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This paper introduces the readers to Neo-Transitional Economics – a volume which aspires to reinvigorate scholarly interest in transition economics research. The classical transition storyline is briefly revisited, and new directions for empirical and policy-relevant research that target post-transition economies in the post-crisis paradigm are highlighted.
I contribute to the ongoing policy discourse on the challenges of monetary policy transmission in environments with consolidated financial sectors and high credit rates. I…
I contribute to the ongoing policy discourse on the challenges of monetary policy transmission in environments with consolidated financial sectors and high credit rates. I empirically investigate the lending rate pass-through in Azerbaijan – a small resource-rich economy in transition – by taking advantage of a unique set of high-frequency bank-level data. My bottom-line policy message is the following. First, lending rates are considerably irresponsive to monetary policy shocks, and the interest rate channel ought to be somehow improved. Second, macroeconomic fundamentals and the concentrated bank sector are surprisingly not among the reasons behind the policy-market disconnect. Third, domestic commercial banks are able to exert substantial monopolistic pricing capacities and keep credit rates high, particularly when the central bank loosens its policy stance. Fourth, the underlying cause of both monetary policy inefficacy and high interest rate stickiness appears to be structural excess liquidity. In fact, empirical results show that pass-through is substantially higher for less liquid banks. Extraction of excess liquidity from the system should mitigate the banks’ monopolistic pricing powers, improve the efficiency of the interest rate channel, and ultimately bring the credit rates down.
This is an exploratory paper of personal reflections on economic system issues, based on half a century of wide-ranging professional experiences, summarized in the section “Professional Background.”
The following broad generalizations are elaborated: (1) For a country’s sustained good economic performance, there is no alternative to a predominantly market-driven economy, supported by appropriate institutions. (2) In societies at all levels of development, it is essential to have mutually supporting cooperation between the private sector and the state (section “An Economic System with Universal Features?”). (3) The quarter-century transformation progress of the 29 former centrally planned economies of the USSR and Eastern Europe has been most uneven, as documented in the section “Relationship between Economic and Political System Transformation.” (4) Regarding China, it is NOT the country’s authoritarian political system but the skillful transformation of its economy into a market-driven one that has been principally responsible for the country’s impressive, long-term economic performance (section “China’s Economic Growth and Development Model”). The paper concludes by suggesting that the most fundamental determinants of a country’s long-term economic success are some combination of its geography, institutions, culture, and momentous historical events.
Vietnam started significant transition policy since 1986 with the introduction of extensive policy of Doi Moi process. The transition from a centrally planned economy…
Vietnam started significant transition policy since 1986 with the introduction of extensive policy of Doi Moi process. The transition from a centrally planned economy toward market-oriented economy has brought some significant results; however Vietnam has until recently stood out as a success story among the transitional economies from a developmental perspective. This requires further investigation of other factors relating to the viability assumption of neoclassical economics. This paper aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm value in Vietnam, a small and open neo-transitional economy. The result suggests a positive relationship of board size and the value of a firm, but it is not significant. The result also shows a lack of significant negative relationship of other two independent corporate governance variables (shareholder concentration and CEO duality) and the value of a firm. However, to some extent, too high shareholder concentration and CEO duality tend to have negative impacts to the firm value. Other control variables such as price-to-book value ratio and return on total assets have significant and positive impacts on the value of a firm, while the market capitalization has a negative relationship with the value of a firm.