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This paper aims to determine the essential “collective goods” which a foreign multinational enterprise (MNE) must have before production can start in a remote area of an emerging economy, and to consider the alternative governance modes available to procure or create these goods.

This purpose is examined conceptually and theoretically. First, the concept of “collective goods” is presented, followed by a consideration of the traditional “buy, ally or make” contractual approaches available to obtain goods and services. These approaches are repositioned in the context of an “emerging economy” so that alternative “ordering systems” as well as “non-contractual” means of obtaining things have to be considered in the context of internalization and reciprocity theories.

It is difficult to obtain collective goods in remote areas of emerging economies where private ordering prevails and even succeeds but at high transaction costs and with substantial government intervention. However, the use of non-contractual modes of exchange such as reciprocity is available to facilitate exchanges between market MNEs and nonmarket state offices and civil-society associations such as non-governmental organizations with which collaboration is necessary but which cannot be acquired or controlled by MNEs. However, market firms can use philanthropy and lobbying to obtain the help of these nonmarket actors who know how to operate under private and state-ordering systems.

Theoretical implications: Internalization theory explains why MNEs are able to obtain collective goods by providing them “in-house”, while reciprocity theory exemplifies how non-contractual modes of exchange can substitute for the traditional but contractual “buy, ally and/or make”.

Managerial implications: In terms of the organizational structure of the subsidiary of an MNE operating in an emerging economy, it appears that the line functions of procurement, engineering and production may rely more on contractual exchanges with foreign suppliers, while the staff functions of public affairs, government relations and human resources may be more adept at using reciprocal exchange with local suppliers.

The provisioning of the collective goods when a firm builds its facilities in a remote and underdeveloped part of an emerging economy has hardly received any research attention nor have the non-contractual ways – such as reciprocity – available in the context of private ordering to obtain these goods.

This paper aims to enhance the understanding of the role of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) policies for cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) by distinguishing between coercive and noncoercive OFDI policies.

The dependent variable is the count of completed M&A transactions, measured monthly. Due to the nature of the study’s data, the author performs a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression.

Separating between coercive and noncoercive policies, the author finds that the latter type shows a stronger supportive effect on the count of M&A deals. Considering firm ownership, the study’s results reveal that announcements of coercive policies have a weaker effect on cross-border M&A for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than that for private-owned enterprises (POEs). For local SOEs (LSOEs) and central SOEs (CSOEs), this difference becomes even larger with noncoercive policy announcements. The influence on M&A of both policy types gets partially replaced with increasing internationalization experience.

Combining institutional theory with policy change theory, the author argues that international business (IB) research on policy change needs to consider the integration of theoretical policy-level approaches to catch the effects of policy change on firm internationalization appropriately. The findings of the study support this argument by highlighting that the policy effect differs by policy type.