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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of narcissistic supply for the association between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking.

The authors investigate a sample of 281 non-financial S&P 1500 firms and a corresponding 457 CEOs in the 10-yr period 2006–2015.

The association between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking depends on the admiration, attention, and affirmation of own superiority (“narcissistic supply”) that the CEO receives given her/his current position. Thus, a narcissistic CEO with an insufficient narcissistic supply (small firm/small compensation) will crave for more and take more risks (“rock the boat”) while a narcissistic CEO with a sufficient narcissistic supply (large firm/large compensation) will protect the status quo and be reluctant to take new risks. Specifically, the authors find that a change from a slightly narcissistic CEO to a strongly narcissistic CEO, for positions entailing limited (abundant) narcissistic supply, is associated with an increase (a decrease) in corporate risk of 6%–8% (11%–27%).

Previous research indicates a positive association between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking in specific domains such as M&A and R&D activities. This paper provides a novel contribution to the existing literature by identifying and assessing the important role of narcissistic supply for the association between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking in general.

The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of industry specialization on the absorption and competitive pricing (or lack thereof) of audits of large Andersen clients (S&P 1500 companies) who switched to the remaining Big 4 international accounting firms in 2002 due to the demise of Arthur Andersen LLP (Andersen). Did the audit clients pay a premium or discount in audit fees to their new auditor who specialized in their industry?

Ordinary least squares regression is used to test hypothesis of a positive association between industry specialization and audit fees charged to former Andersen's audit clients in 2002 following Andersen's demise. This study provides more control over size effects by design. Test variables are constructed based on national market share of audit fees within an industry. Logistic regression is used to examine the likelihood of choosing new auditor that is an industry specialist.

Results support hypothesis, consistent with auditor differentiation explanation. Proportion of clients that had engaged an industry specialist in 2001 increased from 38 percent (84 clients) to 48 percent (105 clients) in 2002. No evidence of price‐gouging in 2002 although clients who aligned with industry specialist paid a 23.2 percent premium in audit fees. Large clients lost bargaining power to negotiate lower fees. Findings are robust to the inclusion of additional alternative measures of company size.

Results of logistic regression analysis imply that large audit clients with former auditor of tarnished reputation, long auditor tenure and high leverage are more likely to switch to an industry specialist to possibly signal audit/financial reporting quality. Large sample companies may limit the ability to generalize findings to smaller companies.

Mandatory audit firm rotation (currently being debated in the profession) will have costly effect on the pricing of Big 4 audits for companies wanting to signal audit and financial reporting quality to affect market perception, and large companies would likely lose their ability to bargain for lower audit fees.

The paper focus on the alignment of Andersen clients and impact on audit fees with Big 4 industry specialists resulting from the sudden increase in audit market concentration. Prior to Andersen's collapse, evidence on the association of audit fees premium and industry specialists was mixed, and little attention has been given to the influence of auditor industry specialization on both audit fees and alignment of former Andersen clients with a Big 4 specialist. This paper fills that void.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation is affected by the compensation of the outside directors sitting on their board, who are also CEOs of other firms.

The authors collect CEOs’ and CEO-directors’ compensation data from Execucomp. The authors then match the CEO-directors’ compensation with appointing firms’ CEO compensation and financial statements, from Execucomp and Compustat, respectively. The sample contains 7,561 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2010, with 1,213 distinct S&P 1500 firms and 1,563 distinct CEO-directors. The authors use ordinary least squared method with firm and year fixed effect in most of the analysis.

With both annual and excess compensation, the authors find strong evidence that CEO-directors’ compensation is related to the compensation of the CEO. Causally, when CEO-director overturns his/her excess compensation from negative to positive, the CEO is more likely to have similar upward change in the following year, while more interestingly, the opposite does not hold. These findings are persistent over time and remain robust to various additional tests.

Due to the data availability, this paper investigates the S&P 1500 public firms.

It is the first work that investigates the link between board members’ external compensation and the CEO’s compensation. This sheds new light on the process of the CEO’s compensation design, in regard to both the information being utilized in the design procedure and the CEO’s influence on his/her own compensation. Second, this paper adds additional evidence to the choice of peer groups in compensation construction. Third, the authors enhance the understanding of the role of CEO-directors. The authors show that CEO-directors may be the ally of CEO, and help in justifying CEO’s compensation, especially when underpaid.

The previous literature finds evidence from birth dates of CEOs that the relative-age effect continually influences their career success. The authors look at a significantly larger collection of CEOs and more exact information on school cut-off dates to reexamine the relative-age effect.

The relative-age effect suggests that older individuals within a cohort are more successful. This study investigates if the relative-age effect exists for CEOs in the S&P 1500 by analyzing the distribution of their relative age. The authors utilize an identification strategy that allows to calculate a CEO's relative age in months and enables to resolve known identification problems.

The authors find no support for the existence of the relative-age effect for CEOs either by season of birth or relative age in months. On the whole, the distribution of CEO birth dates is similar to the US population. Additionally, the authors find no evidence of a relative-age effect on firm performance.

Contrary to previous findings, there appears to be no relative-age cohort effect for CEOs of major corporations.

Research shows that CEO characteristics shape firm strategy that in turn affects firm performance. Despite previous work that suggests a relative-age effect, the authors provide a more comprehensive data set and better measurement of relative-age within a cohort. The authors find that the relative-age effect does not continue throughout a CEO's career, and therefore, birth dates are not a characteristic that influences firm strategy and performance.

The authors examine the spillover effects of CEO removal on the corporate financial policies of competing firms among S&P 1500 firms.

The authors used generalized estimating equations (GEE) on a sample of S&P 1,500 firms from 2000 to 2018 to test this study's research hypotheses. Return on assets (ROA), investment policy, and payout policy are used as proxies for corporate policies.

The authors found an increase in ROA and dividend payout in the immediate aftermath. Further, this study's hypothesis does not hold for R&D expenditure and net-working capital as the authors found an insignificant change in them in the immediate aftermath. However, the authors found a significant reduction in capital expenditure, supporting this study's hypothesis in the context of investment policy. Institutional investors and product similarity moderated the spillover effect on corporate policies (ROA, dividend payout, and capital expenditure).

The authors address a novel aspect of CEO performance-induced removal due to poor performance, i.e., the response of other CEOs to CEO performance-induced removal. This study's findings add to the literature supporting the bright side of CEOs' response to CEO performance-induced removal in peer firms due to poor performance.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an extension of the behavioral agency model (BAM) by focusing on the moderating role of CEO gender on the relationship between CEO stock options and risk “systematic vs idiosyncratic” and the performance consequences “positive vs negative” of these option incentives.

Data on CEO’s stock option portfolios are collected from the Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) ExecuComp. This paper uses a panel data analysis for matched samples of CEOs in S&P’s 1,500 listed firms over the period 2006-2013.

The results indicate a more conservative, risk-averse posture in the case of female CEOs than for male CEOs when they are compensated with stock options for idiosyncratic (firm-specific) risk. The results also confirm that female CEOs in low systematic risk contexts, although more conservative, take more prudent risks that produce better long-term outcomes as compared to their male counterparts.

Important implications for the design of optimal CEO’s compensation packages emanate from this study. Findings provide useful tools for board of directors to design CEO’s pay packages that take into account the different risk behavior of male and female CEOs with the aim of enhancing firm performance.

This paper provides new evidence within the area of stock option-based compensation by focusing on the distinction between systematic and idiosyncratic risk when the effect of CEO stock option is analyzed and performance implications of awarding options to male and female CEOs.

El objetivo de este trabajo es proporcionar una extensión del modelo comportamental de agencia o Behavioral Agency Model (BAM) centrada en el papel moderador del género del CEO en la relación entre la retribución basada en opciones o stock options y los niveles de riesgo –sistemático e idiosincrático– y en las consecuencias –positivas o negativas– sobre el resultado de la empresa.

Los datos sobre stock options de CEOs se recopilan de la base de datos Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp. Este estudio utiliza un análisis de datos de panel para muestras emparejadas de empresas incluidas en S&P 1500 durante el período 2006-2013.

Los resultados indican una postura más conservadora de las mujeres CEO en términos de niveles de riesgo idiosincrático en comparación con la llevada a cabo por los CEOs hombres cuando se les retribuye con stock options. Los resultados también confirman que las mujeres CEO en contextos de riesgo sistemático bajo, aunque más conservadoras, asumen riesgos “de mayor calidad” que producen mejores resultados a largo plazo en comparación con sus homólogos masculinos.

Importantes implicaciones para el diseño de paquetes de retribución óptimos para el CEO emanan de este estudio. Los resultados mostrados proporcionan herramientas útiles para el Consejo de Administración a la hora de diseñar paquetes de retribución para CEOs. Se deben tener en cuenta los diferentes comportamientos relacionados con la asunción de riesgos de CEOs hombres y mujeres con el objetivo de mejorar el resultado de la empresa.

Esta investigación proporciona nueva evidencia dentro del área de la retribución basada en stock options al centrarse tanto en la distinción de riesgos (sistemático e idiosincrático) como en las implicaciones sobre el resultado de la empresa de las stock options dadas como parte de su retribución a hombres y mujeres que ocupan la posición de CEO.

Palabras clave Modelo comportamental de agencia, Opciones sobre acciones, Género, Riesgo sistemático, Riesgo idiosincrático, Resultado

Artículo de investigación

O objetivo deste artigo é fornecer uma extensão da perspectiva do Modelo de Agência Comportamental (BAM) focada nas opções de ações examinando as influências e consequências do desempenho do CEO, considerando a distinção entre risco sistemático e idiossincrático sobre o efeito das opções de ações. em comportamento de risco.

Os dados sobre portfólios de opções de ações do CEO são coletados do Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp. Este documento utiliza uma análise de dados em painel para amostras correspondentes de empresas listadas no S&P 1500 no período 2006-2013.

Os resultados indicam uma postura mais conservadora, avessa ao risco, no caso de CEOs do sexo feminino do que para CEOs do sexo masculino, quando eles são compensados com opções de ações para o risco idiossincrático (específico da empresa). Os resultados também confirmam que as CEOs do sexo feminino em contextos de baixo risco sistemático, embora mais conservadoras, assumem riscos mais prudentes que produzem melhores resultados a longo prazo, em comparação com os seus homólogos masculinos.

Implicações importantes para o projeto de pacotes de remuneração de CEOs ideais emanam deste estudo. Os resultados fornecem ferramentas úteis para o conselho de diretores, a fim de projetar pacotes de remuneração do CEO que levem em conta o comportamento de risco diferente dos CEOs do sexo feminino e masculino, com o objetivo de melhorar o desempenho da empresa.

Este documento fornece novas evidências dentro da área de remuneração baseada em opções de ações, concentrando-se tanto no tipo de risco como determinante do seu efeito de risco quanto nas implicações de desempenho da concessão de opções a CEOs do sexo feminino e masculino.

Palavras-chave Modelo de agência comportamental, Opções de ações, Gênero, risco sistemático, Risco idiossincrático, Atuação

Artigo de pesquisa

What is the role of analysts in reducing agency problems and information asymmetry between stockholders and managers? The purpose of this paper is to confirm the analyst’s role by examining his or her influence on CEO compensation structure.

The major population for this study consists of publicly traded corporations of the S & P 1500 for which data on CEO compensation is available from Standard & Poor’s Execucomp database, along with the proxy statements of these firms. Regression analysis is used to test hypotheses about the effect of analyst coverage on CEO compensation.

The evidence shows that CEOs of firms with greater analyst coverage or higher analyst coverage quality (analyst coverage index) have higher pay-for-performance (Delta), more compensation incentives to increase firm risk (Vega), more total compensation, and more excess compensation. Even after controlling for the effect of other types of corporate governance, including internal governance and institutional holdings, analysts’ activities still have an incremental effect on CEO compensation structure.

The authors findings may be useful to investors who use analyst coverage to evaluate the firm’s CEO compensation, as it suggests that investors may reference the information about analyst coverage of firms to craft appropriate CEO compensation structures.

The authors results contribute by showing that the extra effect of analyst activities on CEO compensation structure exists, even after controlling for other types of governance mechanisms, such as internal governance and institutional investors’ holdings.

This study aims to examine whether CEO duality affects the association between board gender composition, dividend policy and cost of debt (COD).

The S&P 1500 firms’ data for this study were collected from the Bloomberg professional service terminal for the period 2010-2015.

The results show that board gender composition positively impacts both a firm’s propensity to pay dividends and the level of payouts. However, this positive association is only present in firms with CEO duality. The authors find no significant association between board gender composition and COD, but when the authors split the sample into firms with and without CEO duality, the authors find a negative association in firms without CEO duality.

The empirical results highlight important issues for policymakers, managers and investors. The study provides positive feedback on corporate governance rejuvenation efforts that seek to engender and advocate the appointments of female directors to corporate boards. Market participants, such as financial analysts and lenders, could recognize the empirical specifics related to the influence of board gender composition on firms’ dividend policy and COD in the context of CEO duality.

This study fills an important gap in the literature on the relationship between board gender composition and its relation with dividend policy and COD.

Although investigating the factors influencing technological diversification is essential to understanding research and development (R&D) strategies, studies from the perspective of corporate ownership structure are limited. This study examines the effect of heterogeneous institutional investors on technological diversification strategies.

The sample consists of 33,124 firm-year observations of USA manufacturing firms from 1981 to 2008. Data were extracted from US Patent Data, Thomson Reuters' 13f and the Compustat database. A panel regression analysis was used to test the hypothesis. Moreover, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach using instrumental variables (IVs) and generalized method of moments (GMM) were also applied to address the endogeneity issue.

The empirical findings indicate that short-term (long-term) institutional investors positively (negatively) affect technological diversification. That is, short-term institutional ownership hampers R&D diversification, suggesting that firms are forced to make myopic investments to meet short-term goals instead of diversifying corporate R&D projects. Meanwhile, long-term institutional ownership enhances technological diversification to achieve long-term value.

By differentiating between institutional investment horizons, the authors produce empirical evidence that institutional investors with short-term and long-term perspectives have different views on technological diversification. This study is based on data between 1981 and 2008, due primarily to patent data availability and data on institutional investors. However, this limitation does not diminish the importance of the empirical findings, as the study's focus is on discovering antecedent evidence of corporate technological diversification rather than addressing recent trends in firm decisions.

In finding that long-term institutional investors are likely to encourage technological diversification at firms, the paper carries an important practical implication that can help inform decision-making by policymakers and investors.

This research contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of institutional investors' role in technological diversification strategies. Additionally, by challenging the assumption that all institutional owners share the same perspective, this study is the first to confirm the existence of heterogeneous effects of institutional investors on technological diversification strategies.

The motivation behind Section 953(b) of Dodd–Frank Act was the increasing pay inequality and supposed CEOs' rent extraction. It required public companies to disclose CEO-to-employee pay ratios. Using the ratios reported by S&P 1500 firms in 2017–18, this paper examines whether companies led by women and minority CEOs have lower ratios than those led by white male CEOs.

This paper uses multivariate regression along with a matched sample analysis to examine whether female and minority CEOs have higher CEO-to-employee pay ratios compared to male and white CEOs, controlling for other determinants of pay ratios.

Results indicate that CEO-to-employee pay ratios are 22–28% higher for female CEOs compared to their male counterparts, controlling for other determinants of pay ratios. There is, however, no statistically significant difference between the pay ratios of minority vs white male CEOs. Minority female CEOs have lower CEO-to-employee pay ratios than white female CEOs. Consistent with literature, larger and more profitable firms have higher CEO-to-employee pay ratios.

While prior studies on determinants of CEO-to-employee pay ratios have used either industry-level or self-reported data for a small subset of firms (resulting in selection bias), this paper uses firm-level data that are available for all S&P 1500 firms due to new disclosure requirements due to the Dodd–Frank Act Section 953(b). Moreover, this is the first paper to test whether gender or ethnicity of a CEO affects within-firm pay inequality.