Search results

This study investigates the relation between lawsuit attributes that support an inference of fraud and the probability and the size of securities lawsuit settlement. A sample of 607 securities lawsuits between 1996 and 2006 is used in the analysis of the probability of settlement and a subsample of 261 lawsuit settlements is used in the analysis of the size of settlement. The empirical results indicate a positive association between the probability of a settlement and accounting irregularity, SEC enforcement action and stock offer. Accounting irregularity and SEC enforcement action are also documented to be positively related to the size of the settlement. The results imply that a stock offer supports a strong inference of fraud and the presence of accounting irregularity and SEC enforcement action in a lawsuit filing strengthens the fraud allegation and increases the likelihood of a settlement. The findings also suggest that the stronger the inference of fraud, the greater the size of the settlement. The results of this study add to our understanding of the determinants of securities lawsuit settlement. Studies using securities litigation as a proxy for fraud can use the results of this study to distinguish between fraud-related and nonfraud-related lawsuits.

Following the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Basic, securities class plaintiffs can invoke the “rebuttable presumption of reliance on public, material misrepresentations regarding securities traded in an efficient market” [the “fraud-on-the-market” doctrine] to prove classwide reliance. Although this requires plaintiffs to prove that the security traded in an informationally efficient market throughout the class period, Basic did not identify what constituted adequate proof of efficiency for reliance purposes.

Market efficiency cannot be presumed without proof because even large publicly traded stocks do not always trade in efficient markets, as documented in the economic literature that has grown significantly since Basic. For instance, during the recent global financial crisis, lack of liquidity limited arbitrage (the mechanism that renders markets efficient) and led to significant price distortions in many asset markets. Yet, lower courts following Basic have frequently granted class certification based on a mechanical review of some factors that are considered intuitive “proxies” of market efficiency (albeit incorrectly, according to recent studies and our own analysis). Such factors have little probative value and their review does not constitute the rigorous analysis demanded by the Supreme Court.

Instead, to invoke fraud-on-the-market, plaintiffs must first establish that the security traded in a weak-form efficient market (absent which a security cannot, as a logical matter, trade in a “semi-strong form” efficient market, the standard required for reliance purposes) using well-accepted tests. Only then do event study results, which are commonly used to demonstrate “cause and effect” (i.e., prove that the security’s price reacted quickly to news – a hallmark of a semi-strong form efficient market), have any merit. Even then, to claim classwide reliance, plaintiffs must prove such cause-and-effect relationship throughout the class period, not simply on selected disclosure dates identified in the complaint as plaintiffs often do.

These issues have policy implications because, once a class is certified, defendants frequently settle to avoid the magnified costs and risks associated with a trial, and the merits of the case (including the proper application of legal presumptions) are rarely examined at a trial.

A private right of action is not expressly mentioned in either §10(b) or Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and hence such a right must be implied. To justify a reasonable cause of action, the plaintiff must prove: (1) a material omission or misstatement; (2) made by the defendant with “scienter” (defined later); (3) which was the actual and proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff; (4) and was relied upon by the plaintiff.³ To reach the issue of damages, defendants’ liability in terms of satisfying the above four elements must be assumed.

Corporate crime is prevalent and imposes enormous costs on society, yet our understanding of its antecedents remains poor, especially in relation to executive characteristics. In this study, we examine the influence of CEO childhood social class on corporate crime. Using a unique data set of CEOs at the largest US corporations, we consider CEO childhood background and develop the argument individuals raised in middle-class families have a greater disposition to commit wrongdoing within the corporations they lead. Specifically, growing up middle-class leaves a lasting status-anxiety imprint, which increases the tendency to engage in corporate crime to preserve or enhance social status. Furthermore, we show two status-anxiety-minimizing factors – Ivy League education and membership in a prominent golf club – weaken the effect of middle-class upbringing on corporate crime. Our findings suggest childhood social class has significant explanatory power for executive behavior and corporate outcomes.

Purpose: This chapter aims to perform text analysis to investigate the academic area delimitated by economic and financial performance and money laundering.

Need for the study: The findings contribute to the body of literature by providing important insights in terms of money laundering and financial performance.

Methodology: In order to achieve the research objective, further than 640 papers were retrieved from the Web of Science from 1994 to 2022, concentrating on the most referenced documents found in the superior quartile.

Findings: The empirical findings emphasise that the article with the unique words Fraud Detection System: A Survey by Abdallah A., Maarof M. A., and Zainal A., examines a complete and systematic assessment of the concerns and obstacles that impede the performance of fraud detection systems. Furthermore, topic modelling findings highlighted the presence of four main topics: topic 1 – identified by ‘performance’, ‘firms’, ‘financial’, ‘fraud’, and ‘board’; topic 2 – described in terms of ‘fraud’, ‘accounting’, ‘evidence’, ‘audit’, and ‘research’; topic 3 – identified by ‘firms’, ‘fraud’, ‘financial’, ‘CEO’, and ‘results’ while topic 4 – identified through ‘fraud’, ‘detection’, ‘data’, ‘cost’, and ‘card’.

Practical implications: This study will act as a guide for researchers of the financial performance field to explore the scientific publications in the field of money laudering.