Search results

If financial services institutions (FSIs) do not comply with a variety of new regulations they can face criminal charges. Despite budget pressures they must therefore continue to invest in technologies in support of their compliance mandate. This paper describes the major regulations applying to FSIs and discusses IT spending to comply with those regulations.

This paper aims to help auditors manage the risk of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) violations of the companies that they audit, particularly those with operations in Latin America.

First, the paper describes the relevant provisions of the FCPA. Second, it identifies the common schemes and transactions associated with heightened risk of FCPA liability in Latin America and provides recommendations to minimize this risk. Third, it discusses the responsibilities of auditors under U.S. securities laws and regulations with respect to the FCPA violations of their clients. Finally, it describes the sanctions that auditors could face if they fail to fulfill their responsibilities regarding these FCPA violations. The paper is based on data collected from various documents including laws, cases, accounting and auditing standards, litigation releases, press releases, deferred prosecution agreements, and enforcement actions.

Auditors have a responsibility under Section 10A(a) of the Exchange Act to design procedures that provide reasonable assurances of detecting the FCPA violations of their clients, which are illegal acts with direct and material effects on the financial statements. In addition, auditors have a responsibility under Section 10A(b) of the Exchange Act to report the violations of the FCPA that they detect during the audit to the appropriate level of management. If management does not take the necessary remedial steps, auditors must report FCPA violations to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. In order to reduce their FCPA-related liability and fulfill their responsibilities under U.S. securities laws and accounting standards, auditors should closely scrutinize transactions with a high risk of FCPA liability. An analysis of FCPA cases occurring in Latin America reveals six categories of transactions with heightened FCPA risk.

While there is much literature regarding a company’s compliance with the FCPA, there has not been much literature about the auditor’s responsibilities with respect to the FCPA violations of their clients. This paper attempts to start bridging this gap by providing guidance to auditors regarding their responsibilities to detect and report FCPA violations.

Given the conflicting attitudes that people have toward those who report wrongdoing and a lack of empirical research specifically examining subsequent hiring, it is an open question as to whether accounting professionals would want to work with former whistleblowers. The authors examine this question using an experimental design, in which participants evaluate an employment candidate before and after the person discloses having been a whistleblower. Four manipulations of whistleblowing are used in both a within-subjects and a between-subjects manipulation. The authors’ results demonstrate that accounting professionals’ intentions to recommend a candidate for hire decrease after they are informed that a strong candidate has a whistleblowing past. A candidate is viewed most negatively, however, when discovering malfeasance and electing not to blow the whistle internally. Moreover, when the whistle is blown internally and the superior takes no action, the candidate who remained silent and chose not to continue to push the issue is viewed more negatively than the candidate who proceeded to blow the whistle externally. Although a candidate having a whistleblowing past appears to pose a cautionary signal in the interview process, participants reacted more harshly when the candidate failed to act or lacked the durable moral courage to see the matter through to completion.

A basic principle underlying the public securities markets in many countries is that the interests of investors need to be protected. Independence from their clients (i.e., client management) is supposed to make it more likely that auditors will protect investors’ interests. This paper examines the question whether acting in accordance with professional rules governing accounting and auditing is sufficient to provide such assurance. In addition to a set of rules, it is argued that investor protection requires that auditors possess, or act with, integrity. An analysis of the principle of acting with integrity, as contained in the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, shows that its formulation of the principle conflicts with the concept itself, and thus that the profession's commitment to integrity is questionable. Five recent and prominent cases are examined, which show that the required integrity may be lacking. The implications of a lack of integrity are discussed at the end.

With the large majority of colleges and schools of business integrating ethics into their curricula, business ethics educators must work to improve the quality of instruction and find methods that enhance student learning. Because many films now address business ethics issues, the content of these films may be used to enhance the teaching of business ethics to undergraduate and graduate business students. This chapter suggests films that may be presented in business ethics classes to illustrate the four ethical categories set forth by the accrediting body for schools of business, The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB International), in their 2004 report on ethics education in business schools: ethical decision-making, ethical leadership, responsibility of business in society, and corporate governance.

In 2011, Sherry Hunt was a vice president and chief underwriter at CitiMortgage headquarters in the United States. For years she had been witnessing fraud, as the company bought billions of dollars in mortgage loans from external lenders that did not meet Citi credit policy and sold them to government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). This resulted in Citi selling to GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pools of loans that were considerably defective and thus likely to default. Citi had also approved hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of defective mortgage files for U.S. Federal Housing Administration insurance. After reporting the mortgage defects in regular reports, notifying and working closely with her direct supervisor (who was subsequently asked to leave Citi after alerting the chairman of the board to these issues) to stop the purchase of defective loans, leaving anonymous tips on the FBI's and the Department of Housing and Urban Development's websites, and receiving threats from two of her superiors who demanded that she change the results of her quality control unit's reports, the shy and conflict-avoidant Hunt had to decide who she should tell about the fraud, and how.

The case gives students the opportunity to recommend how Hunt should proceed based on their analysis of the stakeholders involved. To aid instructors, the case includes Kellogg-produced videos of Hunt—the only on-camera interviews she has ever given—explaining what happened after she reported the fraud to Citi HR and, later, the U.S. Department of Justice. Within the case, students are also briefly exposed to legislation and bodies pertinent to whistle-blowing in the United States, including the Dodd-Frank Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the SEC Office of the Whistleblower.

This case won the 2014 competition for Outstanding Case on Anti-Corruption, supported by the Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME), an initiative of the UN Global Compact.

• Analyze stakeholders' motivations to prepare counter-arguments to the resistance one might encounter when reporting unethical behavior

• Write a script for who to tell, how, and why

• Discuss how incentive structures, management, and culture play roles in promoting or hindering ethical behavior in organizations

• Identify behaviors that help a whistle-blower be effective

• Gain experience resolving ethical dilemmas in which two values may conflict, such as professional duty and personal ethics

Analyze stakeholders' motivations to prepare counter-arguments to the resistance one might encounter when reporting unethical behavior

Write a script for who to tell, how, and why

Discuss how incentive structures, management, and culture play roles in promoting or hindering ethical behavior in organizations

Identify behaviors that help a whistle-blower be effective

Gain experience resolving ethical dilemmas in which two values may conflict, such as professional duty and personal ethics

Setting audit fees is a persistent source of stress for auditors who must, on one hand, comply with the increasing government regulations that generally cause costs to rise; and on the other hand, respond to client pressures to keep audit fees down. In the post-scandal environment of Enron, WorldCom, and the demise of Arthur Andersen, policy makers have introduced additional costs for auditors by increasing regulations and creating a new industry watchdog – the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). In this environment of constant pricing-cost tension for the auditor, the purpose of this paper is to examine audit fee trends over an extended period, 2000-2014.

The authors calculate the unexpected audit fees using the audit fee model. The authors examine audit fee trends while controlling for changes due to inflation, auditor wages, and other audit fee determinants.

The key findings indicate that audit fees increased in response to the promulgation of new audit regulations requiring additional audit work, the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 and Auditing Standard No. 2 in 2004. Additionally, the authors find that audit fees decreased after new regulations alleviating audit work, namely the passage of Auditing Standard No. 5 in 2007, and remained unchanged when new regulations had a minimal impact on audit work, namely the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.

The findings of this research are relevant to audit clients, auditors, and regulators as they weigh the cost and benefits of significant new audit regulations and their impacts on audit fees.

Using the more recent US data, the results in this paper show how events changed audit fee trends in recent years. The findings indicate that audit fees increased after the passage of new audit regulations such as the SOX Act of 2002, Auditing Standards No. 2 in 2004, and decreased after the passage of Auditing Standards No. 5 in 2007.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the compliance of US‐traded foreign firms with Sarbanes‐Oxley section 404 (SOX 404) by examining recent changes in their material internal control weakness (ICW) disclosures. This study also seeks to explore as a result of compliance, whether large firms can improve their internal controls than small and mid‐sized businesses (SMBs) can.

This study uses a logit regression model to test the data collected from Compustat and AuditAnalytics databases.

Both US firms and US‐traded foreign firms from developed countries experienced a significant descending trend of material ICW disclosures from 2004 to 2006. US SMBs, like large US companies, improved internal controls.

Prior studies asserted that the environment of corporate governance is more favourable for firms in developed countries. This study documents that US‐traded foreign firms from developed countries adjust to SOX 404 more quickly than do those from developing countries, resulting in fewer material ICW disclosures.

Although SOX 404 imposes vast costs on US‐traded foreign firms, investors can benefit from the improved internal control over financial reporting, as the Securities and Exchange Commission asserts. This paper contributes to the literature that US‐traded foreign firms from developed countries adjust to SOX 404 more quickly than those from developing countries. Although the significant fixed cost of implementing SOX 404 impacts SMBs disproportionately, US SMBs, like larger firms, still show an improvement in their internal control systems over time.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between audit committee expertise and financial reporting quality. Since the Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002, there has been growing interest in the research concerning audit committee expertise, especially as the Security Exchange Commission requires firms to identify their audit committee financial experts.

Based on two theories, the resource dependence theory and agency theory, the study examines the association of audit committee experts with financial reporting quality, proxied by earnings management. Samples involved 2008 financial data of 300 firms that were ranked by highest market capitalisation. In total, four types of expertise are developed based on academic qualification, professional qualification and work experience.

Presence of non‐accounting experts and accounting experts is significant to reduce the magnitude of earnings management. Other than that, leverage and firms size are also found to be significant.

The findings show RDT is prevalent in accounting or auditing domain, where there is evidence showing directors bridge firms with external resources such as expertise and experience. Subsequently, contribute to the mainstream accounting literature that the resource dependence theory is also vital in explaining situations where directors' expertise and knowledge are involved.

Reforms set forth in Sarbanes‐Oxley and the NYSE, AMEX, and NASD are designed to prevent the reoccurrence of corporate collapses at companies such as Enron Corp., WorldCom Inc., and Global Crossing Ltd. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the possible impact the reforms may or may not have had in controlling the abuses uncovered in recent corporate failures.

This paper examines the reforms to corporate governance and the rationale behind the reforms, and examines how the actual governance structures of Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing during the years of their accounting scandals compared to the new requirements. It also offers a discussion as to whether the new reforms would have been helpful in preventing management's manipulation of earnings.

Global Crossing's governance structure would have satisfied a majority of the reforms. Enron's and WorldCom's governance structures would have satisfied less than half of the reforms.

This paper highlights the need for management and shareholders alike to focus on the substance of the reforms and not merely the form of the reforms in order to make meaningful improvements to corporate governance.

This paper should serve as a warning to the investing public. The reforms in and of themselves should not be relied on to prevent future corporate scandals. The reforms, however, do focus the spotlight directly on corporate boardrooms where shareholders can now insist that directors' interests be separate from those of the CEO and upper management.