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The purpose of this paper is to engage in a systematic examination of previous scholarship on the relationship between Sharia governance (SG), which is represented by the Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB), and the Internal Sharia Review (ISR), to determine whether the ISR can minimize financing risk in Islamic banking.

The literature search consisted of two steps: a randomized and systematic literature review. The methodology adopted in this article is a systematic literature review.

To reduce the risk of financing in Islamic banking, SG must be implemented optimally by making rules regarding the role of the SSB in supervising customer financing. In addition, it is a necessary to establish an entity that assists the SSB in the implementation of SG, namely, the ISR section, but there is still very little research on the role of the SSB and ISR in minimizing financing risk.

Establishing an ISR to assist the SSB in carrying out its duties has direct practical implications for Islamic banking: minimizing financing risks and compliance with Islamic Sharia principles. In addition, new rules regarding the role of SSBs and the ISR in reducing credit risk include monitoring customers to ensure that they fulfill their financing commitments on time. This new form of regulation and review can be used as a reference by the Otoritas Jasa Keuangan or Finance Service Authority to create new policies or regulations regarding SG, especially in Indonesia.

Subsequent research may introduce other more relevant variables, such as empirically testing the competence, independence or integrity of SSB and the ISR team as it attempts to minimize the risk of financing in Islamic banks. In addition, further research is expected to examine whether the SSB or the ISR team has a positive or negative influence on the risk of financing Islamic banks with secondary data.

This study aims to investigate the effect of the diversity of the board of directors (BOD) and the shariah supervisory board (SSB) on credit risk, insolvency, operations, reputation, rate of deposit return risk (RDRR) and equity-based financing risk (EBFR) of Islamic banks (IB).

The study uses 68 IBs from 19 countries covering 2009 to 2019. BOD and SSB diversity attributes data were hand-collected from the annual reports. Financial data were collected from the bankscope database. The robustness test and two-step system generalized method of moment estimation technique were used to address potential endogeneity issues.

This study provides evidence that diversity in the experience and cross-membership of board members decreases the risk. Gender diversity increases the risk, but the BOD’s education level diversity has no relationship with risk. More interestingly, influences in the experience and cross-membership of the SSB’s members positively influence risk. However, members’ education levels and gender diversity have not been proven to affect risk.

The paper recommends that Islamic banking authorities play a stronger role and make a greater effort in driving corporate governance reform. Also, determining individual characteristics of the board is a requirement to become a member of a BOD or an SSB.

This paper expands the commitment literature through the diversity of the BOD’s and the SSB’s members in terms of their education levels, experience, cross-membership and gender. This study expands the list of potential risks for IBs, by including the RDRR and EBFR.

This study aims to examine how digitalization affects the work efficiency of the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) in Islamic banks.

This study uses panel data analysis of annual report disclosures over the past 10 years. The authors have selected 79 Islamic banks for the period ranging from 2012 to 2021. The criteria for SSB efficiency used in this research are disclosure of Zakat and disclosure in the SSB report.

The econometric results show that digitalization has a positive effect on improving the work efficiency of the SSB in Islamic banks. Accordingly, the authors provide evidence that the higher the bank's digital engagement, the higher the quality of the SSB.

The findings highlight the need to improve the current understanding of SSB structures and governance mechanisms that can better assist Islamic banks in engaging in effective compliance with recent governance and accounting reforms. Moreover, Islamic banks are the most capable and appropriate to implement and activate digitalization because they are based on a vital root calling for development if there are executives believing in it, as well as legislation supporting and serving them.

The unique characteristic of Islamic bank leads in governance and disclosure. Using stakeholder, signaling, and market discipline theory, governance and adequate disclosure may increase bank soundness. This study aims to investigate the relationship of sharia disclosure and Sharia Supervisory Board in influencing Islamic bank soundness in the different regulatory framework of the country. Using purposive sampling, the research covered 84 Islamic banks in 16 countries during the period 2013–2015 with lag data of Islamic bank soundness. The result shows sharia disclosure influences on Islamic bank soundness for management efficiency, capital adequacy ratio, asset quality, and liquidity. The results also show that sharia disclosure mediates the indirect effect of SSB on Islamic bank soundness. The regulatory framework (sharia accounting standard and SSB regulation) shows moderating effect of regulation framework proved on the association of sharia disclosure with management efficiency, capital, and liquidity. The effect is indirectly depending on the regulatory framework for proxy management efficiency, capital, and liquidity. The implication of the research suggests that sharia disclosure could increase the market discipline mechanism of Islamic bank stream. The Islamic bank can increase the transparency using sharia disclosure as a branding for increasing public trust, even though in the deficient Islamic bank regulation countries.

The study aims to critically review the Shariah governance framework for Islamic banking prevailing in Pakistan and provide a comparison with Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).

It analyzes 16 circulars issued by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) since 2002, including three Shariah governance frameworks in 2014, 2015 and 2018. Additionally, the study compares the SBP and AAOIFI Shariah governance standards to evaluate the soundness of the SBP framework against international benchmarks.

Pakistan’s Shariah governance model is centralized, with the SBP’s Shariah board having ultimate authority. The SBP has provided a comprehensive Shariah framework, which includes among others, the criteria for the qualifications and conflict of interests of Shariah members. Both AAOIFI and SBP Shariah governance frameworks have similarities and differences in terms of the tenure of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) members, reporting line of SSB, number of SSB meetings, minimum experience of SSB members, primary duties of Shariah board, code of ethics and conduct for SSB and management and requirement of publication of SSB report in the annual report of Islamic banks. The frameworks differ in terms of the delegation of SSB powers, assessment and appraisal of SSB effectiveness and outsourcing of Shariah Compliance Department and Internal Shariah Audit Unit.

The study recommends expanding the qualification criteria for Shariah advisors to include additional degrees and qualifications, upholding stringent criteria for conflict of interests and promoting stakeholder consultation through exposure drafts.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first of its kind which critically review and compare the Shariah governance framework prevailing in Pakistan.

This research investigates the effect of imposing a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) on the likelihood of purchasing SSBs. We design and test an experimental framework that examines this and the effects of providing an explanation about the presence of an SSB tax and information about the negative health effects of consuming SSBs. Consistent with Elbel, Taksler, Mijanovich, Abrams, and Dixon (2013) and Taylor, Kaplan, Villas-Boas, and Jung (2019), we find that imposing a tax, in addition to increasing the conspicuousness of the tax by explaining the presence of a tax (and in some cases, the negative health effects) reduces the likelihood of purchasing an SSB anywhere from 8.39% to 18.15%. We contribute to the public health and tax policy literature by testing consumer choice in a controlled experimental setting and considering the effect of individual differences on the choice to purchase SSBs. Imposing a tax on SSBs may be an effective tool for decreasing SSB consumption that is made more effective when the tax is conspicuous.

The purpose of this paper is to systematically review the study of the relationship between sharia governance (SG), which is represented by the Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB), and internal sharia compliance, and whether it can affect the performance of Islamic banking.

Literature search consists of two steps: random literature review and systematic literature review. The methodology adopted in this article is a systematic literature review.

The variable of internal sharia compliance, sharia risk and internal sharia audit on one of the indications of SG newly researched variable which will later be used as a new paradigm, to measure the implementation of Islamic sharia principles in sharia banking.

The development of a conceptual framework by using measurement of the new SG has practical implications for sharia bank, which can later be applied to also increase sharia banking performance by complying with Islamic sharia principles. This new concept can be used as a reference by the Financial Service Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan) to establish regulations regarding SG framework, especially in Indonesia.

Further research can add more of it or replace it with other variables that are more relevant, in such a way that it could be empirically tested on how the independence and remuneration (lit. performance allowance) of SSB and the internal sharia control team can affect the performance of sharia banks.

This study aims to examine how sharia supervisory board (SSB) characteristics are determinants of the maqashid sharia performance (MSP) of Islamic banks (IBs) and how MSP has implications for profitability and for profit-sharing investment account holders (PSIAHs).

MSP is ascertained by semi-structured interviews. The SSB characteristics measured are size, cross-membership, education level, expertise, reputation, rotation and remuneration. Annual reports of Indonesian and Malaysian IBs from 2010 to 2018 are analysed using panel data regression.

In Indonesia, SSB education level attenuates MSP, while other characteristics have only minor influence. However, in Malaysia, SSB size, education and reputation reinforce MSP, while others are ineffective. MSP in both countries is pseudo-Islamic; so their customers ignore religiosity. However, MSP in Malaysia can improve profitability because sharia assurance is more transparent; meanwhile, MSP in Indonesia cannot improve profitability because sharia assurance is less transparent.

In order for MSP to improve in Indonesia, the regulators need to increase SSB size, reduce cross-membership and arrange the format for sharia assurance in SSB reports, while IBs need to increase SSB education and expertise.

MSP is constructed in accordance with legal and social requirements to achieve IBs’ Islamic, economic, social and ethical objectives. Resource dependence theory is used to evaluate SSB, while PSIAH and profitability are investigated to demonstrate the impact of MSP. Finally, comparing SSB capabilities in Indonesia and Malaysia could be beneficial to regulatory and IB policies.

Given the relative importance of the Shari’ah supervisory boards (SSBs) in Islamic banks’ (IBs’) performance, this study aims to examine the impact of SSB diversity on IBs’ performance from the stakeholders’ perspective in the context of Pakistan.

Random-effects model and generalized method of moment are used to investigate the impact of SSB diversity on IBs’ performance across a panel data of 22 Islamic banks in Pakistan from 2005 to 2020 inclusive.

The findings of this study show that SSB size, SSB relevant educational background diversity, bank’s size and bank’s stability have a positive impact on IBs’ performance. In contrast, SSB age, nationality and cross-membership diversities have a negative impact on IBs’ performance. Moreover, SSB gender, tenure and general educational diversities have no significant impact on IBs’ performance.

SSB diversity and IBs practices are different across different jurisdictions. This study is conducted on IBs in Pakistan because of data constraints; thus, the results of this study may not be generalizable to other countries' IBs.

In structuring the SSBs’ framework, the regulatory authorities and policymakers should consider mandating an ideal SSB size and hiring relevant qualified members with low cross-membership to improve IBs' performance. Thus, the structure potentially attracts Muslim stakeholders, enhances their satisfaction and improves IBs' performance.

Having diversified members in the SSB, IBs equally benefit both individual and group stakeholders in society. Diversity in SSB members enhances IBs' performance and the social welfare of various stakeholders in society.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first empirical research that examines comprehensively the impact of SSB structural and demographic diversities on IBs' performance in the context of Pakistan. This paper contributes to the unique Shari’ah governance structure in the context of Pakistan. Additionally, this study may serve to assist IBs’ stakeholders in better comprehending the SSB practices of IBs in Pakistan.

This paper aims to explore the asymmetric effect of liquidity risk (LR) and Shariah board size on bank financial stability for a panel of Islamic banks (IBs) based in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Southeast Asian countries over the 2006–2019 period.

This paper uses the asymmetric nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) error correction model insofar as it allows assessing not only whether IBs with large boards outperform their peers with reduced boardrooms but also unveiling the potential asymmetries between LR and stability.

The findings show that while increasing the number of the Shariah board members does not impact the financial stability of IBs in both the short and long runs its decrease appears to enhance their stability in the long run. The findings also show that a hike, as well as a fall in LR, significantly influences the stability in the long run, which underlines the role that LR plays in bank financial stability.

A prominent line of future research may consist in extending the country sample to cover more representative full-fledged IBs based on different regions, which allows the breakdown of the sample into GCC-based and non-GCC-based IBs. Doing so is interesting in terms of governance implications. Another extension would consist in considering additional sources of risk to stability.

IBs should enhance their expertise, which helps them diversify their funding strategy and cater for liquidity solutions. They also must establish a better Shariah governance framework to contain their risk-taking behavior that ultimately contributes to achieving financial stability.

This paper contributes to the empirical literature in Islamic banking by performing a model that simultaneously accounts for both short- and long-run asymmetries in the relationship between the financial stability of full-fledged IBs, the LR and the size of the Shariah supervisory board.