a sui generis foreign policy actor. The European Security Strategy (2003) advances, in an imprecise manner, the possible use of ‘robust’ responses to international challenges, when needed. The military dimension of the EU has to be found in its evolving but still incipient Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Since the launch of ESDP and its first missions in 2003, the EU has been able to conduct a noticeable progress on two fronts. On the one hand, it enhances internal capabilities for crisis management; on the other hand, it favours the principle of participation of third countries in missions. The present analysis considers EU international military cooperation in a strategic neighbourhood: Eastern Europe. We take into account the EU necessity to rely on relevant non-EU players to launch missions. We argue that ESDP missions' success depends not only on these external actors, namely on the consideration of power gaps, but also on domestic EU constraints. We explore the causes of poor cooperation with Russia on ESDP and the perspectives for crisis management in Europe. Considering ESDP activities in Eastern Europe, we conclude that the balance between civilian and military tools is not adequate to engage more seriously with Russia towards the stabilisation of the ‘common’ neighbourhood.

Hungary has been part of NATO's peacekeeping project in Afghanistan since 2003 and currently has more than 240 soldiers in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO's first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Hungary officially took over the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Baghlan Province from October 2006, and currently we have the 5th rotation of the Hungarian PRT in Afghanistan. The Hungarian unit serves in conjunction with representatives of several other nations.

Hungarian participation in NATO's UN-mandated peace support operation in Afghanistan has raised many questions not only in the field of operations, but also at home (mainly in the context of civil–military relations). Many of the Hungarian PRT-related challenges seem to be connected to the difficulties of proper management of civil–military interface, civil–military partnership and cooperation process, and financial backing of the mission.

Well-coordinated, multidimensional proactive and reactive responses to the conflict, and a comprehensive security sector transformation and reform can be vital to consolidate peaceful relations in Afghanistan; may help to win the “hearts and minds” of the local population; can help to establish security and provide improvement to Bahlan province; and might contribute to the success of the whole peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building process in Afghanistan.

What is the historical, normative and institutional setting that helps leading Latin American and Eurasian countries to implement a post-hegemonic agenda and contribute to the multipolarization of global politics? Post-hegemony describes a situation in which the unipolar organization of the world political economy is challenged by a plurality of alternative projects, without however being entirely replaced by another system. Emblematic of post-hegemonic initiatives is the rise of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa countries who have taken the lead in creating alternative institutions that constrain US global hegemony, while however failing to spearhead a coherent, uniform and confrontational opposition movement. Regarding post-hegemonic regionalism, Latin American regionalism – as represented by Bolivarian Alliance for Our America (ALBA) – is characterized by a social justice-driven agenda that refutes US neoliberal hegemony, whereas the peculiarity of Eurasian regionalism – as represented by Shanghai Cooperation Organization – lies in its security-oriented focus that confronts US interventionism and international terrorism. An underlying commonality of both Latin American and Eurasian experiences is that they constitute a multi-front struggle centered on four main areas: culture, economy, financial cooperation, and regional defense. They both hinge on a strong normative framework and firm commitment in the regionalization of an endogenous culture, educational cooperation, and defense system. They all accord primary importance to social, financial, and infrastructural development. Overall, these experiences suffer from unresolved tensions between national sovereignty and supranationalism alongside the predominance of charismatic leaders inhibiting institutionalization. The limitations and contradictions of post-hegemonic transformations also include Latin America’s inability to resolve the question of extractivism, Eurasia’s neglect of the question of democratic participation, and both regionalism’s failure to offer a coherent alternative model of economic development to US hegemonism.

The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the role of Russia in the current world environment, focusing attention on its role in global security. Russia can play a leading role in contributing to global security or it can play a major role in undermining global security. The next section will present an interpretation of the nature of global security, followed by a discussion of recent changes in the global situation. Next, the current position of Russia in the global system and how that position has changed will be considered. Finally, the global security agenda and the contribution that Russia can make to this agenda will be examined. It will be shown that Russia can play a major role in the achievement of global security.