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The purpose of this paper is to provide investment advisers, broker dealers, individual investors and other securities firms with a current and detailed summary of the reporting regime under Sections 13 and 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and guidance on how to comply with the disclosure requirements of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, Form 13F, Form 13H and Forms 3, 4 and 5.

The approach of this paper discusses the transactions or beneficial ownership interests in securities that trigger a reporting requirement under Section 13 and/or Section 16 of the Exchange Act, identifies the person or persons that have the obligation to file reports with the SEC, details the information required to be disclosed in the publicly available reports, and explains certain trading restrictions imposed on reporting persons as well as the potential adverse consequences of filing late or failing to make the requisite disclosures to the SEC.

The SEC continues to provide updated guidance on the disclosure requirements under Sections 13 and 16 of the Exchange Act, which individual investors and securities firms – largely insiders – must take into account when filing any new or amended reports on Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, Form 13F, Form 13H and Forms 3, 4 and 5.

This article provides expert analysis and guidance from experienced securities lawyers.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 and its amendment – the Trade and Competitive Act of 1988 – are unique not only in the history of the accounting and auditing profession, but also in international law. The Acts raised awareness of the need for efficient and adequate internal control systems to prevent illegal acts such as the bribery of foreign officials, political parties and governments to secure or maintain contracts overseas. Its uniqueness is also due to the fact that the USA is the first country to pioneer such a legislation that impacted foreign trade, international law and codes of ethics. The research traces the history of the FCPA before and after its enactment, the role played by the various branches of the United States Government – Congress, Department of Justice, Securities Exchange commission (SEC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); the contributions made by professional associations such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICFA), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the American Bar Association (ABA); and, finally, the role played by various international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). A cultural, ethical and legalistic background will give a better understanding of the FCPA as wll as the rationale for its controversy.

To explain reporting requirements under Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) that must be followed by advisers and brokers who exercise investment discretion over accounts that hold exchange‐traded equity securities, and to describe reporting requirements under Section 16 of the Exchange Act on certain persons considered “insiders” of a company that has a class of equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act.

Describes the required reporting of significant acquisition and ownership positions on Schedules 13G and 13D, including the obligations of exempt investors, passive investors, and firms and their control persons; describes the required reporting of equity positions in managed portfolios of more than $100 million on Form 13F; and describes the reporting obligations of “insiders” (directors, officers, and principal stockholders) under Section 16 of the Exchange Act, including the content of Form 3 – Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities, Form 4 – Statement of Changes of Beneficial Ownership of Securities, and Form 5 – Annual Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities.

Firms and their control persons managing discretionary accounts that hold more than 5 percent of an SEC‐reporting company's equity securities or manage discretionary accounts with market values of $100 million or more; institutional investment managers who exercise investment discretion over accounts with a fair market value of at least $100 million, and corporate insiders have significant reporting obligations under the Exchange Act.

Provides a clear, detailed reference concerning Section 13 and Section 16 Reporting Requirements.

The purpose of this paper is to review the enforcement initiative announced by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in September 2014 directed at reporting violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) by public company officers, directors and significant stockholders. The paper considers the notable features of the first round of SEC enforcement actions pursuant to that initiative and proposes measures public companies and their insiders can adopt to enhance compliance with their reporting and related disclosure obligations under the Exchange Act.

The paper examines the SEC’s enforcement initiative against the backdrop of the agency’s enforcement activity since 1990 for violations by public company insiders of the reporting provisions of Sections 13 and 16 of the Exchange Act. The paper summarizes the features of the reporting violations that attracted SEC enforcement interest in the recent proceedings and identifies the factors apparently weighed by the SEC in determining the amount of the penalties sought against those charged with the violations.

The SEC’s latest enforcement actions are unprecedented for insider reporting violations. The new enforcement initiative represents an abandonment by the SEC of its largely passive approach of the past dozen years in which it charged insider reporting violations only when they related to fraud or other major violations of the securities laws. If reporting violations are flagrant, the SEC now promises to target the offenders for enforcement on a stand-alone basis without regard to other possible wrongdoing. The SEC also cautions that, as it did in some of the recent enforcement actions, it may charge companies that promise to assist their insiders in the preparation and filing of their reports, but do not to make the filings in a timely manner, with contributing to the filing failures.

The paper provides expert guidance from experienced securities lawyers.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

The purpose of this paper is to explain the implications of a June 11, 2008 decision by the US District Court for the Southern District of New York in CSX Corp. v. The Children's Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP concerning beneficial ownership and reporting obligations under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for long parties to cash‐settled total return equity swaps.

The paper summarizes the decision, discusses the court's analysis as written by Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, notes the court's limitation of its ruling to the facts of the case, explains why two funds that “compare notes” may be considered a group, discusses the permanent injunction against the defendants enjoining them from future violations of Section 13(d), and analyzes the implications of the judge's decision.

A new decision by the federal district court in New York creates uncertainty regarding whether the long party to a cash‐settled total return equity swap will be deemed to beneficially own the publicly traded reference security for purposes of Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Holders of cash‐settled total return swaps have historically relied on the absence of the legal right to vote or dispose of the reference security as a basis not to file a 13D with respect to the shares referenced in those swap contracts. The new decision casts doubt on that reasoning, and finds that an investor that consciously structured its swap contracts to try to end‐run its otherwise applicable reporting obligations was deemed to beneficially own the shares subject to the swaps, and accordingly had violated Section 13(d) by failing to file a Schedule 13D in the required time.

The ruling is important for financial institutions and investors who deal in derivatives such as equity swaps and who must determine whether and when reporting under Section 13(d) is required.

The paper is an analysis and provides guidance by experienced securities lawyers.

Throughout the history of commerce, individuals have searched for informational advantages that will lead to their enrichment. In a time of global capital markets, 24 hours a day trading opportunities, and a professional services corps of market experts, informational advantages are pursued by virtually every market participant. This paper examines one of the most vilified informational advantages in modern capital markets: insider trading. In the USA during the 1980s, insider trading scandals occupied the front pages of not only the trade papers, but also quotidian tabloids. Assailed for its unfairness and characterised by some as thievery, insider trading incidents increased calls for stricter regulation of the marketplace and its participants. In the aftermath of the spectacular insider trading litigation in the USA in the late 1980s, many foreign states began to re‐evaluate the effectiveness of their own regulatory structures. In large part, this reassessment was not the produce of domestic demand, but constituted a response to American agitation for increased regulation of insider trading.

The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual realities and the future, potential, best possible conditions of general stable equilibrium which both pure and practical reason, exhaustive in the Kantian sense, show as being within the realm of potential realities beyond any doubt. The first classical revolution in economic thinking, included in factor “P” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of a model of ideal conditions of stable equilibrium but neglected the full consideration of the existing, actual conditions. That is the main reason why, in the end, it failed. The second modern revolution, included in factor “A” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of the existing, actual conditions, usually in disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium (in case of stagnation) and neglected the sense of right direction expressed in factor “P” or the realization of general, stable equilibrium. That is the main reason why the modern revolution failed in the past and is failing in front of our eyes in the present. The equation of unified knowledge, perceived as a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern thinking has been applied rigorously and systematically in writing the enclosed American‐British economic, monetary, financial and social stabilization plans. In the final analysis, a new economic philosophy, based on a synthesis between classical and modern thinking, called here the new economics of unified knowledge, is applied to solve the malaise of the twentieth century which resulted from a confusion between thinking in terms of stable equilibrium on the one hand and disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium on the other.

A pooled income fund (PIF) is one of the methods created under the 1969 Tax Reform Act whereby a taxpayer may make a tax‐deductible remainder gift to a charitable organization. The fund, established by a charitable organization to receive irrevocable gifts from at least two donors, pays current income to the individual beneficiaries for life, but at the termination of each income interest, the allocable principal must revert permanently to the charitable organization. In recent years, a number of PIFs have been offered to the public by charitable organizations through broker‐dealers or related entities. There are numerous securities‐law issues implicated by the sales of these PIFs, including: (i) whether broker‐dealers may solicit donations to such funds and receive compensation for their solicitations; (ii) the effect of the broker‐dealers’ solicitation and receipt of compensation have on securities registration for the PIF or units offered therein under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or the Investment Company Act of 1940; (iii) whether staff and persons affiliated with the sponsoring charity, including parties assisting them in the marketing of such pooled income funds, also should be permitted to solicit donations; (iv) whether such charities or persons, or parties assisting them in the marketing of such pooled income funds, then should be required to register as broker‐dealers; (v) what securities licenses may be required of the aforementioned parties; and (vi) whether there are ways to design the manner in which third parties other than broker dealers are compensated to resolve any potential issues arising from answers to the previous questions. This article first sets forth the applicable law involved in the analysis and then attempts to answer each of the issues presented above.

In June of 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“the SEC”) voted to publish Proposed Regulation B (“Regulation B”), which will implement provisions of the Gramm‐Leach‐Blily Act of 1999 (“GLBA”) that identify activities which banks may engage in without registering as brokers or dealers under The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“The Exchange Act”); effectively governing the manner in which banks, savings associations and savings banks effect securities transactions. By enacting the GLBA, Congress repealed most of the remaining vestiges of the ownership restrictions that prevented banks, securities and insurance firms from combining, thereby allowing them to adopt the universal banking model through the creation of financial conglomerates known as “financial holding companies.” Proposed Regulation B (“Regulation B”) supercedes the SEC's final interim rules issued in May of 2001 with respect to banking and brokering activities. In general, banks and their regulators have found Regulation B to be far more acceptable than the final interim rules of 2001. On a practical level, Regulation B results in considerably more work for banks. This article will examine the existing law as it pertains to banks engaging in broker‐dealer activities and highlight the key provisions of Regulation B.