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Researchers recommend a reorganization of the medical profession into larger groups with a multispecialty mix. We analyze whether there is evidence for the superiority of these models and if this organizational transformation is underway.

We summarize the evidence on scale and scope economies in physician group practice, and then review the trends in physician group size and specialty mix to conduct survivorship tests of the most efficient models.

The distribution of physician groups exhibits two interesting tails. In the lower tail, a large percentage of physicians continue to practice in small, physician-owned practices. In the upper tail, there is a small but rapidly growing percentage of large groups that have been organized primarily by non-physician owners.

While our analysis includes no original data, it does collate all known surveys of physician practice characteristics and group practice formation to provide a consistent picture of physician organization.

Our review suggests that scale and scope economies in physician practice are limited. This may explain why most physicians have retained their small practices.

Larger, multispecialty groups have been primarily organized by non-physician owners in vertically integrated arrangements. There is little evidence supporting the efficiencies of such models and some concern they may pose anticompetitive threats.

This is the first comprehensive review of the scale and scope economies of physician practice in nearly two decades. The research results do not appear to have changed much; nor has much changed in physician practice organization.

Health-care systems currently face great challenges, including an increasing elderly population. To respond to this problem, a hospital emergency department, three municipalities, and self-employed general practitioners in Denmark decided to collaborate with the aim of reorganizing treatment of elderly acute ill patients. By establishing a small-scale collaborative community and through an action research process, we show, how to jointly explore and develop a new organization design for in-home hospital treatment that enables the health professionals to collaborate in new ways, and at the same time to investigate and improve this cocreation process and codesign of knowledge among multiple different stakeholders.

The hospital–physician relationship (HPR) has been the focus of many scholars given the potential impact of this relationship on hospitals’ ability to achieve socially and organizationally desirable health care outcomes. Hospitals are dominated by professionals and share many commonalities with professional service firms (PSFs). In this chapter, we explore an alternative HPR based on the governance models prevalent in PSFs.

We summarize the issues presented by current HPRs and discuss the governance models dominant in PSFs.

We identify the non-equity partnership model as a governance archetype for hospitals; this model accounts for both the professional dominance in health care decisions and the increasing demand for higher accountability and efficiency.

There should be careful consideration of existing regulations such as the Stark law and the antikickback statue before the proposed governance model and the compensation structure for physician partners is adopted.

While our governance archetype is based on a review of the literature on HPRs and PSFs, further research is needed to test our model.

Given the dominance of not-for-profit (NFP) ownership in the hospital industry, we believe the non-equity partnership model can help align physician incentives with those of the hospital, and strengthen HPRs to meet the demands of the changing health care environment.

This is the first chapter to explore an alternative hospital–physician integration strategy by examining the governance models in PSFs, which similar to hospitals have a high reliance on a predominantly professional staff.

Hospitals worldwide are facing the same opportunities and threats: the demographics of an aging population; steady increases in chronic diseases and severe illnesses; and a steadily increasing demand for medical services with more intensive treatment for multi-morbid patients. Additionally, patients are becoming more demanding. They expect high quality medicine within a dignity-driven and painless healing environment.

The severe financial pressures that these developments entail oblige care providers to more and more cost-containment and to apply process reengineering, as well as continuous performance improvement measures, so as to achieve future financial sustainability. At the same time, regulators are calling for improved patient outcomes. Benchmarking and best practice management are successfully proven performance improvement tools for enabling hospitals to achieve a higher level of clinical output quality, enhanced patient satisfaction, and care delivery capability, while simultaneously containing and reducing costs.

This chapter aims to clarify what benchmarking is and what it is not. Furthermore, it is stated that benchmarking is a powerful managerial tool for improving decision-making processes that can contribute to the above-mentioned improvement measures in health care delivery. The benchmarking approach described in this chapter is oriented toward the philosophy of an input–output model and is explained based on practical international examples from different industries in various countries.

Benchmarking is not a project with a defined start and end point, but a continuous initiative of comparing key performance indicators, process structures, and best practices from best-in-class companies inside and outside industry.

Benchmarking is an ongoing process of measuring and searching for best-in-class performance:

• Measure yourself with yourself over time against key performance indicators

• Measure yourself against others

• Identify best practices

• Equal or exceed this best practice in your institution

• Focus on simple and effective ways to implement solutions

Measure yourself with yourself over time against key performance indicators

Measure yourself against others

Identify best practices

Equal or exceed this best practice in your institution

Focus on simple and effective ways to implement solutions

Comparing only figures, such as average length of stay, costs of procedures, infection rates, or out-of-stock rates, can lead easily to wrong conclusions and decision making with often-disastrous consequences. Just looking at figures and ratios is not the basis for detecting potential excellence. It is necessary to look beyond the numbers to understand how processes work and contribute to best-in-class results. Best practices from even quite different industries can enable hospitals to leapfrog results in patient orientation, clinical excellence, and cost-effectiveness.

Despite common benchmarking approaches, it is pointed out that a comparison without “looking behind the figures” (what it means to be familiar with the process structure, process dynamic and drivers, process institutions/rules and process-related incentive components) will be extremely limited referring to reliability and quality of findings.

In order to demonstrate transferability of benchmarking results between different industries practical examples from health care, automotive, and hotel service have been selected.

Additionally, it is depicted that international comparisons between hospitals providing medical services in different health care systems do have a great potential for achieving leapfrog results in medical quality, organization of service provision, effective work structures, purchasing and logistics processes, or management, etc.

This study sets out to shed light on those infrastructures underlying the ubiquitous, yet contested nature of governing by numbers. Investigating the 30-year long emergence of Germany’s “external quality assurance system” for hospitals, the authors show how methods for quantifying quality align with broader institutional and ideational shifts to form a calculative infrastructure for governance. Our study focuses on three phases of infrastructural development wherein methods for calculating quality, institutions for coordinating data and reform ideals converge with one another. The authors argue that the succession of these phases represents a gradual layering process, whereby old ways of enacting quality governance are not replaced, but augmented by new sets of calculative practices, institutions and ideas. Thinking about infrastructures as multi-layered complexes allows us to explore how they construct possibilities for control, remain stable over time and transform the fields in which they are embedded. Rather than governance being enacted according to a singular goal or value, we see an infrastructure that is flexible enough to support multiple modalities of control, including selective intervention, quality-based competition and automatized budgeting. Infrastructural change, instead of revolving around crises in measurement, is shaped by incubation periods – times of relative calm when political actors, medical practitioners, mathematicians, and many others explore and reflect past experiences, rather than follow erratic reforms fads. Finally, analysing infrastructures as multi-layered constructs underlines how they produce multiple images of care quality, which not only shift existing power relations, but also change the ways we understand and make sense of public services.

This chapter reviews and integrates the empirical literature on the influence of organizational factors on hospital financial performance. Five categories of organizational characteristics that research has addressed are identified and examined as part of the review: ownership, governance, integration, management strategy, and quality. With some exceptions, our review reveals a general lack of consistency and conclusiveness across studies in each area. Exceptions were found in the areas of governance (e.g., physician participation and board processes) and integration (e.g., horizontal system centralization). Despite the lack of conclusive findings across studies, our review suggests substantial opportunities for future work, including opportunities for qualitative and exploratory work. Additional implications for theory and management are discussed.

This chapter discusses the experiences of black men who encounter the phenomena of a mental health diagnosis, detention and death in a forensic setting in England. Although there are black women with mental health issues who have also died in forensic settings, the occurrence is significantly higher for men who become demonised as ‘Big, Black, Bad and dangerous’. The author discusses the historical over representation of mental ill health amongst black people in the general community and the plethora or reasons attributed to this. The author then discusses the various points of entry into the criminal justice system, where black men with mental health issues are over represented. The author explores some inquiries into the deaths of black men in custody and the recommendations that were subsequently made, which successive governments have failed to act upon. The author argues that the term ‘Institutional Racism’ is insufficient to explain this phenomenon; and offers her own theoretical interpretation which is a combination of systemic racism influenced by post-colonial conceptualisation

Since the demise of Delivering Race Equality strategy in 2010 under the last Labour government and with the Coalition (2010–2015), and now the Conservative government at times have adopted a “color blind” approach to race and health. This raises the fundamental question why is race equality off the political agenda and how black mental health issues can be part of a future strategy. The 2015 Care Quality Commission (CQC) annual monitoring report of the Mental Health Act (MHA; which has also incorporated the learning since the inception of the Act in 1985) further highlighted the overrepresentation of African and Caribbean men and women who are sectioned in secure wards or on Community Treatment Order (CTO) in the psychiatric system over the last 30 years. The CQC have revised the code of practice which recognizes issues around race equality as part of wider perspectives and principles of human rights.

In October 2017, the government established an independent review of the 2007 MHA as a way of providing more safeguards for patients and service users. The review, under the leadership of Sir Simon Wessely which is reported in 2018, provided an opportunity for an informed public debate on the historical and contemporary roles of psychiatry and the experiences of mental health in Britain’s African and Caribbean communities. The review did examine community anxieties about the proportionally larger numbers of black ethnic minorities receiving inpatient care and CTOs, or in the criminal justice system. However, after 30 years of Black History Month in the UK, we still need to ask the question: Are those of African descent overrepresented in these systems? If so, is serious mental illness over diagnosed among these groups due to the persistence of stereotypes rooted in the experiences of slavery, or do they in fact experience distinctive patterns of mental health and illness, perhaps due to the wider fallout of historical enslavem

This paper aims to help auditors manage the risk of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) violations of the companies that they audit, particularly those with operations in Latin America.

First, the paper describes the relevant provisions of the FCPA. Second, it identifies the common schemes and transactions associated with heightened risk of FCPA liability in Latin America and provides recommendations to minimize this risk. Third, it discusses the responsibilities of auditors under U.S. securities laws and regulations with respect to the FCPA violations of their clients. Finally, it describes the sanctions that auditors could face if they fail to fulfill their responsibilities regarding these FCPA violations. The paper is based on data collected from various documents including laws, cases, accounting and auditing standards, litigation releases, press releases, deferred prosecution agreements, and enforcement actions.

Auditors have a responsibility under Section 10A(a) of the Exchange Act to design procedures that provide reasonable assurances of detecting the FCPA violations of their clients, which are illegal acts with direct and material effects on the financial statements. In addition, auditors have a responsibility under Section 10A(b) of the Exchange Act to report the violations of the FCPA that they detect during the audit to the appropriate level of management. If management does not take the necessary remedial steps, auditors must report FCPA violations to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. In order to reduce their FCPA-related liability and fulfill their responsibilities under U.S. securities laws and accounting standards, auditors should closely scrutinize transactions with a high risk of FCPA liability. An analysis of FCPA cases occurring in Latin America reveals six categories of transactions with heightened FCPA risk.

While there is much literature regarding a company’s compliance with the FCPA, there has not been much literature about the auditor’s responsibilities with respect to the FCPA violations of their clients. This paper attempts to start bridging this gap by providing guidance to auditors regarding their responsibilities to detect and report FCPA violations.