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Brazil and Chile have nearly similar recent political histories. Emerging from protracted military dictatorships at roughly the same time, both developed presidential and representative democratic processes, though with contrasting individual national emphases. Military dictatorships in both countries originated in anti-corruption rationales, among others, and both have emphasized anti-corruption practices since regime changes. Brazil impeached two presidents, ostensibly for corrupt practices. Yet, Chile has managed a corruption level, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, that is among the lowest in Latin America, while Brazil’s is among the highest. This study compares and contrasts the two nations’ experiences with a view to uncover key causal, or at least explanatory, variables in this striking contrast in levels of perceived corruption.

This chapter discusses the Operation Lava Jato (or Operation Car Wash) which is an ongoing investigation in Brazil, since 2014, by the Federal Police and the Federal Public Ministry. This Operation triggered systemic and endemic corruption among companies, self-described as socially responsible, the State, and Brazilian Government. The analysis is based on empirical data available on the internet and in the Brazilian press about “Operation Car Wash” (Operation Lava Jato) and its socio-legal implications. We conclude that when a society has a historical and cultural tradition permeated by close private and patrimonial relations between government and companies, this fact negatively impacts the economic performance and the adoption of ethical behavior and social responsibility. This case study examines the recent police investigation into corruption involving companies and governments in a Latin American country. It provides empirical and historical data on the nature of the capitalism of ties model developed in Brazil that impacts on economic performance and the strategic proposal of corporate social responsibility.

This paper narrates the efforts made in Italy after the end of the Second World War to develop an economic and social model in between corporate capitalism and planned economy, on the one hand, and shareholder versus stakeholder capitalism on the other. The result was the institutional infrastructure that supported the Istituto per la Ricostruzione industriale (IRI), a state-owned public holding in charge of managing the funds of the so-called Marshall Plan. The history of IRI illustrates the importance of a pragmatic approach to dealing with institutional constraints and opportunities when faced with the need to reconstruct destroyed economies in a context of very fragmented societies such as those of post-war Italy. The result was the resistance to an acritical adoption of the corporate American model and the definition of a more balanced form of capitalism. In an era of new recovery plans, there is a lot we can learn from IRI’s history.

In Weberian scholarship, conventional wisdom views the corruption of the modern rational-legal bureaucratic state by local patrimonialisms as an endemic feature in non-Western postcolonial state formation. The resultant neopatrimonial state is often blamed for the social, political, and economic ills plaguing these societies. This essay challenges conventional wisdom and argues that neopatrimonialism is a process of hybrid state formation that has its origins in the cultural politics of colonial state building. This is achieved by drawing on a comparative study of British Malaya and the American Philippines, which offers contrastive trajectories of colonialism and state formation in Southeast Asia.

Because of the precariousness of state power due to local resistance and class conflicts, colonial state building involved the deepening of patron–client relations for political control and of rational-legal bureaucracy for social development. In the process, local political relations were marked and displaced as traditional patrimonialisms distinguished from the new modern center. Through native elite collaborators and paternal-populist discourses, new patron–client relations were institutionalized to connect the colonial state to the native periphery. However, colonial officials with different political beliefs and ethnographic world views in the center competed over native policy and generated cyclical crises between patron-clientelist excess and bureaucratic entrepreneurship.

Instead of the prevailing view that postcolonial states are condemned to their colonial design, and that authoritarian rule favors economic development, my study shows that non-Western state formation is non-linear and follows a cyclical pattern between predation and developmentalism, the excesses of which could be moderated.