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The fundamental change in accounting rules for equity-based compensation (EBC) instituted by SFAS 123, SFAS 123r, and IFRS 2 has allowed for new insights related to a variety of research questions. This paper discusses the empirical evidence generated in the wake of the new regulation and categorizes it into two broad streams. The first stream encompasses research on the changed use of EBC and the incentives provided. The second stream addresses how firms account for EBC, including the underreporting phenomenon and how it was affected by the mandatory recognition of EBC expenses. I discuss where research delivers unanimous findings versus contradictory results. Using these insights, I make recommendations for further research opportunities in the area of EBC.

This paper aims to study a preemption proposition for the compliance costs associated with stock option expensing under SFAS 123(R) by examining whether early adopters used their discretion over option pricing model inputs to mitigate the adoption effect.

The paper uses a matched sample approach of firms that voluntarily adopted stock option expensing during the 2002-2004 period and similar firms that waited until the mandatory expensing. The paper empirically examines some determinants of voluntary adoption, and the changes in option pricing model inputs during the period leading to mandatory expensing.

The paper reports evidence that voluntary adopters of stock option expensing during the 2002-2004 period have used the period leading to mandatory expensing to preempt its compliance cost effect. The authors exercised their discretion by decreasing estimates for stock price volatility and time-to-maturity to preempt or minimize the reduction in earnings before mandatory adoption date.

Results of this paper are useful to accounting regulators in understanding the reaction of financial statement preparers to deliberations, effective dates and voluntary early adoption terms of the accounting standards setting process.

Until 2005, corporations could choose whether to expense incentive options or to disclose the value in the financial footnotes. During 2004, however, the Financial Accounting Standards Board adopted the revised Statement No. 123, which requires public corporations to measure the cost of stock options on grant‐date and expense that cost over the vesting period of the grant. This study investigates the impact of SFAS 123(R) on the type of executive incentive pay‐option versus restricted stock.

Comprehensive compensation data was collected from Standard & Poors ExecuComp data base for the period 2002‐2006 for two industries identified by SIC codes 73 (business services) and 35 (electronics). The study tracks the percentage of pay in the form of incentive stock options or restrictive stock grants before and after SFAS No. 123(R) was adopted in 2004. A series of multivariate regression models test whether the restricted stock percentage of total compensation can be partially explained by the adoption of SFAS 123(R).

The results show that the average fair value of stock awards is higher and the average fair value of option awards is lower after 2004. In addition, after 2004, stock compensation as a percentage of total pay is positively related to stock price volatility. The data also suggest that those companies substituting restricted stock for options actually increase total incentive pay.

The study's findings may suggest that those companies substituting restricted stock for options increase total executive pay. This would be a side effect from the adoption of SFAS 123(R), in that most companies use the Black‐Scholes model to value executive options. Given the long life of these options and the high volatility in certain industries the option value is quite high. Therefore, the amount of substituted restricted stock is also inflated.

The adoption of SFAS 123(R) was highly contested by executives in industries with high stock price volatility. The authors document that, in the case of two industries, executive incentive pay structure was affected.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the motivations for and variations in terms of stock option modifications under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 123(R). Stock options are used to motivate and retain employees. Unfortunately, when stock prices decline, existing options lose their incentive value. In response, firms look for ways to re-incentivize their employees. Their choices include issuing additional options and/or modifying existing grants.

We investigate the economic determinants of stock option modification post SFAS 123(R), such as financial reporting cost, shareholder/political cost and employee incentive and retention. Our analysis is based on 67 sample firms that modify their stock option plans from 2005 to 2008 and 67 control firms constructed based on size, industry, year and stock price performance for the prior five years.

The results show that loss firms are more likely to modify their options, which supports the argument that financial reporting costs influence the decision to modify. We find support for the shareholder/political costs hypothesis, as the overhang ratio is positively associated with the decision to modify. However, we find no evidence that modifications substitute for additional option grants. We find that politically sensitive larger firms are more likely to incorporate more shareholder friendly measures such as excluding executives from modification or providing shareholders the opportunity to vote on modification.

This is the first paper examining the economic determinants of stock option modification under SFAS 123(R). Our findings provide some insights regarding economic determinants of SFAS 123(R) for accounting policy-makers and investors.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between firms’ decisions to expense employee stock options (ESOs) under the voluntary period of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 123 (SFAS 123) and their market-to-book (MTB-1) ratio and conditional conservatism. Conservatism is chosen because, even though expensing of ESOs is a conservative accounting treatment, it is not obvious how the decision would be related to the MTB-1 ratio and conditional conservatism, particularly because the MTB-1 is a long-run measure of conservatism and the decision to voluntarily expense is examined over two years. The setting provides a unique opportunity to assess how two major proxies of conservatism are related.

Using firms listed in the S&P 1500 index, firms that expensed ESOs are compared to firms that disclosed only in the financial statements. The main comparison uses a logistic regression.

During the period when expensing ESOs was voluntary, SFAS 123, the MTB-1 ratio was negatively associated with ESO expense recognition, but conditional conservatism was positively associated with ESO expense recognition. The former is attributed to incentives of conservatism and the latter to the tenet of conservatism tending to reduce income.

The findings add to the literature/controversy on the negative relationship between the MTB-1 ratio and conditional conservatism. More important, they support using more than one measure of conservatism in studies that involve accounting conservatism. A limitation is that the findings are specific to voluntary ESO expense recognition.

This is the first study to examine how conservatism affects the choice to recognize an item on the financial statements or disclosure only. In addition, the study shows that firms were willing to incur real costs from their financial reporting.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the policy consequences of expensing stock‐based compensation in Taiwan.

Data were collected on listed firms from 2006 to 2008 and a goodness‐of‐fit of accounting earnings valuation model was used to investigate the incremental information content of expensing stock‐based compensation. In addition, two sensitivity indexes were used to investigate the sensitivity between compensation and firm performance before and after income statement recognition of stock‐based compensation.

It was found that the association between earnings and abnormal returns is stronger after expensing compensation. In addition, the relationship between compensation variables, especially stock compensation, and firm performance is stronger after 2008, indicating that expensing compensation reinforces the relationship between compensation and performance.

The findings suggest that disclosure and recognition are not substitutes. The findings also have implications for standard setters and for investors attempting to mitigate managers' self‐interested behavior.

The accounting treatment of employee stock‐based compensation is a controversial issue among academics, regulators, managers, auditors, and investors. This paper investigates the incremental information content of the new accounting standard and explores whether the relationship between compensation and firm performance has become more transparent than before.

This paper investigates the debate as to whether employee share options (ESOs) should be expensed in an entity’s financial statements as required by the IASB’s IFRS 2 – Share‐based payment (2004). The paper presents arguments for and against expensing ESOs, demonstrating that compensation of employees via ESOs is a bona fide expense in terms of the recognition and measurement criteria of the IASB Framework. It concludes that, the substance of an ESO transaction is that the entity pays an employee for his services, albeit with a different financial instrument. Consequently, the accounting treatment of such compensation should be the same as for any other payment of services of an employee.

This article investigates the most appropriate accounting treatment for expensing the fair value of employee share options (ESOs) in financial statements. The debate centres around whether the grant date or the exercise date is the most appropriate date for determining the value at which the ESOs are eventually accrued within the financial statements. After examining accounting models for each of the above measurement dates, the article concludes that exercise date accounting best reflects the economic substance of the ESO transaction. Therefore, the IASB should consider revising its definition of equity to encompass only existing shareholders, leaving all other financial obligations to be classified as liabilities.

This paper looks at the research to date on the future of broadly granted stock options (options granted to at least half the full-time employees of a company). In the U.S., granting options broadly became popular in the late 1990s, but has lost some of its appeal in the wake of stock market declines, accounting changes, and increased shareholder concerns about dilution. The data indicate a significant minority of companies will change their plans, but a substantial majority will keep them. The data also indicate changes in accounting rules will not affect stock prices and that broadly granted options are better for corporate performance than narrowly granted options.

This study aims to examine the incremental valuation implication of excess realized tax benefit under Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 123R: share‐based payment (123R excess tax benefit), which is required to be reported as a component of financing cash flows by the publicly traded corporations.

The sample comprises of Standard and Poor's (S&P); large‐, mid‐ and small‐cap firms who adopted SFAS No. 123(R) on January 1, 2006. The study covers a time period of the first and second quarters of 2006.

The multivariate regression analyses indicate that the capital market evaluates the SFAS 123R excess tax benefit in presence of accruals, and operating, investing and other financing cash‐flow components at different rates in pricing equity securities.

The primary results, however, are mostly restricted to large‐ and mid‐cap S&P firms. No incremental valuation consequence of SFAS 123R excess tax benefits for small‐cap S&P firms is observed.

The findings suggest that the 123R excess tax benefit reported as a financing cash‐flow component is incrementally informative in equity valuation but the timing and extent of its market valuation is impacted by firm size, its visibility and information environment, and the magnitude of the excess realized tax benefit in dollar terms.