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To explain reporting requirements under Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) that must be followed by advisers and brokers who exercise investment discretion over accounts that hold exchange‐traded equity securities, and to describe reporting requirements under Section 16 of the Exchange Act on certain persons considered “insiders” of a company that has a class of equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act.

Describes the required reporting of significant acquisition and ownership positions on Schedules 13G and 13D, including the obligations of exempt investors, passive investors, and firms and their control persons; describes the required reporting of equity positions in managed portfolios of more than $100 million on Form 13F; and describes the reporting obligations of “insiders” (directors, officers, and principal stockholders) under Section 16 of the Exchange Act, including the content of Form 3 – Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities, Form 4 – Statement of Changes of Beneficial Ownership of Securities, and Form 5 – Annual Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities.

Firms and their control persons managing discretionary accounts that hold more than 5 percent of an SEC‐reporting company's equity securities or manage discretionary accounts with market values of $100 million or more; institutional investment managers who exercise investment discretion over accounts with a fair market value of at least $100 million, and corporate insiders have significant reporting obligations under the Exchange Act.

Provides a clear, detailed reference concerning Section 13 and Section 16 Reporting Requirements.

The purpose of this paper is to provide investment advisers, broker dealers, individual investors and other securities firms with a current and detailed summary of the reporting regime under Sections 13 and 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and guidance on how to comply with the disclosure requirements of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, Form 13F, Form 13H and Forms 3, 4 and 5.

The approach of this paper discusses the transactions or beneficial ownership interests in securities that trigger a reporting requirement under Section 13 and/or Section 16 of the Exchange Act, identifies the person or persons that have the obligation to file reports with the SEC, details the information required to be disclosed in the publicly available reports, and explains certain trading restrictions imposed on reporting persons as well as the potential adverse consequences of filing late or failing to make the requisite disclosures to the SEC.

The SEC continues to provide updated guidance on the disclosure requirements under Sections 13 and 16 of the Exchange Act, which individual investors and securities firms – largely insiders – must take into account when filing any new or amended reports on Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, Form 13F, Form 13H and Forms 3, 4 and 5.

This article provides expert analysis and guidance from experienced securities lawyers.

The purpose of this paper is to review the enforcement initiative announced by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in September 2014 directed at reporting violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) by public company officers, directors and significant stockholders. The paper considers the notable features of the first round of SEC enforcement actions pursuant to that initiative and proposes measures public companies and their insiders can adopt to enhance compliance with their reporting and related disclosure obligations under the Exchange Act.

The paper examines the SEC’s enforcement initiative against the backdrop of the agency’s enforcement activity since 1990 for violations by public company insiders of the reporting provisions of Sections 13 and 16 of the Exchange Act. The paper summarizes the features of the reporting violations that attracted SEC enforcement interest in the recent proceedings and identifies the factors apparently weighed by the SEC in determining the amount of the penalties sought against those charged with the violations.

The SEC’s latest enforcement actions are unprecedented for insider reporting violations. The new enforcement initiative represents an abandonment by the SEC of its largely passive approach of the past dozen years in which it charged insider reporting violations only when they related to fraud or other major violations of the securities laws. If reporting violations are flagrant, the SEC now promises to target the offenders for enforcement on a stand-alone basis without regard to other possible wrongdoing. The SEC also cautions that, as it did in some of the recent enforcement actions, it may charge companies that promise to assist their insiders in the preparation and filing of their reports, but do not to make the filings in a timely manner, with contributing to the filing failures.

The paper provides expert guidance from experienced securities lawyers.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

This paper aims to provide an analysis of securities class action filings in 2017 along with related trends over time and a comprehensive current view of the securities class action landscape.

The paper details 2017 securities class actions and related trends by measures including the number and size of filings; market capitalization losses; litigation likelihood for US versus non-US exchange-listed companies; status and outcomes of filings (settled, dismissed, continuing); core versus merger and acquisition filings; individual versus institutional investors as lead plaintiffs; and concentration of class action activity by industry sector, stock exchange and court circuit.

The number of federal securities class action lawsuits filed in 2017 reached a record high for the second straight year. The jump was spurred by a sharp increase in lawsuits targeting mergers and acquisitions. The 412 securities class action filings in 2017 represented a more than 50 per cent increase from the previous record of 271 filings in 2016.

This paper details analysis by legal and industry experts.

A financially distressed homeowner considers bankruptcy filing, either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, to delay foreclosure. On one hand, Chapter 13 filing takes longer processing time, spreads mortgage arrearages over the debt repayment period, and increases the possibility of loan modification. On the other hand, Chapter 7 filing discharges unsecured debt, which provides additional disposable income for mortgage payments. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The author uses fixed-effects (within variation), random-effects, and generalized estimation equation models with time dummies on the panel data of US counties.

The results show that mortgage delinquency increases Chapter 7 filings, while it has positive but statistically insignificant effect on Chapter 13 filings. In addition, a county’s mortgage debt to income and proportion of mortgage borrowers increase its Chapter 7 filings.

The contribution of the paper is to assess the effect of mortgage credit on the bankruptcy chapter choice using the county-level data.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

To provide an analysis of securities class action filings in 2015 along with related trends over time and a comprehensive current view of the securities class action landscape.

Details 2015 securities class actions and related trends in terms of the number and size of filings; market capitalization losses; the litigation exposure of IPOs; the classification of complaints; litigation likelihood for US exchange-listed companies; resolutions (settlements, dismissals or trial verdict outcomes); timing of dismissals and settlements; filing lags; filings against foreign issuers; number of mega filings; recent rulings related to class certification; and concentration of class action activity by industry sector, stock exchange and court circuit.

The number of filings in 2015 was the largest since 2008. The Disclosure Dollar Loss Index® (DDL Index®), the Maximum Dollar Loss Index® (MDL Index®) and the number of mega filings rose sharply in 2015 after declines in 2014. The Consumer Non-Cyclical sector had the most filings in 2015 while filings against companies in the Financial sector were below historical averages. Dismissal rates appear to be trending down. The median filing lag has never been shorter than in 2015. Filings against foreign issuers remain at high levels. Filings against S&P 500 companies remained below the historical average.

Detailed analysis by legal and industry experts.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the timing associated with the implementation of the health insurance-related provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) altered the presence and distribution of medical/non-medical debts accumulated by different types of bankruptcy filers.

Data were drawn from the US Bankruptcy Court’s Eastern Washington District over the years 2009, 2011 and 2014 using interval random sampling. Binary probit and Tobit analyses were used to model the existence, and distribution, of medical debts and total debts, respectively, at the time of filing. The impact of the time frame associated with the ACA was operationalized via a Chow test for structural dynamic change.

Chapter 13 filers in 2014 (post-ACA-based health exchange implementation) were more likely to report medical debts than Chapter 7 filers in the pre-intervention period, and were also more likely to report a larger proportion of outstanding debts owed to a single creditor. Filers claiming health insurance premium expenses in 2011 were (at the 10 percent significance level) more likely to report a more skewed distribution of medical debts.

The time frame associated with the implementation of the ACA impacts the distribution of medical debts among filers who have sufficient net disposable income to fund a Chapter 13 plan. The polarization of outstanding medical debts may indicate coverage gaps in existing health insurance policies, whose costs would be disproportionately borne by patients operating on thin financial margins.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of class action litigation on firms' cost of equity capital.

The paper uses three different models to estimate the cost of equity capital. To separate the impact of lawsuit filings on the cost of equity capital from that of the revelation event, a sample of lawsuits with a long lag between the disclosure events and filing dates was analyzed. Also, a comparison group study was conducted to illustrate the distinct impact of a lawsuit filing on the defendant firm's cost of equity capital. Finally, a multivariate analysis was used to examine the factors that affect the magnitude of such impact.

The paper finds that filing of a class action lawsuit results in a significant increase in the defendant firm's cost of equity capital incremental to the effect of the disclosure event. Additionally, increases in the cost of equity capital after the lawsuit filings are higher when the lawsuits involve generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP) violation and have high merit, and when the defendant firms are small and have high leverage.

Findings in this paper suggest that the filing of a lawsuit brings new information to the market and is likely to increase the defendant firm's cost of equity capital by increasing the perceived risk in corporate governance, information asymmetry and operation.

This paper reveals securities class actions increase the defendant firms' cost of equity capital.